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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
DON HALVERSON, 





NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY 
DISTRICT, BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
FOR THE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY 
DISTRICT; ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICHARD 
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their official 
capacities and in their individual capacities; DAN 
PAYNE, in his official capacity and in his 
individual capacity, 
Defendants / Respondents. 
Appealed from the District Court of the Second 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in 
and for the County of Latah 




RONALD J. LANDECK 
TORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS 
Filed this -- day of - . , 2009 
STEPHEN W. KENYON, CLERK 
BY 
Deputy 
SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 36825-2009 
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Defendants seek summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs' claims in this action because the 
material facts of this case are not in dispute and all claims can be decided based on undisputed 
facts as a matter of law. Despite the nature and extent of Plaintiffs' assertions, claims and 
arguments, it is critical that a proper perspective be placed on this case. Plaintiffs' claims are 
Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment -- 1 l i l r j  
premised almost exclusively on two (2) events, the first being the District's widening of Camps 
Canyon Road in 2005 and 2006 by "less than a foot or two when gravel was spread over the 
entire portion of the traveled roadway.. . ." and the second being the District's issuance of a 
public right-of-way approach permit on or about March, 2006, to Plaintiffs' neighbors which was 
revoked in June, 2006. See Facts below, par. 6 and 13-18. This conduct is not of the heinous 
variety as the misguided legal attack of Plaintiffs' Complaint would have this Court believe. 
This Brief will show that the District has, at all times relevant to this action, properly discharged 
its statutory responsibilities to improve and maintain the public highway known as Camps 
Canyon Road. 
Also, importantly, Plaintiffs did not file a notice of claims under Idaho Code section 6- 
901 et seq. arising out of the District's alleged "negligent or otherwise wrongful acts or 
omissions and those of its employees.. . ." until November, 2007, which was well beyond the 180 
day limitation period from the date many of Plaintiffs' claims arose. 
Regarding to the organization of this Brief, identification of Plaintiffs' claims is made 
difficult because Plaintiffs' Complaint is intermittently conclusory, speculative, argumentative, 
generalized, repetitive and disorganized and relies fundamentally on factual assertions that are 
not admissible in evidence, primarily for reasons of lack of foundation and hearsay. The same 
descriptors apply to the factual record produced by Plaintiffs in support of their numerous, 
unsuccess~l pretrial motions. Defendants anticipate that similar, unfounded assertions will be 
forthcoming in response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. These observations are 
made to emphasize that particular attention will be required in the consideration of this Motion to 
distinguish between material and immaterial evidence and between admissible and inadmissible 
evidence. 
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In this Brief and supporting affidavits, Defendants will identify and specify the relevant, 




3 facts and prove that summary judgment is appropriate in favor of Defendants and against 
1 
B 
Plaintiffs on all Plaintiffs' claims in this action. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Rule 56(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant to move for 
summary judgment against any or all of Plaintiffs' claims. The standard for determining the 
appropriateness of summary judgment, applied to a case in which the admissibility of evidence 
was an important consideration, as is the circumstance in this matter in regard to Plaintiffs' 
speculative, unfounded and hearsay assertions, is held by the Idaho Supreme Court to be as 
follows. 
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor 
of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from 
the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Thompson v. Idaho 
Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527,529,887 P.2d 1034, 1036 (1994). "I.R.C.P. 
56(e) provides that the adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations in the 
pleadings, but must set forth by affidavit specific facts showing there is a genuine 
issue for trial." Carrzell v. Barker ilfgmt., Inc., 137 Idaho 322, 327,48 P.3d 651, 
656 (2002) (citations omitted). "Affidavits supporting or opposing the motion 
for summary judgment 'shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to 
the matters stated therein."' Id. "The admissibility of the evidence contained in 
affidavits and depositions in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment is a threshold question to be answered before applying the liberal 
construction and reasonable inferences rule to determine whether the evidence is 
sufficient to create a genuine issue for trial." Id. "Summary judgment is 
appropriate where the nonmoving party bearing the burden of proof fails to make 
a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that 
party's case." Id. 
Upon moving for summary judgment, the moving party must show the absence 
of a genuine issue of material fact. Qzrirzlan v. Idaho Cornrn 'n for Pardons and 
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Parole, 138 Idaho 726,729,69 P.3d 146,149 (2003). The burden then shifts to 
the nonmoving party to show that a genuine issue of material facts does exist. Id. 
The nonmoving party must come forward and produce evidence to set forth 
specific facts showing a genuine issue of material fact. Id. The nonmoving party 
must present more than speculation or a mere scintilla of evidence to create a 
genuine issue. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 1 19 Idaho 5 14, 5 17, 808 
P.2d 85 1, 854 (1 99 1). Failure to do so will result in an order granting summary 
judgment. Quinlan, 13 8 Idaho at 729,69 P.3d at 149. 
Sprinkler Irrigation Company, h c .  v. John Deere Insurance Company, Inc., 139 Idaho 691,695- 
Further guidance for the trial court in regard to evidentiary decisions in summary 
proceedings is given in relation to the appellate review standard. Evidentiary 
rulings shall be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Perry v. Magic 
Valley Reg'l. Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 50,995 P.2d 8 16 (2000). Upon review to 
determine whether a trial court abused its discretion, this Court inquires: (1) 
whether it correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) whether it acted 
within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal 
standards; and (3) whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
Swallow v. Emergency Med. ofIdaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 592,67 P.3d 68, 71 
(2003) (citing State v. Merwin, 13 1 Idaho 642,962 P.2d 1026 (1998); Sun Valley 
Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87,94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 
(1 991)). 
Id. at 693, P3d at 762. 
ADMISSIBLE MATERIAL FACTS RELEVANT TO PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ("Facts") 
Plaintiffs' claims in this action arise almost exclusively &om two (2) occurrences, the 
first being improvements made by Defendant North Latah County Highway District (the 
"District") in 2005 and 2006 to an area of Camps Canyon Road, located principally betureen 
property owned by Plaintiffs ("Plaintiffs7 real property") and Robert Wagner and Kate Wagner, 
husband and wife ("Wagners' real property"), approximately 700 feet in length, and the second 
being the District foreman Dan Payne's (i) issuance and revocation and (ii) reissuance of a 
driveway approach permit to Robert Wagner in 2006 to access Wagner's real property. 
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The admissible material facts relevant to Plaintiffs' claims are as follows: 
1) Camps Canyon Road was established as a public highway through public use prior to 
1930, has retained its status to the present as a public highway under jurisdiction of the 
District and is shown a public highway on the official map of the District's highway 
system pursuant to Idaho Code Section 40-202(1). Affidavit of Orland Arneberg filed 
herein on November 4,2008 ("Arneberg Affidavit"), par. 5 and 7. Affidavit of Dan 
Carscallen filed herein on November 4,2008 ("Carscallen Affidavit"), par. 3 and 4. I 
have been employed by Defendant North Latah County Highway District ("District") 
since 1974 and District foreman since 1994. Since 1974, my duties for District 
foreman have included maintaining and improving projects on Camps Canyon Road 
with the primary difference being that, as foreman, I oversee and supervise the 
District's work instead of doing it. At least since 1974, the District has maintained 
Camps Canyon Road as needed by grading and/or adding gravel. Affidavit of Dan 
Payne filed herein on November 4, 2008 ("Payne Affidavit"), par. 2 and 4. 
2) Although improved over the years, Camps Canyon Road follows the same approximate 
centerline now that it has since the early 1930's. Arneberg Affidavit, par. 8; Payne 
Affidavit, par. 8. Larry Hodge, licensed Idaho surveyor, opines that based upon a 
comparison of aerial maps that the location and course of Camps Canyon Road has not 
been changed between 1940 and 2004. Affidavit of Larry Hodge filed herein on 
January 30,2009 ("Hodge Affidavit"), par. 5. John Dunn LPS, who surveyed for 
Plaintiffs the Wagner real property, more particularly described in Instrument No. 
501 677, records of Latah County, Idaho, which is contiguous to real property owned by 
Plaintiffs more particularly described in Instrument No. 42441 I, records of Latah 
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County, Idaho, at the centerline of Camps Canyon Road, commented in his May, 2007 
survey notes that: 
Camps Canyon Road (County road) is shown with a 50 foot wide 
prescriptive R/W. The physical location of the road is on a sidehill and 
appears to be stable with little, if any, change occurring over time. 
See Hodge Affidavit, par. 4(g). 
3) Absent special circumstances, which are not applicable in this case, such as when the 
District has been deeded a public right-of-way less than fifty feet wide or when an 
improvement predated the establishment of the public road, the District's public road 
maintenance and improvement activities are undertaken based upon Idaho law that 
states a public highway shall be not less than fifty (50) feet wide. In my opinion, this 
minimum width is reasonably necessary to properly maintain a public highway in rural 
Latah County that is safe and reasonably convenient for the public. Payne Affidavit, 
par. 10. 
4) Absent special circumstances, which are not present in this case, if the District 
undertakes improvenlents on a public road established by prescription, such as Camps 
Canyon Road, those improvements will be made within the District's prescriptive 
minimum fifty foot (50') wide right-of-way without permission of adjoining 
landowners because such permission is not necessary as all of the District's work is 
undertaken within its legal rights. However, the District's foremen will routinely make 
an effort to inform adjoining landowners of planned improvement projects, particularly 
major ones, as a courtesy and convenience. In 1996, the District followed this practice 
when it undertook ilnprovements to Camps Canyon Road without seeking or obtaining 
the permission fi-orn the landowner, Ed Swanson. At no time did Mr. Swanson 
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improvements. Mr. Swanson was aware of those improvements and had no objection 
to them. Second Affidavit of Dan Payne filed herein on January 30,2009 ("Payne 
Second Affidavit"), par. 4; Arneberg Affidavit, par 10; Defendants' Second Record 
Supplement, Items 2 and 3. 
5) In 1996, to improve road safety for increased public, vehicular traffic, the District 
widened the traveled surface of Camps Canyon Road on the north side (the side then 
owned by Ed Swanson, Plaintiffs' predecessor in interest to Plaintiffs' real property) by 
approximately 4 feet to its approximate present width by hauling in fill dirt from a 
ditch cleaning project nearby and grading that dirt and adding some gravel onto the 
road surface, and the District installed a culvert and covered the exposed bedrock in the 
road with fill dirt. Payne Affidavit, par. 5. 
6) In 2005 and 2006, to improve road safety for increased public vehicular traffic, the 
District widened the traveled surface of Camps Canyon Road on its southerly side (the 
side opposite Halvorsons' real property) by drilling and blasting bedrock, adding gravel 
to level the road surface, sloping and seeding the banks on that side, extending the 
culvert under the road by approximately four feet (4') and improving the ditch on that 
southerly side of the road. Payne Affidavit, par. 6. Camps Canyon Road was widened 
less than a foot or two in 2005 and 2006 on the Plaintiffs' side of the road when gravel 
was spread over the entire portion of the traveled roadway following the improvements 
to Wagners' side. Payne Second Affidavit, par. 4. 
7) After the District's improvements in 2006, the traveled surface of Camps Canyon Road 
does not exceed approximately 23 $4 feet in width in the general vicinity of Plaintiffs' 
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real property at issue in this litigation and averages approximately 2 1 feet in width in 
that same stretch. Payne Affidavit, par. 7. 
8) In addition to using and maintaining the traveled surface of Camps Canyon Road and 
in order to properly grade and drain the road for safe public travel, the District must 
maintain the cut slope, which is the southerly side of Camps Canyon Road in the 
vicinity of Plaintiffs' property and the ditch and culvert on that southerly side beneath 
the cut slope, and the District must utilize the fill slope, which is the northerly side of 
Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of Plaintiffs' real property, for structural support 
for the traveled surface of the road and for snow removal and storage in winter months. 
Payne Affidavit, par. 9. 
9) A minimum 50 foot width is reasonably necessary to properly maintain a public 
highway in rural Latah County that is safe and reasonably convenient for the public. 
Payne Affidavit, par. 10. 
10) The entire stretch of Camps Canyon Road used by the District for public highway 
purposes in the vicinity of Plaintiffs' real property, including cut slope to fill slope lies 
within a 50 foot wide right-of-way. 
I I) Sometime after 1996, Plaintiffs constructed a fence on the steep hillside on the full 
(northerly) slope adjacent to the traveled surface of Camps Canyon Road and, in 
places, within fifteen feet (1 5') of the centerline of Camps Canyon Road. While the 
fence does not interfere with the public traffic on the traveled surface of Camps 
Canyon Road, the District's maintenance activities, primarily grading and snow 
removal, are affected by the fence's placement. That is, given the steepness of the 
slope on Plaintiffs' property, it is virtually impossible to properly maintain Camps 
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Canyon Road without some gravel or snow reaching Plaintiffs' fence. Plaintiffs have 
failed to relnove or reconstruct the fence outside of the District's right-of-way and, in 
fact, Plaintiffs have now used their placement of the fence to support their claim that 
the District has damaged and trespassed upon their property. To the contrary, the 
District has been diligent in its efforts to avoid causing any damage to Plaintiffs' 
misplaced fence or their property. Payne Affidavit, par. 12. 
12) Since 2005 and 2006, the only significant activities that have been undertaken by the 
District on Camps Canyon Road in the area of Plaintiffs' real property and Wagners' 
real property are graveling, road grading and snow plowing. These activities are 
essential to proper maintenance of all public roads. These activities and vehicular use 
contribute to the movement of gravel particularly toward the sides of a road. In the 
grading process, most gravel is brought back toward the road center, but inevitably 
some gravel moves outward, which serves to stabilize and support the road but does 
result in minimal, necessary widening of the road over time. Payne Second Affidavit, 
par. 5. 
13) On or about March, 2006, Robert Wagner, who was in the process of building a 
residence, applied to the District using the District's standard form to obtain a permit 
for an approach onto Camps Canyon Road from the Wagners' real property. Dan 
Payne met with Mr. Wagner who showed me a post next to the road which he said 
represented his southern property line. North of that post was an old driveway that 
used to lead to a home and outbuildings on Mr. Wagner's property. At least 50 feet 
further north of that driveway, Mr. Wagner had begun construction of a driveway 
which he wanted to be the location of his approach permit. Dan Payne asked why he 
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didn't want to use the old driveway onto his property, and he replied that his neighbor, 
Plaintiff Don Halvorson thought it would encroach on his property. Mr. Wagner said 
something to the effect the location he had selected was well north of the old driveway, 
would "be safe" and not cause any problems with his neighbor. Dan Payne approved 
his approach permit application for that location. Payne Second Affidavit, par. 6. 
14) On or about April, 2006, Mr. Wagner told Dan Payne that Don Halvorson had 
complained that the driveway approach was on the Halvorsons' real property. Mr. 
Wagner then handed Dan Payne a copy of the legal description fiom the deed to his 
property, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. Dan Payne 
met Mr. Wagner at Camps Canyon Road and used a measuring wheel fi-om that legal 
description's point of beginning in Camps Canyon Road, which Dan Payne lined up 
with Plaintiffs' fence, and measured "699 feet, more or less, along the County Road." 
That distance was a great distance past the post Mr. Wagner had set for his 
southeasterly comer and was south of the old driveway and approximately one hundred 
feet south of the approach for which the permit had been issued. Payne Second 
Affidavit, par. 7. 
15) On April 12,2006, Dan Payne attended a meeting of the District commissioners where 
Don Halvorson and Mr. Wagner were present and spoke about the driveway issue. 
Dan Payne stated that he had measured the distance along the County Road and that, in 
his opinion, the permitted approach was approximately 100 feet north of Mr. Wagner's 
southern property boundary. Mr. Halvorson confirmed that the point of beginning Dan 
Payne used that was based on his fence location was accurate. Dan Payne asked Mr. 
Hah7orson why he thought the approach was on his property and, if so, what had 
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happened to the 699 feet of road frontage shown on Mr. Wagner's deed. Mr. 
Halvorson mentioned something about a "switchback" and that the road had been 
moved, which Dan Payne knew to be false. Payne Second Affidavit, par. 8. 
16) On or about June, 2006, Mr. Wagner told Dan Payne that Mr. Halvorson had produced 
a survey and that he wanted Mr. Wagner to move his driveway. Mr. Wagner filled out 
a new application and showed Dan Payne the location, which was at least one hundred 
feet north of the first, permitted approach. Dan Payne approved this second application 
on June 9,2006, a true and correct copy of which is attached to the Payne Second 
Affidavit as Exhibit B. Dan Payne revoked the first permit and threw it away as it was 
no longer valid. Payne Second Affidavit, par. 9. 
17) Mr. Wagner proceeded over the next weekend to construct the new driveway and he 
had the rock used in construction of the first driveway pulled onto his property and had 
the cut that was made for the first driveway filled in with soil. Payne Second Affidavit, 
par. 10. 
18) District has delegated to its foreman the responsibility to review and issue approach 
permits. Payne Second Affidavit, par. 12; Second Affidavit of Dan Carscallen filed 
herein on February 2,2009 ("Carscallen Second Affidavit"), par. 7. 
19) Plaintiffs have not filed a petition with the District to initiate a validation proceeding 
under Idaho Code section 40-203 A. Carscallen Second Affidavit, par. 8. 
20) Plaintiffs filed a Tort Claim Notice with the District on November 6,2007. This is the 
only tort claim notice filed by Plaintiffs with the District. Carscallen Second Affidavit, 
par. 3. 
2 1) Key public records related to this action are the following: 
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1 b. Instrument No. 42441 1, records of Latah County, Idaho ("Plaintiffs' Deed" to 
"Plaintiffs' real property"). 
c. Instrument No. 5742 1, records of Latah County, Idaho ("1 9 1 1 Deed"). 
d. 1940 aerial photo, with mapping annotations, records of Latah County, Idaho 
(" 1 940 aerial"). 
e. 2004 aerial photo, records of Latah County, Idaho ("2004 aerial"). 
f. Instrument No. 506484, records of Latah County, Idaho ("July, 2006 Sur~ey'~). 
g. Amended Record of Survey, Instrument No. 5 13 8 19, records of Latah County, 
Idaho ("May, 2007 Survey"), which describes the boundaries of the Wagners' real 
property, being, for purposes of this Affidavit, the "2.78 Ac t "  parcel noted on the 
May, 2007 survey contiguous to Camps Canyon Road. 
Second Record Supplement filed herein on February 2,2009 ("Second Record 
Supplement"), par. 2. 
THERE ARE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT AND 
DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 
Plaintiffs' failure to comply with the notice requirement of Idaho Code section 6-905 bars 
certain of Plaintiffs' claims under Idaho Code sections 9-1 01 et seq. 
Plaintiffs' only Tort Claim Notice ("Plaintiffs' Notice") was filed with the District on 
November 6,2007. Carscallen Second Affidavit, par. 2 and Exhibit A. Plaintiffs' Notice 
claimed damages to Plaintiffs' fence in 2004 and 2006, to Plaintiffs' real property related to the 
District's issuance of a driveway permit to Wagners and construction of a driveway in 2006 and 
for Wagners' trespass on Plaintiffs' real property beginning in 2005 and 2006. Plaintiffs' 
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The Idaho Tort Claims Act, Idaho Code sections 6-901 et seq. ("ITCA") requires 
claimants against political subdivisions to submit a written "claim" to the clerk or secretary of the 
political subdivision within 180 days from the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been 
discovered. Idaho Code 5 6-906. This 1 SO-day period begins to run when the wrongfbl acts occur, 
even if the plaintiff doesn't yet know, and could not even know the full extent of his injuries. 
Mitchell v. Bingharn Mem. Hosp., 130 Idaho 420 (1997). All ITCA claims must be written. Idaho 
Code 5 6-902(7). County highway district are political subdivisions for the purposes of the ECA. 
Curl 17. Indian Springs Natatorium, Inc., 97 Idaho 63 7 (1 976). Where the ITCA bars an action, 
summary judgment is appropriate. Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co., 140 Idaho 702 (Ct. App. 2004). 
All of Plaintiffs' claims for damages against Defendants under ITCA, prior to May 8, 
2007, being 180 days prior to the District's receipt of Plaintiffs' Notice on November 6,2007, 
and all Plaintiffs' claims for which a notice of tort claim is required but which are not described 
in Plaintiffs' Notice must be dismissed for failure to comply with the notice requirements 
mandated by Idaho Code sections 6-905,907 and 908. Overrnan v. Klein, 103 Idaho 795,797, 
654 P2d 888,890 (1982). 
The barred claims include claims described in Plaintiffs' Notice for the reason that those 
claims arose more than 180 days prior to Plaintiffs' filing, as follows: claims for damages to 
Plaintiffs' fence in 2004,2005 and 2006 and claims for damages to Plaintiffs' real property, 
including from construction of the Wagners' driveway in 2006 and claims for damages from any 
alleged trespass, and/or nuisance f?om 1996 through May 8,2007. Complaint 5 1 1. E. 
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The barred claims also include claims not described at all in Plaintiffs Notice, as 
follows: claims that the District failed to survey and record surveys in 1996,2005 and 2006, 
claims that the District failed to keep and/or maintain District records in 1996,2005 and 2006, 
claims that the individual Defendants misrepresented information. See Idaho Code section 6- 
907; Cook v. State ofIdaho, 133 Idaho 288,298,985 P.2d 1150, 1160 (1999). 
District and the individual Defendants while acting within the course and scope of 
employment are not liable for certain claims of Plaintiffs under Idaho Code sections 6- 
904 and 6-904B. 
The District and the individual Defendants are not liable for Plaintiffs' claims arising out 
of alleged acts or omission of the individual Defendants, exercising ordinary care, "in reliance 
upon or the execution or performance of a statutory.. .function.. . ." Idaho Code section 6-904. 
Plaintiffs have alleged numerous violations by Defendants of such statutory fbnctions, including 
those statutes referenced in $8 11. K, 0, P. 7 and Q 8. of the Complaint, namely Idaho Code 
sections 7-701 et seq., 40-203 A, 208,604,605,608, 1307, 1310, 131 1, 13 12, 1336,2012,2302 
and 23 17,67-5232 and 8001 et seq. 
ITCA establishes a "rebuttable presumption that any act or omission of an employee 
within the terms and at the place of his employment is within the course and scope of his 
employment and without malice or criminal intent. Idaho Code section 6-903 (e). Plaintiffs' 
Complaint does not set forth any facts that rebut this presumption or that show Defendants did 
not exercise ordinary care in the performance of these functions. To the contrary, Dan Payne's 
affidavits detail the District's due diligence in all operational matters related to this proceeding. 
Facts, par. 1, 3,4, 6-9 and 11. All of these claims of violation of statutory duties fail against the 
District and all individual Defendants and should be dismissed. 
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Plaintiffs claim that Defendants have abused their discretion by creating improper 
f standards and policies regarding the District's management of prescriptive right of ways. 
Complaint, $ J. These claims against the District's creation and implementation of policies 
likewise fail under the express language of Idaho Code section 60-904 which imlnunizes the 
Districts and the individual Defendant foreman and comlnissioners for the "exercise.. .failure to 
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty.. .whether or not the discretion be abused." 
Id. The legislature has provided such immunity from suit under the "discretionary fimction" 
exception to ITCA. The Idaho Supreme Court has set forth the "planning/operational" test for 
determining whether this immunity exists, and, under this test, a party is immune fiom activities 
involving "policy judgments and decision making." United PaciJic Railroad Company v. State 
ofIdaho, 654 F. Sup. 1236, 1242 (1987) (Dist. Ct. Idaho) (citing Sterling v. Blo0172, 11 1 Idaho 
21 1, 723 P2d 755 (1986). Accordingly, Plaintiffs' claims related to policy and standards issues 
should be dismissed absent sufficient proof to overcome the presumption of no malice or 
criminal intent. 
Plaintiffs claim that the District's issuance of a driveway permit to the Wagners violates 
the District's duties to Plaintiffs. Idaho Code section 6-904B(3), however, states, in part, as 
follows: 
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course and 
scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent and without 
gross negligence or reckless, willful and wanton conduct as defined in section 6- 
904C, Idaho Code, shall not be liable for any claim which: 
... 
3. Arises out of the issuance.. .or revocation of.. .a permit.. .approval.. .or similar 
authorization. 
Idaho Code section 6-904B(3). 
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The rebuttable prescription under Idaho Code section 6-903(e) that the individual Defendants 
acted within the course and scope of employment and without malice or criminal intent applies 
to the issuance of a permit. While the immunity of section 6-904B(3) could be breached upon 
proof that rebuts the presumption or upon proof of "gross negligence or reckless, willful and 
wanton conduct," there is substantial evidence on this record that Defendants used ordinary care 
in the issuance and revocation. Plaintiffs' Complaint sets forth no admissible facts to the 
contrary. Facts, par. 13- 18. Plaintiffs' claims as to issuance of this permit should be dismissed. 
Defendants have not exceeded their jurisdiction with respect to Camps Canyon Road, a 
public highway established by prescription with a statutorily prescribed minimum width 
of 50 feet. 
The facts on this record establish that Camps Canyon Road is a public highway 
established by prescription since at least 19 1 1. Camps Canyon Road is referenced as a "County 
Road" in the 191 1 Deed, and, beyond that, by Orland Arneberg's recollections of the 1930's and, 
more recently, by District foreman Dan Payne's continuous observations and work since 1974. 
The minimum width of public highways established by user in Idaho has been 50 feet since 1887 
Meservey v. Gullifovd, 14 Idaho 133,93 P.780,784 (1908); Idaho Code Section 40-23 12. The only 
exception to this requirement was for those highways "consisting of a less width at the date of 
enactment" of Section 932, Rev. St. 1887, in 1887. Mesewey, supra. Idaho law also holds that all 
highways "may be as wide as required for proper construction and maintenance in the discretion of 
the authority in charge of the construction and maintenance. Id. In a case that focused on the right 
to install utilities beneath the surface area of a public road, the Idaho Supreme Court, relying on 
Mesen~ey, rejected the argument "that public prescriptive easements should be construed as 
narrowly as private prescriptive easements." Benfel v. County of Bannock, 104 Idaho 130,656 P.2d 
1 3 83 (1 983) at 1 3 3. The Court cited approvingly from Mesewey, for its holding that a 50-foot 
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easement will be upheld because "common experience shows that width [is] no more than sufficient 
for the proper keeping up and repair of roads generally." Bentel, supra, at 133, citing Mesewey, 
supra at 148. 
Mesewey states that "the right of the public is not limited to the traveled part, but such user 
is evidence of a right in the public to use the whole tract as a highway, by widening the traveled part 
or otherwise, as the increased travel and the exigencies of the public may require.. .." hfesewey, 
supra at 784, citing Burr~ows v. Guest, 5 Utah 91, 12 P.847. Mesewey further held that "the right 
acquired by prescription carries with it such width as is reasonably necessary for the reasonable 
convenience of the traveling public.. .." Id. at 785. The Mesewey Court, too, stated that "it must be 
borne in mind that the statute fixes the width of highways at not less than 50 feet, and common 
experience shows that width no more than sufficient for the proper keeping up and repair of roads 
generally. Id. Moreover, "it should be presumed that a public highway is of the prescribed width 
unless the contrary is proven." Hzmahr  v. Utah, 29 Utah 2nd 322,324,509 P.2d 352,354 (1973). 
Htrnsakev involved a highway which the landowner asserted was not of the prescribed statutory 
width because it had been used as a parking lot and gas station and, therefore, the public highway 
should be confined to the traveled path. The Utah Supreme Court disagreed with plaintiffs and held 
that such evidence of use "does not rebut the presumed statutory width.. .." Id. at 325. That Court, 
concurring with Mesewey, held: 
This Court has reiterated that where the public has acquired the right to a public 
hghway by user, they are not limited to such width as has been actually used. The 
use carries with it such use as is reasonably necessary for the public easement of 
travel. 
Id. 
The District has acted entirely within its legal authority in all matters pertaining to its 
jurisdiction over Camps Canyon Road. Since the establishment of Camps Canyon Road as a public 
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highway by user sometime prior to the early 1930's, the District, and its predecessor entities, have 
not used or occupied more area than the minimum 50 foot width mandated by Idaho law. Payne 
Affidavit, par. 5-12; Payne Second Affidavit, par. 2-5. Further, there is no evidence to prove the 
contrary. Unlike Hurzsakev, there is not even evidence of competing uses, other than the fence 
constructed by Plaintiffs after 1996 within the District's right of way. Of course, this effort to 
confine the public road has no effect on the District's public highway rights as Plaintiffs cannot 
acquire prescriptive rights against the public. Rich v. Buvdick, 83 Idaho 35,362 P2d 1088 (1961). 
Plaintiffs' argument that the District's authority over the road is limited to a lesser width fails as a 
matter of law. 
Applying the statement of facts above to the public highway law of Idaho results in the 
conclusion that the District has acted entirely within its legal authority in all matters pertaining to its 
jurisdiction over Camps Canyon Road. Since the establishment of Camps Canyon Road as a public 
highway by user sometime prior to the early 1930's, the District, and its predecessor entities, have 
not used or occupied more area than the minimum 50 foot width mandated by Idaho law. Plaintiffs 
have offered no evidence to the contrary in their previous submittals to this Court. They have 
merely argued that the District's authority over the road is limited to a lesser width but, as a matter 
of law, that assertion fails. 
Plaintiffs' constitutional claims fail for the reason that the District has not exceeded its 
statutory authority. 
Because the facts on this record are that the District has the legal right to exclusive general 
supervision and jurisdiction over the 50 foot wide public right-of-way of Camps Canyon Road, 
because the District has not exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction and because such jurisdiction has 
existed since 19 1 1, the 1930's or 1974, depending on the required level of proof with any dictating 
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the same conclusion, Plaintiffs' taking claims fail as those claims cannot, by definition, be asserted 
where there has been no taking or deprivation. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint makes reference to inverse condemnation claims against Defendants 
using various terms including "taking," "deprivations," misappropriation," "expansion," 
"encroachment," "use of our land," "realignment," "loss of our right to use and peacefblly enjoy," 
"seizure/confiscation," "extension," "loss of right to exclude others," "alteration," "widening and 
relocating," and "crossing property line" ("inverse condemnation claims"). Complaint, §§ E, K, L, 
0 and others. Plaintiffs' inverse condemnation claims in connection with Camps Canyon Road 
arise exclusively from (i) the District's 2005-2006 alleged "taking" of "less than a foot or two" by 
the spreading gravel over Camps Canyon Road and (ii) the District's issuance of the Wagners' 
driveway permit in March, 2006, which was revoked in June, 2006. Plaintiffs also assail the 
District's policy of widening public, prescriptive road as an unconstitutional, impermissible use of 
the District's authority. 
No genuine issue has been raised in thts case about Camps Canyon Road's status as a 
public, prescriptive highway. That it became a highway by user before 191 1 or in the 1930's or 
even as late as the 1970's is of no moment. The unrebutted proof is that it is a public highway 
established by prescription. See Idaho Code section 40-202(3). There is also no question but that 
Mesefvey and its progeny Idaho Code section 40-23 12, establish a minimum fifty (50) foot width 
for public, prescriptive highways. Further, Plaintiffs have not offered any proof that any 
circumstances existed at the point in time that Camps Canyon Road became a public htghway to be 
of a lesser width. 
In the recent case of Ada County Highway District v. Total Success Irzvestments, LLC, 145 
Idaho 360, 179 P3d 323, in deciding a claim that asserted the acquisition of a prescriptive, public 
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road pursuant to Idaho Code section 40-202(3) was an unconstitutional taking of property, the Idaho 
Supreme Court held that section 40-202(3) was "not unconstitutional on its face." Id. at 369, P3d at 
332. The Court then cited the limitations provision of Idaho Code section 5-224 in advising that the 
"landowner has four years from the accrual of the cause of action to bring a claim of inverse 
condemnation." Id. 
Total Success, as applied to this case, instructs that the statute authorizing establishment of 
public highways by prescription is to be given effect and that a landowner must assert any claims 
adverse to the public right with four (4) years. Because no such claim was brought by a landowner 
within four (4) years of the establishment of Camps Canyon Road many years ago, all rights of the 
public, including in and to the statutorily established minimum fifty (50) foot width, became vested 
and not subject to any future landowner's claim. Plaintiffs' claims assailing the District's 
unconstitutional policies related to road maintenance and improvement fail for the same reason 
because the law clearly permits the District to conduct its operations within the public, prescriptive 
right-of-way, which the records establishes it has done. For these reasons, Plaintiffs' inverse 
condemnation claims in all forms related to Camps Canyon Road should be dismissed as a matter of 
law 
Plaintiffs' remaining invase condemnation claim arises because a permit was issued to the 
Wagners that, arguably, would have permitted the Wagners to cross Plaintiffs' real property before 
reaching their own. District foreman Dan Payne took reasonable and appropriate actions to verify 
that the permit issued to Plaintiffs' neighbors, the Wagners, was located on the Wagners' property. 
While there .J an issue of fact regarding the boundary line between Plaintiffs' real property and the 
Wagners' real property, that issue is not material to Plaintiffs' inverse condemnation claim. 
Plaintiffs relied upon the June, 1996 survey, which was amended by the May, 2007 survey, in 
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convincing Wagners that a portion of the Wagners' driveway approach crossed Plaintiffs' real 
property and demanding that Wagners move their approach. Wagners acceded to that demand. 
Facts, par 16. The permit was revoked, Wagners abandoned the initial driveway approach and the 
alleged taking ceased. Further, as the permit on its face provides, the Wagners made a 
representation that they owned the "property to be sewed," and it was the Wagners, not the District 
that allegedly "took" and occupied Plaintiffs' real property. Under these circumstances, there was 
no "taking" whatsoever by the District and, as discussed above, no liability under ITCA for such 
issuance. Licensed surveyor Larry J. Hodge has opined that the Wagners were likely justified in 
putting the first driveway where they did and, if so, that the District's grant of a permit was proper 
in all respects. Facts, par 13 andl8; Wodge Affidavit, par. 6-1 0. 
However, even if thts boundary issue were to be resolved in Plaintiffs' favor, the District's 
conduct does not give rise to actions for damages, taking claims andlor due process violations. The 
facts demonstrate that Dan Payne undertook due diligence in this matter in that he (i) received and 
reviewed an application, which contains a representation that the applicant is the "owner" of the 
"property to be served," (ii) personally inspected the approach, noting the lstoric driveway access 
for t h s  property and (iii) discussed the property boundary consideration with the applicant. The 
District had every right to rely on this information in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction over 
the public right-of-way. The District used ordinary care and acted reasonably and in good faith in 
all matters pertaining to this permit. 
Plaintiffs allege violations of their substantive and procedural due process and equal 
protection rights, although not specifically pled, but generally referenced under the lSf, 5' and 14' 
amendments to the U.S. Constitution, Article 1, $ 5  1,2,3, 13, 14 and 17 of the Idaho State 
Constitution as well as Idaho Code sections 40-203A and 208 and 42 U.S.C. $ 1983. 
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Plaintiffs "predeprivation" due process claims fail for the same reason as the taking claims 
and also because Idaho Code $ 30-203A provides a predeprivation process that allows any property 
owner within the District system, a right "to initiate public proceedings to validate a highway or 
public right-of-way" if the "location of the highway.. . cannot be accurately determined due to 
numerous allegations of the highway.. . ." among other provisions. Idaho Code $ 40-203A(1). This 
statute speaks directly to Plaiiltiffs' circumstances, yet, as this Court has previously been advised 
through a declaratory judgment filed by Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs elected not to avail themselves of this 
"predeprivation" remedy that Idaho law provides. Carscallen Second Affidavit, par. 8. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has commented on this process as follows: 
Idaho Code 5 40-203A entitles a resident or property holder within the county, who 
is aggrieved by a decision of the board of commissioners in a validation proceeding 
to judicial review I.C. 5 203A(4). . . . 
The Legislature has provided the method by which certain persons, or the board 
having jurisdiction over the particular highway system, may initiate proceedings to 
validate a road. I.C. 5 203A. 
Thus, one can safely conclude that "[plroceedings for review" of county road- 
validation proceedings, as provided in I.C. $40-208, are to be characterized as 
separate proceedings.. .these proceedings are the exclusive means by which a 
validation decision can be challenged.. . . 
... one cannot challenge in a separate civil suit the action of a board where that 
board has acted on matters within its jurisdiction. 
Cobblev v. City of Challis, 143 Idaho 130, 135- 134, 139 P.3d 732,735-736 (2006) (citations 
omitted). Plaintiffs' efforts to force a validation decision "in a separate civil lawsuit" is proscribed 
by these statutes and must be dismissed. 
Neither does the District violate Plaintiffs' due process rights when no conduct by the 
District has taken place that triggers a right to hearing. The District is well within its legal rights to 
improve and widen a road without holding a public hearing when that improvement occurs withn 
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the District's public right-of-way. Plaintiffs fail to understand that the District is empowered under 
law to improve and even widen public highways so long as that activity does not occur beyond the 
lawful, minimum 50 foot width of that highway. Moreover, even if the District's activities resulted 
in the District making a claim to the roadway, it would not be a violation of Plaintiffs' due process 
rights even if no notice was provided to them. Total Sz~ccess, Supra at 372, P.3d at 371. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has held that adequate notice is provided by "the statute itself, I.C. 4 40-202(3), 
which provides that highways include those used and maintained by the public for five years." Id. 
See also Powers v. Canyon County, 108 Idaho 967,970,703 P.2d 1342,1345 (1985). 
Moreover, the courts have been reticent to apply a broad stroke requiring a hearing before 
every deprivation of a person's rights. See Matthews v. EZdridge, 424 U.S. 3 19,335 (1 976); see 
also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,268-9 (1970). The Matthews and Goldberg cases illustrate 
that the degree of potential deprivation that may be caused by a particular decision is a factor in 
assessing the validity of the process, as is the fairness and reliability of the process and the probably 
value, if any, of the additional procedural safeguards. Id. A final factor in striking the appropriate 
due process is the "public interest." This includes the administrative burden and other societal costs 
that would be associated with requiring, as a matter of constitutional right, an evidentiary hearing 
upon demand in all cases.. . ." Matthew, supra at 347. The administrative costs to the District in 
matters such as the instant case would outweigh any safeguard. Moreover, this case is unique in the 
District's history which is evidence that fms alleged problem does not need additional safeguards. 
See Anleberg Affidavit, par. 10. 
Therefore, given that Plaintiffs have not shown a deprivation, have an available 
predeprivation remedy, and have not shown that a hearing is warranted under the due process 
considerations of this case, Plaintiffs' claims in this regard fail and must be dismissed. In addition, 
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42 U.S.C. § 1932 claims must be brought before the expiration of the applicable statute of 
limitations. The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims brougbt in Idaho courts is two years. 
Henderson v. State, 1 10 Idaho 308; Idaho Code 8 5-219(4) (2005). In this case, Plaintiffs filed their 
Complaint on March 3,2008. Therefore, to the extent the Court does not dismiss all Plaintiffs' 
federal due process claims for the reasons set forth above, this Court should dismiss as untimely all 
claims based on conduct that took place before March 3,2006. 
Moreover, the issuance of a driveway permit does not require a due process hearing. Idaho 
Code section 40-13 10 (8) expressly provides for delegation of that supervisory authority to the 
board of commissioners. ("The highway district board of commissioners shall have exclusive 
general supervisory authority, over all public highways.. .under their jurisdiction, with full power to 
establish design standards, use standards.. .and to control access to said public highways.. . .'3; see 
also Matthews, supra. This exercise of this express authority to "establish use standards" and 
"control access" is what occurred in connection with issuance of the first driveway permit. Title 40 
of the Idaho Code does not require that the District conduct a due process hearing for issuance of a 
driveway permit. Other District actions do, including abandonment and validation proceedings, 
which are not implicated in this case. 
Plaintiffs' claims to abate nuisance should be dismissed as no trespass has occurred and the 
alleged driveway nuisance has been abated. 
Plaintiffs allege continuous torts of nuisance and trespass in relation to road widening for 
whch there is no factual support in this record as discussed at length hereinabove and such 
equitable claims should be dismissed. Plaintiffs allege a continuing tort of nuisance and trespass in 
relation to the issuance of the Wagners' driveway permit, however, that permit was revoked by the 
District and Wagners vacated the disputed area three (3) months after the initial permit was issued 
and twenty-one (21) months prior to the commencement of this action. Plaintiffs' allegations in ths  
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regard are blatantly false and Plaintiffs' claim for equitable relief in regard to the driveway permit 
should be dismissed. 
Plaintiffs7 remaining claims are infirm for various reasons and, as a matter of law, should be 
dismissed. 
Plaintiffs' remaining claims should be dismissed as a matter of law for various reasons. 
First, Plaintiffs claim relief based on a number of theories that are not supported by law. Where the 
Plaintiffs have failed to establish their prima facie case, summary judgment is appropriate. Gavzee 
v. BavkZey, 12 1 Idaho 88 1 (Ct. App. 1992). A claim has been satisfactorily stated if it contains "a 
concise statement of the facts constituting the cause of action and a demand for relief." Clark v. 
OZsen, 1 10 Idaho 323 (1 986) (citing Id. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)(2)). The complaint must be phrased as a 
series of numbered paragraphs, each of which is limited to a single set of circumstances. Id. R. Civ 
P. 1 0(b) Plaintiffs' claims, when taken together, are not concise, as required by Rule 8(a)(1)(2). 
Plaintiffs' Complaint's length, disorganization, repetitiveness and lack of factual support render 
Plaintiffs' Complaint unsatisfactory as Plaintiffs' claims are difficult to ascertain. 
Plaintiffs complain of some conduct that does not support any cognizable claim - e.g., "the 
conduct of the defendants.. .has been deliberate, flagrant, arbitrary, and offensive to the sense of 
democracy and to the sense of good government.. .." (Plaintiffs' Complaint at 5 1I.U.)' "the lack of 
any agency structure and the arbitrary disregard to resolve disputes and violations, the fomenting of 
neighborly disputes.. .," (Id. at 5 E and see also, 5 E. 6., P., P.2, Q.f.xiii.(a), "negotiating in bad 
faith" (Id.), "misrepresentation of statements and legal views and rulings.. .and questionable 
applications of or statements.. .of standards (Id at § Q.f.xii; see also, 5 Q.f.xiii(b)), "violated the 
doctrine of quasi-estoppel" (Id. at $Q.f.xiii(c)) and "testimony.. .flagrantly intended to thwart any 
and all remedies.. ." (Id. at 5 R.(6).) . 
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Other of Plaintiffs' claims fail to state any cause of action. Plaintiffs' Complaint 
specifically alleges violation of at least three statutory criminal provisions: § 18-7001, malicious 
injury to property; 5 18-7008, trespass; and, 5 18-7012 destruction of fences. Plaintiffs, as civil 
litigants, have no authority to prosecute criminal offenses, and so these allegations facially fail to 
state any claim. 
Other Plaintiffs' claims fail for lack of any factual assertion and include those related to 
District's alleged failure to train and failure to supervise, the claim for punitive damages and other 
claims perhaps unmentioned as a result of the disorganization and complexity of Plaintiffs' 
Complaint and the difficulty in ascertaining claims. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants respectfilly request the Court's order granting Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs as to all claims in Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Defendants move under Rule 1 l (a)(l) I.R.C.P. and Idaho Code Sections 12-1 20, 12- 12 1 and 
12-123 for an award of their attorney fees incurred herein as Plaintiffs' Complaint for the reasons 
that Defendants are the prevailing parties and that Plaintiffs pursued this action unreasonably, that 
Plaintiffs acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law and that Plaintiffs pursued claims not well- 
grounded in fact and warranted by existing law, all as described above in this Brief 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of February, 2009. 
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C. 
By: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifjr that on this 2nd day of February, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of 
this document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below: 
DON HALVORSON [ ]U.S.Mail 
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON [ 1 Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail 
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD [ IFAX 
KENDRICK, IDAHO 83537 [ XI Hand Delivery 
Ro Id J. Landeck T 
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RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 3001 
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C. 
693 Styner Avenue, Suite 9 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-1 505 
FAX (208) 883-4593 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON 1 
(Husband and Wife), ) Case No. CV 2008- 180 
1 




NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY ) 
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR ) 
THE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY 1 
DISTRICT, ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICHARD ) 
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their individual ) 
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official capacity and ) 
in his individual capacity, 1 
) 
Defendants. 1 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Latah 1 
Larry J. Hodge, upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am over eighteen (1 8) years of age, am competent to testify to the matters set forth 
herein and make this affidavit upon my personal knowledge. 
AFFIDAVIT OF LARRY J. HODCE -- 1 
2. I am licensed and work as a professional engineer and land surveyor in the State of 
Idaho. 
3. My firm, Hodge & Associates, Inc., of which I am President, has been retained by 
Ronald J. Landeck, P.C., attorney at law, to provide expert, professional land surveyor advice to 
and testimony on behalf of the North Latah County Highway District in this action. 
4. In connection with these services, I have reviewed the following attached documents: 
a) Instrument No. 501677, records of Latah County, Idaho ("Wagners' Deed" to 
"Wagners' real property" as defined below). 
b) Instrument No. 42441 1, records of Latah County, Idaho ("Plaintiffs' Deed" to 
"Plaintiffs' real property"). 
c) Instrument No. 5742 1, records of Latah County, Idaho (:'I 91 1 Deed"). 
d) 1940 aerial photo, with mapping annotations, records of Latah County, Idaho 
('"940 aerial"). 
e) 2004 aerial photo, records of Latah County, Idaho ("2004 aerial"). 
Instrument No. 506484, records of Latah County, Idaho ("July, 2006 Survey"). 
g) Amended Record of Survey, Instrument No. 5 13 8 19, records of Latah County, 
Idaho ("May, 2007 Sun~ey''), which describes the boundaries of the Wagners' 
real property, being, for purposes of this Affidavit, the "2.78 AC4" parcel noted 
on the May, 2007 survey contiguous to Camps Canyon Road. 
5. In my professional opinion, the locatiol~ of Camps Canyon Road in the area between 
Plaintiffs' real property and Wagners' real property has not been changed to any significant 
degree, if at all, between 1940 and 2004. 
AFFIDAVIT OF L z 4 W  J. WODGE -- 2 
6. In my professional opinion, a more accurate and legally appropriate record of survey 
of the boundaries of Wagners' real property, than the survey description contained in the May, 
2007 Survey, would be to give effect to all of the distances set forth in Plaintiffs' Deed and 
Wagners' Deed (which are identical distances despite references to "rods" and "feet" in 
Plaintiffs' Deed which were converted to "feet" only in Wagners' Deed) fiom the point of 
beginning on the County Road back to that same point of beginning. This results in recognition 
of all distances described in these instruments. The May, 2007 survey, on the contrary, 
recognizes all distances except (i) the distance of "699 feet, more or less, along the County 
Road," which the May, 2007 survey shows as 468.6 feet and (ii) the connecting "due North" 
distance of 104 feet, which the May 2007 survey shows as 156.54 feet. 
7. In my opinion, not recognizing the "699 feet, more or less along the County Road" 
and reducing that to 468.6 feet does not support the intent of the parties to the 191 1 Deed. 
Althougll the term, "more or less" is used in the 19 1 1 Deed, that term, under generally applied 
surveying standards, would not pennit a deviation of that magnitude. That is, principally, why I 
believe the survey should incorporate the 699-foot distance along the County Road. Another 
supporting principle is that the County Road is a de facto monument for surveying purposes and 
the distance between the two points on that road should take precedence over other calls in the 
1911 Deed. 
8. Other evidence to support this opinion exists upon observation of the 1940 aerial 
from the Latah County Assessor's records, which shows the southerly boundary of Wagners' real 
property running on a southeasterly course and utilizes all distances described in these deeds. I 
also note that configuration of Wagners' real property in the 1940 aerial includes the driveway 
serving the Wagners' real property which was then apparently owned and occupied by "Charles 
AFFIDAVIT OF LARRY J. HODGE - 
E. Harris," as noted thereon. The distances that comprise the "3.4" acre parcel shown on the 
1940 aerial, generally appear consistent with the distances set forth in the 191 1 Deed, Plaintiffs' 
Deed and Wagners' Deed. 
9. My opinions are based on my 32 years work as a licensed surveyor and, in various 
parts upon authoritative sources, including: (i) Writing Legal Descriptions, by Gurdon H. 
Wattles and, in particular, p. 1 1.18 thereof which deals with ties and boundaries, wherein there is 
a quote from Corpus Juris for the proposition "concerning course or distance.. .that the true rule 
is that one or the other shall be preferred according to the manifest intention of parties and the 
circumstances of the case;" (ii) a review of some pertinent Idaho case law, including Hogan v. 
Blakney, 73 Idaho 274 (1 952), which states that "in interpreting and construing deeds, the 
primary rule to be observed is that the real intention of the parties.. .is to be sought and carried 
out whenever possible," and Campbell v. Weisbrod, 73 Idaho 82 (1952), in which the Idaho 
Supreme Court states that in the construction of deeds, the "general rule is that monuments, 
natural or artificial, or lines marked on the ground, control over calls for courses and distances;" 
and (iii) Clark on Suweying and Boundaries (Fifth Edition), and, in particular, 5 16.36, thereof 
which states that the use of the "term 'more or less' will permit a slight deviation fkom the 
measurement." 
AFFIDAVIT OF LARRY J. I-IODGE -- 4 
The above statements are true to the best of my knourledge. 
Dated this 29th day of January, 2009. 
I hercby certifl that on 
N TO before me this 29th day of January, 2009. 
w e & -  
NOTARY PUBLIC for the Statc of Idaho 
My commission expires: 8-1 7- d 0/3  
CERTIFICNE OF SERVICE 
, 2009, I caused a true and 
u 
correct copy of this document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated 
below: 
DON HALVORSON @a US.  Mail 
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON [ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail 
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD [ ] FAX (208) 322-4486 
KENDRICK, IDAHO 83 53 7 N H a n d  Delivery 
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FAX NO. 2088824255 
WRRRANTY DEED 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, J.9MES E. HUFF & PATRICIA A. HUFF TRUST, dated Ju ly  
4, 1999, the grantor?, do hereby grant, bargain, eel1 and convey unto: 
ROBERT F. WAONER AND KATE A. WAGNER 
husband and wife 
P.O. Box 712 
Troy, Idaho 83871 
the grantees, the following described premises situated in Lacah County, 
State of Idaho, to-wit: 
SEE ATTACHED CONTINUED SCHEDULE A 
TOGETHER WITH all and singular the tenements, hereditaments aIid 
appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, including a l l  
water and water rights, ditch and dicch rights. 
SUBJECT to reservations in United States patent, reotrfctive covenants, 
existing and recorded rights-of-way and easements, zoning and building 
ordinances, and taxes and assessments as prorated between the parties 
hereto. 
TO HAVE AFTD TO HOLD the said premises, with cheir appurtenances unto 
the eaid Grantees, their successors, heirti and assigns forever. Said 
Grantors do hereby covenant to and with said Gr&?cees, that they are the 
owners in fee simple of said prercises; that saia premises are f r ee  from 
all encumbrances except as hereinabove set forth and that they will 
warrant and defend ths same from all lawful claims whatsoever. 
!-%TED this ,&$&-day of December, 2005 
JAMES E. HUFF & PATRICIA A. HUFF TRUS" 
. - SS 
county op SAC& IT gd7;j 
On this& day a£ December. 2005, before me, =he 
undersigned, a Xotary Public in and for said state, personally appeared 
JAMES li. HUFF AND PATRICIA A. tiUFF, Trustees of the J M S  E. & PATRICIA A. 
HUFF TRUST, known to me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the 
, above and foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that they executed 
f the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, 1 have hereur.to set my hand and affixed my notarial 
ComrnrWan # 1509727 1 
~otary PW~:  - CaUfomia f 
Sacramento C F 
DEC-15-2005 THU 
.. . . 
LATAHCOUNTYTITLE 
Uc". cz- - 
-- 
FAX NO. 2083824255 
P O 4  #0.1(156-8 
A11 Polioy Q e m  
The land referred to in this policy is situated i n  rhe Sta te  of 
Idaho, County of Latah and is described as follows: 
The NE1/4sW1/4, SW1/4NE1/4, NW1/4sEl/a and the ~1/2~E1/4NWl/4 of
section 15, Township 39 North, Range 3 West, B.M. 
AND a parcel of  land located i n  the SE1/4NEL/4 o f  said Section 15, 
being more particularly described as follows: 
BEGINNING a t  a point where the public toad passes through the West 
line of said S E 1 / 4 ~ ~ 1 / 4 ,  the same being South 201 feet, more or le66, 
of t h e  Northwest corner of said SE1/4NE1/4; thence due South 418 
feet$ thence due East 379.50 feet; thence due North 104 feet ,  mare or 
l e s s ,  to the County Road; thence in a Northwesterly direction 699 
feet, more or lees ,  along the Co~lr,ty Road to the POINT OF BEGINNING. 
r c r u r r h t l r  
R)(Y ALL HEn PY TEESE PRESGIRS: I-. QlUtl d 
That A. &bard S w a m o n  md G l a d y s  Swanson, husband and r i f e  of  C l / E E n / 4  IQ 
1021 G r l n l U o d  Road, Troy. Idaho 83871, Grantor (sl f o r  and I n  
cdasiderat ion o f  the  sum of T m  Dollars  ($10.001, and other  good t l / m / 4  or bc 
and valuable considerat ion,  Fn hand paid, the rece ip t  oE r h i c h  is 
Srreby actnovledgeb, b these presents  grant ,  bargain, s e l l .  convey SAVE 1ID 
and warrant unto Donard I.. Emloorson and Char lo t te  R. Halvoreon. 
huband and wife of 1550 L l t t l e  Bear Road, Troy, Idaho 63871, 4 u . t . ~  
Grantees, the following described r e a l  property s i t u a t e d  i n  the (k.t 1- of t h  
S t a t e  of Idaho, County of  Latah to  wit: 1-88. .outb of t )  
See schedule .cg a t tached  hereto and incorporated herein by 
reference.  
together vith a11 te-nts, hereditaments and appurtenances 
tbcreunto belongioq, o r  i n  anyuise appertaining. and Grantorls)  
oorspsnt and warrant that the above-described premises are f r e e  and 
clear tram a l l  l i ens .  and cncu&trances,excepting those of record,  
and t h a t  they will and the ir  bci rs ,  executors,  a h l n l s t r a t o r s  and 
.asipna shall forever warrant and defend a fee simple and 
merchantable t i t l e  there in ,  aga ins t  a11 lawful denands, except 
w r a n c e s  of record. 
t h i s  Warranty Deed 03 
0, blrh+rrr( cud w i f e  of 
:mtarr(*) far ind i n  
D. DO), and other good 
4 s.wipt of daich is 
w i n ,  sell, convey 
ulotte 8. mLmraaa, 
Troy, X W w  83871, Lzty sit- in the 
:r md apgwtonancea 
L n f n q *  Grmtot(sf 
. prcrises u* f t ~  d 
ting chosr?; of record. 
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n 
U L  
i %anpon, Grantor 
'4 before me a liotary - 
per-lly appeased 
:o be the Mns whose 






RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 3001 
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C. 
693 Styner Avenue, Suite 9 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-1505 
FAX (208) 883-4593 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICML DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON ) 
(Husband and Wife), ) Case No. CV 2008-180 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) SECOND AFFIDAVIT 
) OF DAN CARSCALLEN 
VS. ) 
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY 
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR ) 
THE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY 
DISTRICT, ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICHARD ) 
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their individual ) 
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official capacity and ) 
in his individual capacity, 
) 
Defendants. ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Latah ) 
Dan Carscallen, upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am over eighteen (18) years of age, am competent to testify to the matters set forth 
herein and make this affidavit upon my personal knowledge. 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF DAN CARSCALLEN -- 1 
2. I am the Secretary of the North Latah County Highway District ("District") and, as 
such, custodian of and responsible for the District's official records. 
3. A certain Tort Claim Notice, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit A, was hand-delivered to me at the District on November 6,2007, by Plaintiff Don 
Halvorson. This is the only tort claim notice that the District has received fi-om Plaintiffs. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the District's standard 
Application and Permit to Use Public Right-Of-Way-Approaches and General Provisions that 
District foremen require be completed by applicants and approved before approaches can be 
constructed onto District highways and right-of-way. 
5. Attached as Exhibit C hereto is a true and correct copy of a Manual for Use of Public 
Right of Way Standard Approach Policy prepared by the Local Highway Technical Assistance 
Council, a State of Idaho legislative agency. The District has adopted this Manual and the 
District's foremen use this Manual, including the standardized Application and General 
Provisions set forth on pages 10 and 11 of the Manual, in the review and issuance of approach 
permits. 
6. As stated in Section 1 .B. on page 2 of the Manual, the authority of the District to 
regulate the use of public right-of-way is found in: 
3. Section 40- 13 10, Idaho Code, gives highway districts supervisory 
authority over access to the public right-of-way under their jurisdiction. 
4. Section 50-1330, Idaho Code, gives highway districts authority over 
the public streets and public right-of-way under their jurisdiction. 
Further, Sections 1 .B. and 1 .C. of the Manual describe the permit process for controlling access 
onto the public right-of-way. (See Exhibit C, page 8.) 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF DAN CARSCALLEN -- 2 
7. At all times relevant to this action the District's Commissioners have delegated the 
issuing of such approach permits to the District's foremen who are employees of the District. 
Idaho Code section 40-13 10 (1) expressly allows the District's Commissioners to delegate this 
supervisory responsibility to the District's employees. 
8. The District has determined that $750 is a reasonable fee, as permitted under Idaho 
Code section 40-203 A, to cover the cost of validation proceedings under said section 40-203 A, 
and has adopted that as the fee for a petitioner to initiate a validation proceeding. At no time 
have Plaintiffs submitted a petition for validation to the District or paid the required fee. 
9. At no time relevant to this action have Plaintiffs filed any petition or other request 
with the District that, in my opinion as District Secretary with advice from legal counsel, would 
require publication of notice and a public hearing under applicable law. 
10. I have been present at all meetings of the District Commissioners which Plaintiffs, or 
either of them, attended since 2006. At no time was any commissioner or other representative of 
the District disrespectfkl in any manner to Plaintiffs. 
The above statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
Dated this 3oth day of January, 2009. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 30th day of January, 2009. 
NOTARY PUBLIC for the State of Idaho 
My commission expires: 8 - /7 -a 13
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF DAN CARSCALLEN -- 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 2nd day of February, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of 
this document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below: 
DON HALVORSON [ ]U.S.Mail 
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON [ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail 
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD [ ] FAX (208) 322-4486 
KENDRICK, IDAHO 83 53 7 [ XI Hand Delivery 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF DAN CARSCALLEN -- 4 
North Latah County I+ighGy District 
1 132 White Ave. 
Moscow, Idaho, 83843 
Tort Claim Notice 
November 1, 2007 
Claimant's Name: Don and Charlotte Halvorson 
Current Address: 1290 American Ridge Road (address current for the last 6 months) 
Kendrick, Idaho, 83537 
Telephone Numbers: Home-(208) 289-5602 
Cell-(208) 669-0909 
E-mail address: sprnqbrkranch@huqhes.net 
INCIDENTIS INFORMATION 
Dates: Fall of 2004 until spring of 2007 
Location of Incidents: Latah County, Idaho NESE Section 15 T39NR3WBM 
Name of road: Camps Canyon Road 
Responsible Agency: North Latah County Hiqhwav District 
Type of Damagellnjury: Economic and non economic 
Description of ComplainVs or IncidenVs: 
1. During road maintenance an unnamed employee of the NLCHD -
pushed a wind fallen tree through our fence in the fall of 2004. Under the 
color of law, and without ordinary care said employee willfully, recklessly, 
wantonly and with gross negligence damaged our fence and was the direct, 
proximate, and legal cause of the violation our property rights. Our fence is 
rightfully built and rightfully positioned and neither our fence nor the buffer 
between the road bed and our fence is under the authority of the NLCHD. 
Further our pasture is not the repository for the NLCHD's unwanted debris. 
Names of witnesseslinvolved parties 
1. Jon Van Houten (he sawed the tree out of the road) 
Troy, ldaho 83571 
(208) 835-531 1 
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2. Joe Yockey (he saw the grader go by and heard the wires creak) 
1061 Claypit Road 
Troy, ldaho 83571 
(208) 835-6831 
2. During the years of 2005 and 2006 the NLCHD has widened Camps -
Canyon Road and has, under the color of law, confiscated our land along 
an1/8 mile stretch of the north side of the road in the Northwest corner of 
NESE of Section 15 and has encroached upon cur fence. Confiscation 
took place without just compensation or due process. 
3. Under the color of law, the NLCHD, without ordinary or reasonable -
care, and with willful, reckless or wanton conduct, or with gross 
negligence, and both in acting in bad faith and negotiating in bad faith, 
confiscated a portion of our property by issuing a permit for a driveway 
access in March 2006 and without revocation of said permit did hold to 
possession of said property for a determined period of time. We allege 
that the NLCHD was the direct, proximate, and legal cause of the 
deprivation of our constitutionally protected property rights, that our 
property was taken from us without due process or equal treatment 
under the law, and that our property was taken for non public use. 
Further, the NLCHD, failed to remedy the taking and in so failing to act 
has not returned the property to us. Further, the NLCHD misrepresented 
the facts and situation of the previouslhistoric driveway. 
Names of witnesseslinvolved parties 
I. Bob and Kate Wagner 
Troy, ldaho 83571 
(208) 835-421 5 
4. Under the color of law, and both in acting in bad faith and in negotiating -
in bad faith the NLCHD did permit and advocate the construction of a 
driveway across our property and were the direct, proximate, and legal 
cause of creating a nuisance which, did damage both in loss of soil and in 
disfiguration of the landscape, resulted in the loss of enjoyment of our land, 
and fomented a neighborly dispute. Further, in failing to revoke and 
remedy this nuisance the NLCHD necessitated actions to abate this 
nuisance. These actions and the consequential bad feelings which have 
arisen from these actions would have been totally unnecessary if the 
NLCHD, its commissioners and its employees had not abdicated 
their public interest responsibility and had acted reasonably and with 
ordinary care. Further the NLCHD misrepresented the facts and situation of 
the previouslhistoric driveway. 
Names of witnesseslinvolved parties 
I. Bob and Kate Wagner 
Troy, ldaho 83571 
(208) 835-42 1 5 
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5. During the widening of the road, under the color of law, the 'NLCHD -
employees pushed a compaction roller through our fence and altered the 
runoff drainage from the road, undermining the corner support post of our 
fence and eroding land in the summer of 2006. Under the color of law, 
without ordinary care, and with willful, reckless or wanton conduct, or with 
gross negligence, the NLCHD was the direct, proximate and legal cause 
of damage to our fence and to our ground (erosion). In this action the 
NLCHD has taken additional land for runoff drainage from the road. 
6. During their widening of the road, under the color of law, the NLCHD -
buried the wires of our fence during the summer of 2006. Under the color 
of law, the NLCHD, without ordinary care, and with willful, reckless or 
wanton conduct, or with gross negligence were the direct, proximate and 
legal cause of damage to our fence. Further, future damage is foreseeable 
due to the lack of buffer between the road bed and the fence. 
7. [Jnder the color of law, the NLCHD, the NLCHD commissioners, and/or -
the employees of the NLCHD have with deliberate indifference 
in officially sanctioned acts and omissions or in the manner of inadequate 
employee training, and in spite of the obvious need for such training have 
deprived us, of our constitutional rights. Our rights to own, and to enjoy 
and to restrict access to our land has been deprived by these acts 
and omissions, in any and in total as stated above, by the NLCHD, the 
commissioners of the NLCHD, and! or the employees of the NLCHD. The 
NLCHD, the commissioners of the NLCHD, andlor the employees of the 
NLCHD are the direct, proximate, and legal cause of the deprivation of 
these rights. In clearly established laws the NLCHD, the commissioners of 
the NLCHD, in their individual and in their official capacities, as stated 
above have deprived us of these constitutionally protected rights. These 
actors have done so without ordinary care, and done so recklessly, 
intentionally, willfully, wantonly, and with gross negligence, and without due 
process and equal treatment of the law. 
AMOUNT OF CLAIM 
1. Cornpensatow damages for I )  the taking and holding of our private 
property (driveway access) in the sum of 
$150/day during the time the deprivation of our 
property rights took place. 
($150 X 579 days=$86850) This is the amount 
accrued to 11/1/07. No final disposition was 
ever given by the NLCHD. 
2) for the value of the land taken by road widening 
of 2005 and 2006 in the sum of $1 000. 
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2. Damages to fence for all complaints in total in the sum of $1250. 
3. Damaqes to land due to construction of driveway access for loss of top soil, 
alteration and disfiguration of landscape and subsequent erosion in the amount of 
$3000. 
4. Legal costs in the amount of $500. 
5. General or consequential damages (abatement costs) in the amount of $5150. 
6. For the loss of the enjoyment of land in the amounts of $25000. 
7. Erection of a barrier to prevent further intrusion of soil, gravel, and lor snow 
during routine maintenance onto our land and damage to our fence. 
8. Survey of the entire length of Camps Canyon Road as it crosses the NESE 
SectionlSN39WBM and demarcation of the NLCHD right-of-way to be described 
as follows: From east to west the right-of-way shall extend from the present 
center of the road 25 feet to the north of the center line and 25 feet south of the 
centerline for the distance covering the east half of the NESE Sectionl5N39WBM. 
For the west half of the NESE Section 15N39N3WBM the right-of-way shall be 
considered to be the north edge of the road bed except in such instances that the 
road bed encroaches on or comes within 3 feet of the fence. In these instances 
the right-of-way shall be 3 feet to the north of the present fence. For what 
remaining distance lies between the half way mark and the property line with the 
Wagners on the south side of the road bed the right-of-way shall be whatever the 
old prescriptive right-of-way may remain effective. 
9. Return the drainage at the corral to its 1996 position. 
Don Halvorson 1 1/1/07 
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APPLlCATlON AND PERMIT 10 USE PUBLIC RIGHT-OF-WAY -- APPROACHES 
COPY OF PERMIT MUST BE PRESENT AT WORK SITE DURING CONSTRUCTION 
PUBLIC ROAD SURFACE TYPE: (DIRT) (GRAVEL) (PAVEMENT) 
Start Date: 






This permit shall not be valid for excavation 
until, or unless, the provision of Idaho code, 
Title 55, Chapter 22 have been complied 
with. 
PRIOR T O  EXCAVATION, CALL ONE 
NUMBER LOCATION SERVICE 
Telephone No. 1-800-342-1 585 
APPROACH I 
Single Residence I WIDTH SURFACE TYPE 








See reverse side for General Provisions. 
Must meet the requirements of North Latah County Highway District (NLCHD) 
Approach Policy and 549-222, ldaho Code. 
I CERTIFY THAT I AM THE OWNER OR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PROPOSED PROPERTY TO BE 
SERVED AND AGREE TO DO THE WORK REQUESTED HEREON IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 
REQUIREMENTS PRINTED ON THE REVERSE SIDE, THE SPECIAL PROVISIONS AND THE PLANS MADE A PART OF 
THlS PERMIT. 
L I 
SUBJECT TO ALL TERMS, CONDITIONS, AND PROVISIONS SHOWN ON THIS FORM OR AnACHMENTS, PERMISSION IS HEREBY 
NAME OF PERMITTEE 
I 
ADDRESS 
CITY STATE ZIP 
GRANTED TO THE ABOVE-NAMED APPLICANT TO PERFORM THE WORK DESCRIBED ABOVE. 
APPLICANT-PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT 
SIGNATURE OW NERI AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE 
DATE 
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT USE 
TEMPORARY PERMIT FINAL PERMIT 
Approved Date: R e j e c t e d  Date: 
Tentative approval subject to inspection of installation. Corrections Required: 
Date: 
By: 
NLCHD Authorized Representative Approved by: 
NLCHD Authorized Representative 
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NORTH UTAH COUNTY HIG DISTRICT 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
2. The NLCHD may change, amend or terminate this permit or any of the conditions herein enumerated if permittee 
fails to comply with its provisions or requirements as set forth herein. 
3. Approaches shall be for the bona fide purpose of securing access and not for the purpose of parking, conducting 
business, or servicing vehicles on the public right-of-way. 
4. No revisions or additions shall be made to an approach or its appurtenances on the public right-of-way without 
the written permission of the NLCHD. 
5. The permittee shall furnish all material, labor and equipment involved in the construction of the approach and its 
appurtenances. This shall include furnishing approved drainage pipe of a size specified on permit (12 inch 
minimum) curb and gutter, concrete sidewalk, etc., where required. Materials and workmanship shall be good 
quality and are subject to inspection and approval by the NLCHD. 
6. The NLCHD reserves the right to require the permittee, its successors and assigns, at any time, to make such 
changes, additions, repairs and relocations to any approach or its appurtenances within the public right-of-way 
as may be necessary to permit the relocation, reconstruction, widening, drainage, and maintenance of the 
roadway andlor to provide proper protection to life and property on or adjacent to the roadway. 
7. Approaches shall conform to the plans made a part of this permit. Adequate drawings or sketches shall be 
included showing the design, materials, construction requirements and proposed location of the approach. All 
approaches shall be in accordance with Exhibits 9 and 13 of the Manual for Use of Public Right of Way - 
Standard Approach Policy. 
8. During the construction of the approach(es), such barricades, signs and other traffic control devices shall be 
erected and maintained by the permittee, as may be deemed necessary by the NLCHD. Said devices shall conform 
to the current issue of the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices. Parked equipment and stored materials 
shall be as far from the traveled way as feasible. Items stored within 30 feet of the traveled way shall be marked 
and protected. The NLCHD may provide barricades (when available) upon request. 
9. In accepting this permit, the permittee, its successors and assigns, agrees to hold the NLCHD harmless from any 
liability caused by the installation, construction, maintenance or operation of the approach(es). 
10. If the work done under this permit interferes in any way with the drainage of the roadway, the permittee shall 
wholly and at his own expense make such provision as the NLCHD may direct to take care of said drainage 
problem. 
11. Upon completion of said work herein contemplated, all rubbish and debris shall be immediately removed and 
the roadway and roadside shall be left neat and presentable and to the satisfaction of the NLCHD. 
12. The permittee shall maintain at his or their sole expense the structure or object for which this permit is granted 
in a condition satisfactory to the NLCHD. 
13. Neither the acceptance of this permit nor anything herein contained shall be construed as a waiver by the 
permittee of any rights given it by the constitution or laws of the state of Idaho or of the United States. 
14. No work shall be started until an authorized representative of the NLCHD has given written notice to the 
permittee to proceed, except in case of an emergency when verbal authorization may be given with a written permit 
and fee required within five (5) working days. 
15. This permit shall be void unless the work herein contemplated shall have been completed before 30 days 
unless otherwise arranged with local road foreman. 
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LOCAL HIGHWAY TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE COUNCIL 
3330 Grace, St. 
BOISE, IDAHO 83703 
MANUAL FOR 
USE OF PUBLIC RIGHT-OF-WAY 
STANDARD APPROACH POLICY 
PREFACE 
This document is one of several produced by the Local Highway Technical Assistance 
Council, (LHTAC) in an attempt to assist the Local Highway Jurisdictions in controlling 
the use of their public rights-of-way. It is the intent that the document be applicable to 
city, county, and highway district jurisdictions equally, regardless of size. 
It is hoped that the Local Highway Jurisdictions will officially adopt this document and 
incorporate it into their city, county, or highway district operational activities. If your 
present standards exceed those presented in this document, it may be appropriate to 
adopt the more restrictive of the two. These standards are a suggested standard and 
may be modified to meet the needs of each Local Highway Jurisdiction. 
LHTAC welcomes any comments, questions, and suggestions you may have 
concerning this manual. 
Additional copies of the manual can be obtained by sending a check or money order for 
$5.00 to LHTAC, 3330 Grace St., Boise, Idaho 83703. 
Electronic copies of this manual and others can be obtained by containing LHTAC at 
1-800-259-6841 or 1-208-344-0565, or E-mail at Ihtac@micron .net, or by writing to 
LHTAC at the above address. 
June 1995 
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NOTICE 
THIS APPROACH DOES NOT HAVE A 
T AS REQUIRED BY THE 
PLEASE CALL FOR 
INFORMATION WITHIN 10 DAYS OR 
APPROACH MAY BE REMOVED. 
DATE: 
CONTACT: 
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1. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The efficiency and safety of modern streets and highways are directly related to 
the number of approaches, the design of approaches, the character of 
roadside interference and roadside obstacles. Uncontrolled approaches 
nullify carefully planned safety and maintenance features of highways. 
Highway frontage property owners have certain rights of access to and use of 
public right-of-way. The traveling public has a right to safety, freedom of 
movement, and the efficient expenditure of highway funds. 
The Local Highway Jurisdiction, (LHJ) is responsible for reviewing each 
application for an approach to see that operational efficiency and safety of 
the highway are not unduly compromised when granting access to the 
property owner. Operationally unsafe approaches should not be granted. 
Alternate means of access should be developed. 
The number of approaches should be kept to the minimum required to handle 
the anticipated volume of vehicles. 
B. PERMIT REQUIRED 
To help preserve the highways as constructed and provide responsible growth 
where allowed, any applicant planning to construct an approach to access 
the public right-of-way for any purpose shall obtain an approved 
"Application and Permit to Use Right-of-way (Approaches)." See Exhibit 
3. 
NO WORK OF ANY NATURE SHALL BE PERFORMED ON PUBLIC RIGHT- 
OF-WAY UNTIL AN APPROVED PERMIT HAS BEEN ISSUED. In an 
emergency, approval may be given in advance of processing the permit. 
The permit process should be discussed with the applicant regarding the type of 
permit application and the type of access control in effect for the roadway 
segment where the permit is requested. 
Applicant shall be informed of local policies and rules concerning approaches 
and shall pay for any changes or adjustments of highway features or 
fixtures brought about by actions, operations or requirements caused by 
the applicant. 
The authority to regulate the use of the public right-of-way of Local Highway 
Jurisdictions (LHJ) is cited as follows: 
June 1995 
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1. Section 50-314, ldaho Code, gives the cities authority over the 
streets and alleys within their jurisdiction. 
2. Section 31-805, ldaho Code, gives counties authority over the 
public streets and highways within their jurisdiction. 
3. Section 40-1310, ldaho Code, gives highway districts supervisory 
authority over access to the public right-of-way under their 
jurisdiction. 
4. Section 50-1 330, ldaho Code, gives highway districts authority over 
the public streets and public right-of-way under their jurisdiction. 
C. RESPONSIBILITY FOR ISSUING PERMITS 
The issuing of permits may be delegated to a staff member of the governing 
authority. Otherwise, all permits will be issued by the elected officials of 
the governing authority. 
D. s49-221, IDAHO CODE 
49-221 . Removal of traffic hazards. 




DEFINITION OF TERMS SECTION II 
II. DEFINITION OF TERMS, (See Exhibits 1 and 2 - Figures II,A,A and II,A,B) 
A. TERMS 
ACTUAL COSTS - As used in Section III,B and III,F of this manual, these 
costs are those incurred by the Local Highway Jurisdiction, (LHJ) for 
inspection personnel, (public or private) and for contractual services to 
have plans reviewed when these reviews are beyond the capability of the 
LHJ. LHJ costs would include wages, (loaded rate) travel, subsistence, 
and other expenses incurred. Other fees would be for personal services 
invoices. The intent is to recover LHJ costs only. 
APPLICANT - Any person, persons, corporation, partnership, or other 
singular or plural individuals making application to the LHJ for an 
approach. 
APPROACH - The section of the public right-of-way between the outside 
edge of the roadway shoulder and the public right-of-way line which is 
designed as an approved roadway for the movement of vehicles between 
the public roadway and the abutting property. 
APPROACH FLARE - The curve radius connecting the approach to the 
outside edge of the roadway shoulder. Sometimes referred to as the fillet. 
APPROACH SKEW ANGLE - The acute angle between the highway 
centerline and the extended approach centerline. 
APPROACH TRANSITION - The area from the edge of an urban 
approach sloped to match the curb and border area elevations. 
APPROACH WIDTH - Width of the approach excluding flares or 
transitions measured along the curb line or outside edge of shoulder in 
urban sections and perpendicular to approach roadway in rural sections. 
BORDER AREA - The area outside the roadway, auxiliary lanes and 
shoulders, constructed and maintained as wide, flat, rounded, and as free 
from physical obstructions and practical. 
CONTROLLED ACCESS HIGHWAY - A highway where rights of abutting 
landowners or others to access, light, air or view - in connection to a 
highway - are partially or fully controlled by public authority. 
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CORNER CLEARANCE - At an intersecting street or highway, the 
distance measured along the outside edge of shoulder or curb line, 
between the beginning or end of the intersecting street or road approach 
flare and extension of the nearest private approach edge, excluding flares 
or transitions. 
DISTANCE BETWEEN APPROACHES - The distance measured along 
the curb line or outside edge of shoulder between the extensions of the 
near edges of adjacent approaches, excluding the flares or transitions. 
FLARE TANGENT DISTANCE OR TRANSITION TANGENT DISTANCE - 
The distance, measured along the curb line or outside edge of shoulder, 
from the extension of the approach edge to the end of the approach flare 
or transition. 
FRONTAGE - The distance for which a separate property is contiguous to 
public right-of-way measured along the curb line or outside edge of 
shoulder, between frontage boundary lines of the property. 
FRONTAGE BOUNDARY LINE - A line perpendicular to the highway 
centerline that passes through the point of intersection of the property line 
and the public right-of-way line. 
HIGHWAY - The entire width between the boundary lines of every way 
publicly maintained when any part is open to the use of the public for 
vehicular travel, with jurisdiction extending to the adjacent property line - 
including sidewalks, shoulders, berms, and rights-of-way not intended for 
motorized traffic. The terms "public street" and "public right-of-way" are 
interchangeable with highway. 
JOINT USE APPROACH - An approach shared by two adjacent property 
owners for service and connecting both properties. 
LOCAL HIGHWAY JURISDICTION (LHJ) - The city, county, or highway 
district having authority over the public right-of-way. 
PERFORMANCE BOND - A document issued by a bonding company 
authorized to do business in the state of Idaho. The LHJ may allow 
substitution for the bond by an irrevocable Letter of Credit issued by a 
financial institution, or a cash deposit. 
PRIVATE APPROACH - An approach used for access to a private 
residential property. 
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PROPERTY LINE CLEARANCE - The distance measured along the curb 
line or outside edge of shoulder between the frontage boundary line and 
the extension of the nearest edge of the approach, excluding flares or 
transitions. 
PUBLIC APPROACH - An approach used by the public for access to a 
public, commercial, or industrial facility. 
PUBLIC RIGHT-OF-WAY - A right-of-way open to the public and under 
the jurisdiction of an LHJ, where the LHJ has no obligation to construct or 
maintain said right-of-way for vehicular traffic. A term used to define a 
specific space. 
ROADSIDE - A general term denoting the area adjoining the outer edge of 
the shoulder. 
ROADWAY - That portion of a highway improved, designed or ordinarily 
used for vehicular travel, exclusive of sidewalks, shoulders, berms and 
rights-of-way. A divided highway has two (2) or more roadways. 
SETBACK - The horizontal distance measured at right angles to the 
highway centerline between the right-of-way line and permanent fixtures, 
i.e., fuel-pump islands, signs, display stands, buildings, etc. 
STANDARD APPROACH HIGHWAY - All highways within the local 
jurisdictions not having controlled access restrictions. 
STOPPING SIGHT DISTANCE - Distance along a roadway that an object 
of specified height is continuously visible to the driver. For approaches 
the driver's height is 3.5' from roadway surface and the object height is 
1.5' from the roadway surface. 
STREET - Interchangeable with definition for HIGHWAY as described 
above. 
TEMPORARY APPROACH - A temporary approach will require a permit 
in conformance with this Manual. The permit will contain a time certain for 
removal of the approach. In general, it should be for not more than a 
three (3) month period. 
TRAVELED WAY - The portion of the roadway for the movement of 
vehicles, exclusive of ditches and roadside areas. 
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B. MEANINGS OF "SHALL," "SHOULD," "MAY," AND "WILL" 
• SHALL - A mandatory condition. Where certain requirements in the 
design or application of the device are described with the "shall" 
stipulation, it is mandatory when an installation is made that these 
requirements be met. 
SHOULD - An advisory condition. Where the word "should" is used, it is 
considered to be advisable usage, recommended but not mandatory. 
MAY - A permissive condition. No requirement for design or application is 
intended. 
WILL - A mandatory condition. Can be used interchangeably with the 
term shall and connoting the same meaning. 
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ELLUSTRATION OF DEFINITIONS 
APPLYING PCI WRB W ~ E R  SECT~O~YS 
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PERMITS SECTION Ill 
I l l .  PERMITS 
A. GENERAL RULES FOR APPROACHES 
General requirements are listed on Exhibit 3, Application and Permit to Use 
Public Right-of-way, Approaches. Additional requirements are as  follows: 
1. The location, design, construction, and operation of all approaches 
should comply with the design principles and geometric restrictions 
established in this manual. The approach should be designed for 
the actual and future property access requirements. 
2. Alleys should generally conform to approach standards, 
maintaining sidewalk continuity across the approach. 
3. Urban and rural approaches shall conform to standard drawings 
4. The LHJ should encourage the construction of joint-use 
approaches for the access to adjoining properties - if not prohibited 
by local ordinance, and providing the application for a joint-use 
approach is signed by both property owners. Permittees may 
record the joint-use approach permit signed by both parties with the 
County Recorder after final permit approval by the LHJ. This would 
insure that both parties would continue to have use of the approach 
until the agreement is modified. 
5. The LHJ reserves the right to require the Permittee, its successors 
or assigns, to make any changes, additions, repairs or relocations 
to any approach or its appurtenances within the public right-of-way 
for necessary relocation, reconstruction, widening, or maintenance 
of the highway and/or to provide proper protection of life and 
property on, or adjacent to, the roadway. 
6. Generally, no part of the public right-of-way shall be used for: 
a )  the parking of vehicles except in authorized parking areas 
b) the servicing, refueling, repairing of vehicles except for 
emergencies. 
c)  displays, sales, exhibits, business signs, etc. 
June 1995 
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APPLICATION AND PERMIT TO USE PUBLIC RIGHT-OF-WAY 
APPROACHES 
COPY OF PERMIT MUST BE PRESENT AT WORK SITE DURING CONSTRUCTiON 
PUBLIC ROAD SURFACE TYPE: (DIRT) (GRAVEL) (PAVEMENT) 
I I 
Start Date: 





This permit shall not be valid for excavation 
until, or unless, the provision of ldaho code, 
Title 55, Chapter 22 have been complied 
with. 
PRIOR TO EXCAVATION, CALL ONE 
NUMBER LOCATION SERVICE 
Posted Speed: 
APPROACH 
Single Residence WIDTH SURFACE TYPE 
Multiple Residence No. Served ESTIMATED ADT (VEHICLE COUNT) 
Business type Must meet the requirements of Local Highway Technical Assistance Council, 
(LHTAC) Standard Approach Policy and §49-221, ldaho Code. 
Agriculture 
Other Explain: 
ATTACH SKETCH OF PROPOSED WORK AND TRAFFIC CONTROL PLANS: 
SPECIAL PROVISIONS: 
See reverse side for General Provisions. 
I CERTIFY THAT I AM THE OWNER OR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PROPOSED PROPERTY TO BE 
SERVED AND AGREE TO DO THE WORK REQUESTED HEREON IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 
REQUIREMENTS PRINTED ON THE REVERSE SIDE, THE SPECIAL PROVISIONS AND THE PLANS MADE A PART OF 
THlS PERMIT. 
NAME OF PERMITTEE 
I 
ADDRESS 
I i 1  
SUBJECT TO ALL TERMS, CONDITIONS, AND PROVISIONS SHOWN ON THlS FORM OR ATTACHMENTS, PERMISSION IS HEREBY 
GRANTED TO THE ABOVE-NAMED APPLICANT TO PERFORM THE WORK DESCRIBED ABOVE. 
APPLICANT-PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT 
SIGNATURE OWNER/ AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE 
CITY STATE ZIP 
FOR LOCAL HIGHWAY JURISDICTION USE 
DATE 
TEMPOWRY PERMIT FINAL PERMIT 
Approved Date: R e j e c t e d  Date: 
Tentative approval subject to inspection of installation. Corrections Required: 
Date: 
Approved by: 
LHJ Authorized Representative 
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GENERAL PROVISIONS 
A deposit in a n  amount  to b e  determined by t h e  Local Highway Jurisdiction, (LHJ) (minimum $200.00) shall 
accompany  this application. If proper construction or  repair is m a d e  a n d  accepted within ten  (10)  days,  t h e  
deposit will b e  refunded. If proper construction or  repair is not completed within ten (10) days ,  the  LHJ m a y  
m a k e  repairs and  a s s e s s  t h e  deposit. A $25.00 administrative f e e  is non-refundable. 
T h e  LHJ m a y  change ,  a m e n d  or  terminate this permit o r  any  of t h e  conditions herein enumerated if permittee 
fails to comply with its provisions o r  requirements a s  s e t  forth herein. 
Approaches shall b e  for the  bona fide purpose of securing a c c e s s  a n d  not for the  purpose of parking, conducting 
business ,  or servicing vehicles on the  public right-of-way. 
No revisions or additions shall b e  m a d e  t o  a n  approach or its appur tenances  on  the  public right-of-way without 
t h e  written permission of the LHJ. 
T h e  permittee shall furnish all material, labor a n d  equipment involved in t h e  construction of t h e  approach and its 
appurtenances.  This shall include furnishing approved drainage pipe of a size specified on  permit (12 inch 
minimum) curb and  gutter, concrete  sidewalk, etc., where required. Materials and workmanship shall b e  good 
quality and  a r e  subject to inspection a n d  approval by t h e  LHJ. 
T h e  LHJ reserves the right to require t h e  permittee, its s u c c e s s o r s  a n d  assigns,  a t  a n y  time, to m a k e  s u c h  
changes ,  additions, repairs a n d  relocations t o  any  approach or its appur tenances  within the  public right-of-way 
a s  may  b e  necessary  to  permit t h e  relocation, reconstruction, widening, drainage, a n d  maintenance of the  
roadway and/or  to provide proper protection t o  life a n d  property on  o r  adjacent  to  the roadway. 
Approaches shall conform to the  plans m a d e  a part of this permit. Adequate drawings or s k e t c h e s  shall b e  
included showing the  design, materials, construction requirements a n d  proposed location of t h e  approach.  All 
approaches  shall b e  in accordance  with Exhibits 9 and  1 3  of t h e  Manual for Use  of Public Right of Way - 
Standard Approach Policy. 
During the construction of t h e  approach(es) ,  s u c h  barricades, s i g n s  a n d  other  traffic control devices  shall b e  
e rec ted  and maintained by t h e  permittee, a s  m a y  b e  d e e m e d  n e c e s s a r y  by t h e  LHJ. Said devices shall conform 
to t h e  current i s sue  of t h e  Manual on  Uniform Traffic Control Devices. Parked equipment and  stored materials 
shall b e  a s  far from the  traveled way a s  feasible. Items stored within 3 0  fee t  of t h e  traveled way shall b e  marked 
a n d  protected. T h e  LHJ may provide barricades (when available) upon  request .  
In accepting this permit, the  permittee, its s u c c e s s o r s  a n d  ass igns ,  a g r e e s  to  hold the  LHJ harmless  from any 
liability caused  by t h e  installation, construction, maintenance or  operation of t h e  approach(es).  
If t h e  work d o n e  under this permit interferes in a n y  way with t h e  drainage of t h e  roadway, t h e  permittee shall 
wholly and a t  his own e x p e n s e  m a k e  s u c h  provision a s  the  LHJ m a y  direct to t ake  c a r e  of said drainage 
problem. 
Upon completion of said work herein contemplated, all rubbish and  debris  shall b e  immediately removed and  t h e  
roadway and  roadside shall b e  left n e a t  a n d  presentable  a n d  to the  satisfaction of the LHJ. 
T h e  permittee shall maintain a t  his o r  their s o l e  e x p e n s e  the  structure o r  object for which this permit is granted in 
a condition satisfactory to  the  LHJ. 
Neither the accep tance  of this permit nor anything herein contained shall b e  construed a s  a waiver by the 
permittee of any  rights given it by t h e  constitution o r  laws of the  s t a t e  of Idaho or  of the United S ta tes .  
No work shall b e  started until a n  authorized representative of the LHJ h a s  given written notice to  t h e  permittee to 
proceed,  except  in c a s e  of a n  emergency  when verbal authorization m a y  b e  given with a written permit and  fee 
required within five (5) working days. 
This permit shall b e  void unless the work herein contemplated shall have been completed before 
J u n e  1995 
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8. INSTRUCTIONS FOR ISSUING PERMITS 
The Application and Permit to Use Public Right-of-way should be completed by 
the issuing agency rather than the applicant. 
Only the original copy of the application is needed. Copies for LHJ use may be 
duplicated as required. The applicant receives a copy of the temporary 
permit during construction, then is give the original of the final permit after 
approval of the LHJ. 
The LHJ may request additional information for some specific approaches prior 
to or during processifig of the applications. This request normally involves 
traffic operations and plans for some commercial approaches. 
Applications shall be signed by the owner or his authorized representative. 
A sketch should be provided by the applicant showing the locations (by highway 
station or other local means) of existing and proposed approach changes, 
location of other proposed work to be done within the public right-of-way, 
and highway signs in the area of the approach, i.e., a copy of reduced 
project plan sheets is sufficient. Two copies of the prints, drawings or 
sketches are required. Cost of relocating any highway signs shall be 
borne by the permittee. 
A special provision should be added to permits for inspection reimbursement 
for permits requiring large amounts of work on the right-of-way; those 
which severely impact traffic; or those using sizable amounts of inspection 
time. 
The following special provision could be used: 
"The shall be reimbursed for inspection 
(LOCAL HIGHWAY JURISDICTION) 
including actual costs." 
The "temporary permit" portion should be signed by the authorized 
representative of the LHJ when issuing. After the facility is completed, the 
"final permit" portion should be signed by the LHJ - if acceptable. 
1. Assignment of Numbers to Permits and Receipts 
Permits should be numbered by the fiscal year and the sequence 
numbers started over each year with 001. 
June 1995 of 
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Example of Assigning Numbers: 
The first permit issued in fiscal year 1995 (FY95) would be 95-001. 
A single numbering sequence should be used for both the 
Application and Permit to Use Public Right-of-way 
(Approaches) and (Utilities) forms. 
C. TRAFFIC CONTROL FOR PERMITS TO USE PUBLIC RIGHT-OF-WAY 
The safe, efficient passage and protection of vehicles and pedestrians during 
any work within the public right-of-way covered by permit is very important 
and shall be the responsibility of the permittee. During the progress of the 
work, barricades, signs and other traffic control devices shall be erected 
and maintained by the permittee in conformance with the current Manual 
on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, Part VL, latest edition. See Exhibits 4 
and 5 - Figures III,C. - A and B. 
D. OBTAINING RIGHT-OF-WAY VIA THE LOCAL PLANNING ACT OF 
1975 
Planning and zoning authorities may require that additional land needed to 
accommodate acceleration/deceleration lanes, corner radii, etc., be 
granted to the applicable LHJ by appropriate instrument as a condition for 
approving any rezoning, special use permit, or subdivision request. 
The following are needed to accomplish granting of property: 
1. A comprehensive plan for the citylcounty must be in effect. 
($67-6508, 1 .C.) 
2. The transportation component of the plan should have the location 
and widths of the major thoroughfares identified. 
($67-6508, I.C.) 
3. When platting a subdivision, $50-1310, Idaho Code, provides for 
dedication of public right-of-way. 
In special cases, a permanent easement (least desirable) can be granted when 
building setback or other problems preclude other forms of dedication. 
Instruments conveying land for public right-of-way use should be granted 
to and accepted by the appropriate city, county, or highway district and 
recorded with the County Recorder. 
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E. APPROACHES FOR NEW DEVELOPMENTS 
Before an approach permit is granted, a traffic-impact study may be required of 
all new developments which will generate over 100 cars per hour (total 
two-way) during the peak hour, or a lesser volume if requested by the 
LHJ. 
1. The study should include data on the following: 
a) Existing peak hour traffic volumes and conditions. 
b) Oireetionai distribution estimates of added traffic. 
c) Projections of added traffic volumes for all appropriate 
critical hours. 
d) Determination of needed improvements, traffic controls, 
approach locations and their design and the impact on 
nearby traffic control. 
e) Identification of any additional highway right-of-way which 
might be required. 
2. The results of the impact study should enable the responsible 
agencies having jurisdiction to: 
a) Verify the need for capacity improvements along access 
streets and critical intersections. 
b) Consider the effects on the local transportation system. 
c) Enable the LHJ to check the access design. 
d) Determine a fair and equitable means of cost-sharing 
between the developer and the public agencies for needed 
intersection or access improvements, including added traffic 
lanes and traffic control devices. 
The developer is required to coordinate the study with both the LHJ and the local 
planning agency andlor building department which controls issuance of 
building permits for the development if they are separate agencies. 
The developer shall provide and pay for the study and the LHJ, or its agent, 
should review the study. See Section III,F, Application Fees, for details 
on the Special Traffic Studies Fee. 
June 1995 
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F. APPLICATION FEES 
Application fees for the various types of public right-of-way use permits 
issued by the LHJ shall be as  follows: 
1. Approach Applications 
a)  Standard Approach Policy 
b) Partial and Full Control Access 
2. Agricultural Use and Other Non-Permanent Use $20.00 
3. Special Traffic Studies or Appraisal Fee Actual Cost 
4. Inspector Fee Actual Cost 
5. Performance Bond (Furnished by Applicant 
when required) 
In addition to the application fee, the LHJ may require payment of the estimated 
cost of any studies or appraisals when large development plans must be 
reviewed and/or extensive LHJ time is expended on a traffic study or 
review. These fees may be charged at the discretion of the LHJ. 
Estimated costs would include wages, travel, subsistence and other 
expenses incurred. The intent is to recover LHJ actual costs only. 
Applications may not be processed before payment of the non-refundable 
application fee. 
Application fees may be waived for the following (waiver of the fee does not 
waive the need for a permit) 
Government Agencies 
Approaches resulting from right-of-way negotiations 
Future approaches shown on plan - if installed according to 
plan. 
Agricultural use of right-of-way as  part of right-of-way 
agreement. 
Approach width changes on standard approach sections, if safety 
and drainage are not adversely affected. 
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Those instances where a direct benefit to the LHJ is gained. An explanation 
justifying the waiver of fee shall be made on the application or attached to 
it. Examples would be: Allowing an adjacent landowner to level the public 
right-of-way along with adjacent property to remove earth obstructions and 
improve safety; plant and. maintain grass; and non-obstruction 
landscaping on the right-of-way. 
Inspection fees may be charged at the discretion of the LHJ when substantial 
inspection time will be required. The fee would include wages, (loaded 
rate) travel, subsistence and other expenses incurred. The intent is to 
only recover LHJ costs. When the inspection fee is to be assessed it shall 
be stipulated under the application special provision. 
A performance bond may be required of an applicant at the discretion of the LHJ. 
The purpose of this bond is to guarantee completion of the work in 
accordance with the requirements of the permit. The bond amount should 
be large enough to cover costs to correct potential damage to the highway 
system the permittee might cause. The bond must be executed by a 
surety company authorized to conduct business in Idaho. The bond must 
be executed and incorporated into the permit file before the permittee is 
authorized to commence work. 
The Performance Bond will be returned to the Permittee following the final 
approval of the facility by the LHJ. 
G. SUBSTANDARD APPROACHES 
If a substandard approach is constructed, t h e  permittee shall be given ten (10) 
days to upgrade t h e  approach to the prescribed standards on the permit, 
or have a plan of action approved by the LHJ with a completion date. 
Permits shall be revoked for approaches which are not upgraded to the 
prescribed standards and action taken to remove the approaches. 
Exhibit 6 - Figure III,G, "Notice" may be used to post an illegal approach if the 
owner or the owner's representative cannot be found at the site. If the 
owner does not respond to notifications, the LHJ may send a certified 
letter (with a return receipt requested from the post office) to the owner 
advising of the illegal approach or encroachment and give ten (10) days to 
obtain the permit. In case of an illegal approach jeopardizing the safety of 
the traveling public, the LHJ may install appropriate temporary traffic 
control devices at their discretion. 
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Un-approved approaches may be removed by the LHJ and legal action initiated 
to collect the removal cost, 940-2319, Idaho Code. The above ten (10) 
day requirement may be reduced if a hazardous situation is created by 
permittee or party and immediate corrective work is ordered by the LHJ 
when time is of the essence. 
H. MAINTENANCE RESPONSIBILITY 
Once the approach has been constructed and approved, the LHJ will maintain 
the approach as follows, unless otherwise provided: 
@ Paved Public Apprsaek - rvlainiained to the public right-of-way 
line. 
o Paved Private Ap~roach - Maintain to end of radii, permittee 
maintains beyond radii. 
Gravel Public Approach to Paved Highway - Permittee installs 
an asphalt wedge sufficient to protect the roadway pavement edge 
(three (3) to six (6) feet back from the edge of road for the width of 
the approach). It is desirable to pave the approach to the right-of- 
way line when the road is reconstructed. The LHJ maintains to the 
right-of-way line. 
Gravel Public Approach to Gravel Highway - Maintained to the 
right-of-way line. 
Gravel Private Approach to Paved Hiahway - Permittee installs 
an asphalt wedge sufficient to protect the roadway pavement edge 
(three (3) to six (6) feet back from the edge of road for the width of 
the approach). The permittee maintains beyond the wedge. 
1. APPEAL PROCESS 
Applicants denied an approach permit or final approval by the authorized staff 
member may appeal to the appropriate city council, county 
commissioners, or highway district commissioners. The decision of the 
LHJ shall be final. 
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IV. DESIGN PRINCIPLES 
Design principles for the border area, setbacks, approach locations, base and surfacing, 
and drainage must meet minimum standards set by the Local Highway 
Jurisdictions or as shown in this manual. 
A. BORDER AREA 
The border area may require re-grading andlor landscaping when adjacent 
property and approaches are developed. Border area work shall ensure 
that adequate sight distance, proper drainage, desirable slopes for 
maintenance operations and a pleasing appearance are present. (See 
Exhibit 7 - Figure IV,A.) 
The border area shall be free of encroachments and treated as necessary to 
prevent vehicular use by ditching, special grading, use of concrete or 
bituminous curbs, fencing, guard rail, guide posts, etc., as long as the 
devices do not impair adequate sight distance or constitute a hazard to 
pedestrians or vehicles. 
6. SETBACK 
Businesses that are located adjacent to the highway cannot lawfully serve patrons 
in vehicles that are parked or standing on the public right-of-way. 
Improvements on private property adjacent to the public right-of-way to 
serve patrons shall be setback from the roadway so that stopping, standing 
or maneuvering of vehicles on the public right-of-way is not necessary. A 
minimum setback of fourteen (14) feet from the public right-of-way line is 
required. When a certain number of parking spaces per square footage of 
building are required, the parking spaces cannot be included within the 
public right-of-way. 
Sufficient parking and or storage area to prevent the stopping of vehicles on the 
approach or the backing up of traffic onto the traveled way, especially for 
parking lots, garages, drive-in cafesltheaters, truck terminals, etc., should 
be provided off the public right-of-way. Business traffic flow should be 
designed to exit the main highway onto a local road or street before 
entering the business and then exit the business onto the main highway 
whenever possible. 
Poles, signs, displays, etc., that restrict the sight distance of a vehicle entering or 
leaving the property should not be installed. 
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C. APPROACH LOCATIONS 
Approaches shall be located so as not to create undue interference with, or hazard 
to, the free movement of normal roadway or pedestrian traffic, or cause 
areas of congestion. Approaches must be located where the roadway 
alignment and profile are favorable, i.e., away from sharp curves, steep 
grades, andlor where the sight distance would not be adequate for safe 
traffic operations. Approach locations that restrict or interfere with the 
placement and proper functioning of traffic control signs, signals, lighting, or 
other devices must also be avoided. 
At all approaches the sight triangle depicted in Exhibit 7 - Figure IV,A., shall be 
protected. 
Minimum sight distances for approaches should not be lower than the stopping 
sight distance on wet pavement (150 feet at 25 mph, 200 feet at 30 mph, 
225 feet at 35 mph, 325 feet at 45 mph, 400 feet at 50 mph, and 450 feet at 
55 mph). Recommended sight distances are 710 feet at 35 mph, 915 feet 
at 45 mph and 1130 feet at 55 mph. The recommended distance would 
allow a 50 foot truck to make a left turn from an approach and clear the 
near lane before a vehicle in the near lane had to slow down, A downgrade 
prior to the approach increases the sight distance requirement. 
All approaches serving primarily truck traffic shall use a curb return approach in 
accordance with Exhibit 8 - Figure IV,C. The radius shall be adequate to 
accommodate the truck turning movements, and the approach width shall 
be forty (40) feet. 
Private approaches onto arterial highway and collector highways should be 
designed and constructed to provide forward vehicular movement for 
ingress and egress to the adjacent properties. Approaches should be 
limited such that a minimum separation of three hundred thirty (330) feet 
center to center of approach is achieved. If unusual conditions prevent 
approach locations as specified above, the Applicant may request special 
consideration by the LHJ. All approaches should conform to the 
requirements in this policy. 
Failure to comply with minimum requirements and/or recommendations may be 
sufficient cause for the LHJ to deny an approach location, prohibit specific 
approach usage, or revoke an existing approach permit. 
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D. BASE AND SURFACING 
The applicant must supply, place, and properly compact the approach fill and base 
material. All base material should consist of crushed sand-gravel, or 
crushed sand and rock mixtures containing sufficient granular fines to fill the 
voids between the larger gravel and stone, and to permit compaction. 
In curb and gutter areas, approaches should be paved to the back edge of the 
sidewalk or right-of-way line, whichever is the least. (See Exhibit 9 - Figure 
IV,D) 
In areas without curb and gutter, the approach base and surfacing should consist 
of an adequate depth of granular material to protect the roadway edge. The 
LHJ may require the property owner to furnish and place asphalt surfacing 
when necessary for maintenance or operational purposes. The surfacing 
should normally extend a minimum distance of twenty (20) feet from the 
outside shoulder line, or to the public right-of-way line, whichever is the 
least. Casually used field approaches may extend a lesser distance; a five 
(5) foot minimum is recommended. Commercial approaches are normally 
required to be surfaced. (See Section III,G., for required paving and 
maintenance.) 
E. DRAINAGE 
All approaches should drain away from the roadway - except in areas having curb 
and gutter. Generally, approaches in areas having curb and gutter should 
be graded so that adjacent properties do not drain to the roadway unless 
existing storm drain system capacity is demonstrated to be adequate within 
current design criteria. Approaches should also be constructed so they do 
not impair the drainage within the public right-of-way, alter the stability of the 
roadway subgrade, or materially alter the drainage of the areas adjacent to 
the public right-of-way. 
Culverts and drop inlets should be installed where required and should be the type 
and size specified by the LHJ. Where the border area is re-graded and/or 
landscaped, the border area should have sufficient slope, culverts, and drop 
inlets for adequate drainage. Slopes, where practical, should be a 4:l 
maximum. 
Culverts should be installed in accordance with Exhibit 10 - Figure IV,E. 
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REWRM APPROACH 
-- 
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F. CATTLE GUARDS - (See LHTAC Manual for Highway and Street 
Standards) 
Section 40-2310, ldaho Code, regulates the installation of cattle guards 
on local highways and should be referenced when the question arises. 
LHJ's are encouraged to place them on private property when necessary 
on private approaches. 
Section 40-203(5), ldaho Code, speaks to obstruction of the public right- 
of-way and the misdemeanor offense involved. 
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V. GEOMETRIC RESTRICTIONS 
A. GENERAL 
The following geometric restrictions shall be considered on each Application and 
Permit to Use Public Right-of-way Approaches: 




Property Line Clearance 
Distance Between Approaches 
Approach Transitions and Flares 
Approach Grades 
Volume of Traffic Using Approach 
B. NUMBER OF APPROACHES 
The number of approaches should be the minimum number required to adequately 
serve the needs of the property. The Standard Approach Policy should be 
that not more than two approaches be allowed for any single property tract 
or business establishment frontage. Traffic circulation on the property, 
parking and access to other streets shall be reviewed and adjusted to 
provide a minimum number of approaches. The LHJ shall evaluate each 
case on an individual merit and allow or disallow additional approaches 
based on the evaluation. 
C. APPROACH ALIGNMENT 
Single approaches should intersect as closely as possible at right angles to the 
roadway. When two approaches are used on one frontage for access to 
both directions of travel on the travel-way, each approach may be placed at 
skew angles between 70' and 90' (desirable). (See Exhibit 12, Figure V,H, 
page 33) 
D. APPROACH WIDTH 
An approach shall be wide enough to properly serve the anticipated type and 
volume of traffic. Minimum widths should be used only when space 
limitations must be considered. 
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Standard Approach Widths: 
A design speed of 10 mph minimum and a recommended 15 mph is desirable. 
The width shall be within the specified limits, except that approaches in 







A joint-use approach should use the maximum dimensions of a single approach. 
An approach that is adjacent to a public alley may include the alley, if 
approved by the LHJ; however, the width of the combined approach shall 
not exceed forty (40) feet. 
Commercial approaches in urban areas with volumes exceeding fifty (50) vehicles 
per hour during a total of any four (4) hours per day should be designed to 
public highway standards using a curb radius or fillet radius of twenty (20) 
feet minimum, and a recommended thirty (30) feet on high volume 
approaches. An approach divider is recommended for a commercial 
approach to improve operation of the approach. Special approaches 
serving shopping centers or other major traffic generators shall not be 
restricted to the width requirements, but shall be designed to serve the 
traffic; i.e., both a right turn and a left turn lane, divider and entrance lane. 
These special approaches shall be designed by a professional engineer 
licensed in the state of Idaho. 
Minimum 
Twelve feet (1 2') 
Twelve feet (1 2') 
Fifteen feet (15') 
Twenty feet (20') 
Twenty-eight feet (28') 
E. CORNER CLEARANCE ( See Exhibit ?I - Figure V,E.) 
Maximum 
Thirty feet (30') 
Forty feet (40') 
Thirty feet (30') 
Forty feet (40') 
Forty-eight feet (48') 
1. Approaches should be located as far as possible from intersections 
to: 
a) Preserve visibility at the intersection. 
b) Allow a vehicle that is leaving the approach to enter the 
desired traffic lane before entering the intersection. 
c) Permit a vehicle crossing the intersection to enter the 
approach in an orderly, safe manner with a minimum of 
interference to through traffic. 
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d) Facilitate the installation of traffic signs, signals, and lighting where 
required. 
If traffic volumes exceed 250 vehicles per hour, or if the intersection is 
signalized, the corner clearance shall be at least twice the minimum 
requirement. Any approach within a limited left or right turn may also 
be restricted to a right turn in and a right turn out, in addition to the 
minimum corner clearance requirements. 
Less than the minimum distance may be permitted by special 
circumstances; however, the approach transition or curb flare shall 
not encroach upon the curb or pavement edge forming the corner 
radii of the intersection. 
Corner clearances are as follows: 
See Exhibit 11 - Figure V,E., Corner Clearance Diagram for further details. 
With Curb and Gutter 
Entering Side of lntersection 
Exit Side of Intersection 
Without Curb and Gutter 
Entering Side of lntersection 
Exit Side of Intersection 
F. PROPERTY LINE CLEARANCE 
Minimum property line clearance should be five (5) feet for curbed or urban 
approaches and equal to the approach radius. A minimum of twenty (20) 
feet for all other highways is recommended, unless a joint-use approach is 
installed. The approach shall not extend within the clearance distance 
except when existing physical features such as a house or garage, etc., 
require that the approach be located closer to the property line. Field 
approaches may be allowed adjacent to the property line when required for 
proper utilization of the field; however, joint-use approaches are 
recommended whenever the property line allowance is made. 
Minimum 
Corner Radius + 20 ft. 
Corner Radius + 10 ft. 
Minimum 
Corner Radius + 40 ft. 
Corner Radius + 20 ft. 
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Recommended 
Corner Radius + 40 to 60 ft. 
Recommended 
Corner Radius + 20 to 40 ft. 
GEOMETRIC RESTRICTIONS SECTION V 
G. DISTANCE BETWEEN APPROACHES 
The minimum distance between approaches shall be ten (10) feet for curb 
and gutter sections and for developed urban areas where curb and gutter 
do not exist, but are warranted. The minimum distance between 
approaches for other areas is forty (40) feet except as stated in the 
following paragraph. In curb and gutter areas with sidewalks, a minimum 
sidewalk distance between approaches of eight (8) feet at back of sidewalk 
shall be provided for pedestrian refuge. Where parking is allowed along the 
highway, the distance between approaches shall be short enough to 
discourage parking or long enough to provide multiples of parking spaces. 
All approaches serving primarily truck traffic shall use a curb return approach in 
accordance with Exhibit 8 - Figure IV,C. The radius shall be adequate to 
accommodate the truck turning movements, and the approach width shall 
be forty (40) feet. Private approaches onto arterial or collector classified 
highways shall be designed and constructed to provide forward vehicular 
movement for ingress and egress to the adjacent properties. Approaches 
shall be limited such that a minimum separation of 330 feet center to center 
of approach is achieved. If unusual conditions prevent approach locations 
as specified above, the applicant may request special consideration by the 
LHJ. 
H. APPROACH TRANSITIONS AND FLARES 
In curb and gutter sections, the transition connecting the edge of the approach to 
the curb shall be as specified in Exhibit 9 - Figure IV,D. 
In sections not having a curb and gutter, the circular arcs or approach flares should 
connect the outside edge of the approach to the outside edge of the 
roadway shoulders, as specified in Exhibit 12 - Figure V,H. The approach 
flare tangent distance should not exceed twenty (20) feet. 
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GEOMETRIC RESTRICTIONS SECTION V 
1. APPROACH GRADES 
On curbed sections, the approach grade should conform to Exhibit 9 - Figure IV,D. 
If the maximum allowable slope is not great enough to bring the approach 
to the level of the sidewalk, a depressed sidewalk should be installed. The 
connection between the original sidewalk and the depressed sidewalk shall 
be made through a warped section, the slope of which shall not vary more 
than six percent (6%) from the longitudinal grade of the original sidewalk. 
All new curbs or sidewalks should be constructed to the line and grade of 
the existing curb or sidewalk with every effort to construct a sidewalk that is 
uniformly graded and free of dips. The maximum gradient limits beyond the 
outer edge of the sidewalk shall be the same as for uncurbed approaches. 
On uncurbed sections, the approach grade should be a minus two percent (-2%) 
for at least six feet (6') beyond the outside shoulder line in order to provide 
proper drainage in a ditch section of twenty feet (20') in a fill section, as 
specified in Exhibit 12 - Figure V,H. Beyond this point, the maximum grade 
for commercial approaches should be a plus or minus six percent (2 6%). 
The maximum grade for all other types of approaches should a plus or 
minus eight percent (2 8%) in flat terrain, a plus or minus twelve percent (2 
12%) in rolling terrain and plus or minus fifteen percent (2 15%) in 
mountainous terrain. 
J. MAILBOX TURNOUTS 
Mailbox turnouts may be combined with or may be independent of 
approaches in rural areas. It is desired to have the mail carrier stop out 
of the travel-way whenever possible for safety reasons. The approach 
applicant should be required to construct a mailbox turnout at the same 
time if a mail box will be installed. Turnouts with a minimum width of 
eight (8) feet {ten (10) feet desirable) from the edge of the travel-way are 
recommended. See Exhibit 13 - Figure V,J, or refer to the Manual for 
the Location, Support and Mounting of Mailboxes, published by LHTAC 
April, 1997. Mailbox supports should not be larger than 4-inch by 4-inch 
wood posts, 1%-inch metal pipe or 1%-inch angles (2.3 pounds per foot) 
for safety reasons. The box-to-post attachment should be strong enough 
to resist separation when hit. No massive metal, concrete, stone or other 
hazardous support should be allowed. Deficient installations should be 
corrected. 
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RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 3001 
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C. 
693 Styner Avenue, Suite 9 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-1505 
FAX (208) 883-4593 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICLAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON ) 
(Husband and Wife), ) Case No. CV 2008-1 80 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) SECOND AFFIDAVIT 
) OF DAN PAYNE 
VS. 1 
) 
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY ) 
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR ) 
THE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY ) 
DISTRICT, ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICHARD ) 
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their individual ) 
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official capacity and ) 
in h ~ s  individual capacity, ) 
) 
Defendants. 1 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Latah ) 
Dan Payne, upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am a Defendant in this matter, am over eighteen (1 8) years of age, am competent to 
testify to the matters set forth herein and make this affidavit upon my personal knowledge. 
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2. I have been employed by Defendant North Latah County Highway District 
("District") since 1974 and District foreman since 1994. Since 1974, my duties for District 
foreman have included maintaining and improving projects on Camps Canyon Road with the 
primary difference being that, as foreman, I oversee and supervise the District's work instead of 
doing it. 
3. Absent special circumstances, which are not present in this case, when the District 
undertakes improvements on a public road established by prescription, such as Camps Canyon 
Road, those improvements are made within the District's prescriptive minimum fifty foot (50') 
wide right-of-way without permission of adjoining landowners because such permission is not 
necessary as all of the District's work is undertaken within its legal right-of-way. However, the 
District's foremen will routinely make an effort to inform adjoining landowners of planned 
improvement projects, particularly major ones, as a courtesy and convenience. In 1996, the 
District followed this practice when it undertook improvements to Camps Canyon Road in that 
the District did not seek permission from landowner Ed Swanson who owned what is now the 
real property owned by Plaintiffs. At no time did Mr. Swanson either dedicate or gift any right- 
of-way to the District in connection with the 1996 improvements. Mr. Swanson was aware of 
those improvements and merely had no objection to them. 
4. In 2005 and 2006, Camps Canyon Road was widened slightly, meaning less than a 
foot or two on Plaintiffs' side of Camps Canyon Road when gravel was spread over the entire 
portion of the traveled roadway following the improvements on Wagners' side of the road. 
5. Since 2005 and 2006, the only significant activities that have been undertaken by the 
District on Camps Canyon Road in the area of Plaintiffs7 real property and Wagners' real 
property are graveling, road grading and snow plowing. These activities are essential to proper 
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maintenance of all public roads. These activities and vehicular use contribute to the movement 
of gravel particularly toward the sides of a road. In the grading process, most gravel is brought 
back toward the road center, but inevitably some gravel moves outward, which serves to stabilize 
and support the road but does result in minimal, necessary widening of the road over time. 
6. On or about March, 2006, Robert Wagner, who was in the process of building a 
residence, applied to the District using the District's standard form to obtain a permit for an 
approach onto Camps Canyon Road from the Wagners' real property. I met with Mr. Wagner 
who showed me a post next to the road which he said represented his southern property line. 
North of that post was an old driveway that used to lead to a home and outbuildings on Mr. 
Wagner's property. At least 50 feet further north of that driveway, Mr. Wagner had begun 
construction of a driveway which he wanted to be the location of his approach permit. I asked 
why he didn't want to use the old driveway onto his property, and he replied that his neighbor, 
Plaintiff Don Halvorson thought it would encroach on his property. Mr. Wagner said something 
to the effect the location he had selected was well north of the old driveway, would "be safe" and 
not cause any problems with his neighbor. I approved his approach permit application for that 
location. 
7. On or about April, 2006, Mr. Wagner told me that Don Halvorson had complained 
that the driveway approach was on the Halvorsons' real property. Mr. Wagner then handed me a 
copy of the legal description from the deed to his property, a true and correct copy of which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit A. I met Mr. Wagner at Camps Canyon Road and used a measuring 
wheel from that legal description's point of beginning in Camps Canyon Road, which I lined up 
with Plaintiffs' fence, and measured "699 feet, more or less, along the County Road." That 
distance was a great distance past the post Mr. Wagner had set for his southeasterly corner and 
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was south of the old driveway and approximately one hundred feet south of the approach for 
which the permit had been issued. 
8. On April 12, 2006, I attended a meeting of the District commissioners where Don 
Halvorson and Mr. Wagner were present and spoke about the driveway issue. I stated that I had 
measured the distance along the County Road and that, in my opinion, the permitted approach 
was' approximately 100 feet north of Mr. Wagner's southern property boundary. Mr. Halvorson 
confirmed that the point of beginning I used that was based on his fence location was accurate. I 
asked Mr. Halvorson why he thought the approach was on his property and, if so, what had 
happened to the 699 feet of road frontage shown on Mr. Wagner's deed. He mentioned 
something about a "switchback" and that the road had been moved, which I knew to be false. 
9. On or about June, 2006, Mr. Wagner told me that Mr. Halvorson had produced a 
survey and that he wanted Mr. Wagner to move his driveway. Mr. Wagner filled out a new 
application and showed me the location, which was at least one hundred feet north of the first, 
permitted approach. I approved this second application on June 9,2006, a true and correct copy 
of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B. I revoked the first permit and threw it away as it was 
no longer valid. 
10. Mr. Wagner proceeded over the next weekend to construct the new driveway and he 
had the rock used in construction of the first driveway pulled onto his property and had the cut 
that was made for the first driveway filled in with soil. 
1 1. To the best of my knowledge, Plaintiffs have not complained about the June, 2006 
permit or Mr. Wagner's second driveway. 
12. As foreman for the eastern subdistrict of the District, the District commissioners have 
delegated to me the responsibility for the review and issuance of approach permits for my 
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subdistrict. I follow District standards, including the applicable Local Highway Technical 
Assistance Council Manual, in the review and issuance of approach permits. 
The above statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
Dated this 30th day of January, 2009. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 30th day of January, 2009. 
I hereby certify that ( 
NOTARY PUBLIC for the State of Idaho 
My commission expires: F- 17-3.0 1 3 
CERTIElUTE OF SERVICE 
~4 9 ~ k w t i ~  
3n this day of hmary, 2 09, I caused a true and correct copy of 
this document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below: 
DON HALVORSON U.S. Mail 
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON [ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail 
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD [ ] FAX (208) 322-4486 
KENDRICK, IDAHO 83 537 [&J Hand Delivery 
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EXHISIT  A 
APPLICATION AND PERMIT TO USE PUBLIC RIGHT-OF-WAY -- APPROACHES 
COPY OF PERMIT MUST BE PRESENT AT WORK SiTE DURING CONSTRUCTIUN 
PUBLIC ROAD SURFACE TYPE: (DIRT) (GRAVEL) (PAVEMENT) 
Start Date: 6 
f 
  st. Completion Date: 6 I I )  
Road Name: C o l 0 ~ q  loo ,,r) j? 
~ocation: SE ,?$ cia t ~,i,! 
Sight Distance: mc *a 
Posted Speed: SS M P\ 
! 
NOTICE s i
This permit shall not be valid for excavation 
until, or unless, the provision of ldaho code, 
Title 55, Chapter 22 have been complied 
with. 
PRIOR TO EXCAVATION, CALL ONE 
NUMBER LOCATION SERVICE 
Telephone No. 1-800-342-1 585 
APPROACH 
Single Residence 
Multiple Residence No. Served 
Business type 
Agriculture 
WIDTH 1% $4; SURFACE TYPE r i ~  k. 
ESTIMATED ADT /c (VEHICLE COUNT) 
Must meet the requirements of Local Highway Technical Assistance Council, 




ATTACH SKETCH OF PROPOSED WORK AND TRAFFIC CONTROL PLANS: 
SPECIAL PROVISIONS: 
GRANTED TO THE ABOVE-NAMED APPLICANT TO PERFORM THE WORK DESCRJBED ABOVE. 
See reverse side for Approach Design and attached Special Provisions and Information Sheet. ., 
I CERTIFY THAT I AM THE OWNER OR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PROPOSED PROPERTY TO BE 
SERVED AND AGREE TO DO THE WORK REQUESTED HEREON IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENERAL 
REQUIREMENTS PRINTED ON THE REVERSE SIDE, THE SPECIAL PROVISIONS AND THE PLANS MAdE A PART OF 
THIS PERMIT. 
NORTH UTAH COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT USE I 
NAM OF PE MITTEE P A  ~ 3 , f i n ~ i  
ADDRESS 
kc- s, 7S 
CITY STATE ZIP ' 
-Re\i 11a. s ~ 3 7 l  
TEMPORARY PERMIT 
Tentative approval subpct to inspection of imtal(ation. 
PLICAN -PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT 
?o~eA caqar 
REPRESENTATIVE 





Approved Date: Rejected Date: 
Corrections Required: 1 
SUSJEC? TO ALL TERMS, CONfItTKNS, AND PROVlSrONS SHOWN ON THIS FO&d OR ATTACHMENTS, PERMISSON tS HEREBY 
BY 
ApFfoved bY 
NLCHD A-ed Repres&&ke 
.r n 4  cr 
This form may be rguoduced for use in making multipfe applications. .#.&.L;f 
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RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 3001 
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C. 
693 Styner Avenue, Suite 9 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-1 505 
FP-Y (208) 883-4593 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON ) 
(Husband and Wife), ) Case No. CV 2008-1 80 
1 
Plaintiffs, ) DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
VS. ) 
) 
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY ) 
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR ) 
THE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY ) 
DISTRICT, ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICHARD ) 
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their individual ) 
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official capacity and ) 
00- -o;c.. in PIS iiicti\+dud ilap silt LY,  > 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Defendants North Latah County Highway District, Orland Ameberg, Richard Hansen, 
Sherman Clyde and Dan Payne, through their attorney, Ronald J. Landeck, P.C., move this Court to 
enter summary judgment against Plaintiffs on all claims set forth in Plaintiffs' Complaint pursuant 
to Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs further move for an award of attorney 
fees under Rule 1 1 (a)(l) I.R.C.P. and Idaho Code sections 12-120, 121 and 123. 
1217 
Defendants7 Motion For Summary Judment -- 1 
This Motion is supported by the pleadings, affidavits and record supplements on file, along 
with the affidavits, record supplement and Brief filed on February 2,2009, in conjunction with this 
Motion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of February, 2009. 
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C. 
By: %dio*li(lrh I 
Rorfald J. Landeck 
~ t t & n e ~ s  for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of February, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of 
this document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below: 
DON HALVORSON [ ] U.S. Mail 
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON [ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail 
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD [ IFAX 
KENDRICK, IDAHO 83 53 7 [ XI Hand Delivery 
Ro ald J. Landeck Y' 
Defendants' Motion For Summary J u d ~ e n t  -- 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DON and CHARLOTTE I-IALVORSON ) 
(Husband and Wife), 
Plaintiff, CASE NO. CV-08-00 180 
VS. ) ORDER SETTING HEARING 
1 
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY ) 
DISTRICT; BOARD OF 1 
COMMISSIONERS FOR THE NORTH ) 
LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT, ) 
ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICHARD 
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their ) 
official capacities, and their individual 
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official ) 
capacity and in his individual capacity, 
Defendants. 1 
IT IS HEREBY O R D E E D  that the above-entitled case be set for hearing on 
Plaintiffs' Motions For Partial Surnmary Judgments on Tuesday, the 3rd day of March, 2009, at the 
hour of 9 9 0  a.m., Pacific Time, at the Nez Perce County Courthouse, Lewiston, Idaho. 
DATED this 
4 P- 
day of February, 2009. 
CARL B. KERRICK - District Judge 
ORDER SETTING HEARING 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the 
foregoing ORDER SETTING 
HEARING was mailed, postage 
prepaid, by the uncle igned at LB Lewiston, Idaho, this 1 day of 
February, 2009, on: 
Don and Charlotte Halvorson 
11 290 American Ridge Road 
Kendrick, ID 83537 
Ronald J.   an deck 
Landeck, Westberg, Judge & Graham 
P.8. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
ORDER SETTING HEARING 
c v  a?,@/ CASE 140 -" - .- - -- 
RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 3001 
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C. 
693 Styner Avenue, Suite 9 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-1505 
FAX (208) 883-4593 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON 1 
(Husband and Wife), ) Case No. CV 2008-1 80 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) DEFENDANTS' ANSWERING BRIEF 
) AND OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' 
VS. ) MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
) JUDGMENTS AND OTHER MOTIONS 
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY ) SUBMITTED JANUARY 26,2009 
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR ) 
THE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY 1 
DISTRICT, ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICHARD ) 
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their individual ) 
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official capacity and ) 




Defendants submit this Answering Brief and Objections to Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial 
Summary Judgment and Other Motions submitted January 26, 2009 (collectively "Plaintiffs' 
Motions"), which make twenty-one (2 1) separate motions. Of those 2 1 Plaintiffs' 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWFiRING BRIEF AND OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS AND OTHER IMOTIONS SUBMITTED 
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Motions, sixteen (16) are motions for summary judgment under Rule 56 I.R.C.P. (collectively 
"Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Motions"). The remaining five (5) motions (collectively 
"Plaintiffs' Other Motions") include one (1) declaratory judgment motion (Plaintiffs' Motions, par. 
1.20), two (2) discovery motions (Plaintiffs' Motions, par. 1.12 and 1.18), one (1) motion for leave 
to amend (Plaintiffs' Motions, par. 1.17) and one (1) motion to enlarge time (Plaintiffs' Motions, 
par. 1.21). For efficiency, Defendants' will address Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Motions 
separately from Plaintiffs' Other Motions. 
11. DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT ON ALL OF PLAINTIFFS' 
CLAIMS AS A MATTER OF LAW OR, ALTERNATIVELY, THERE ARE 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT THAT PRECLUDE ENTRY OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFFS. 
Generally: 
Plaintiffs have not set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial or that 
Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment on any of Plaintiffs' Motions for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs' 
Summary Judgment Motions. are conclusory, repetitive, generalized, speculative, conhsing and 
disorganized. Further, Plaintiffs rely fundamentally on factual assertions that are not admissible in 
evidence, primarily because those assertions constitute hearsay or are made without personal 
knowledge. Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Motions also duplicate, in great part, motions and 
briefing previously filed by Plaintiffs in this action, which motions have already been denied by this 
Court, yet Plaintiffs have again pursued these same claims without supplementing this record with 
additional, admissible facts. Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Motions serve only to harass or to 
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of this litigation in violation of Rule 
1 1 (a)(l) I.R.C.P. 
Moreover, Plaintiffs' S m a r y  Judgment Motions ultimately fail because Defendants have 
shown through Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed herein that there are no genuine 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERING BRIEF AND OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS AND OTHER MOTIONS SUBMITTED 
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issues as to the material facts of Plaintiffs' claims and that summary judgment is appropriate in 
favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs on all Plaintiffs' claims in this action. 
Alternatively, affidavits submitted by Defendants that are part of this record set forth 
specific facts which, construed in a light most favorable to Defendants, at the very least clearly 
preclude a determination that Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to any of 
Plaintiffs' Motions for Summary Judgment. Defendants, however, urge the Court to determine that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact in this action and that Defendants are entitled to 
prevail as to all of Plaintiffs' Motions for Summary Judgment as a matter of law and to enter 
summary judgment in favor of Defendants as the non-moving party as to all such motions. 
Summary Judgrnent Standard: 
Summary judgment should be granted where there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c). In 
determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the court must construe the pleadings, 
depositions, admissions and affidavits in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Conway 
v. Sontag, 141 Idaho 144, 146, 106 P.3d 470,472 (2005), citing Infanger v. City ofSalmon, 137 
Idaho 45'44 P.3d 1100 (2002). 
"A motion for summary judgment urges the trial court to hold that there are no genuine 
issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to jud-ment as a matter of law. 
I.R.C.P. 56(c). However, if the court determines, after a hearing, that no genuine issues of 
material fact exist, the court may enter judgment for the parties it deems entitled to prevail as a 
matter of law. Thus, in appropriate circumstances, the court is authorized to enter summary 
judgment in favor of non-moving parties. E.g., Rasrnusorz v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 102 
Idaho 95, 625 P.2d 1098 (1981); Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Const. Co., Inc., 99 Idaho 462, 583 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERING BRIEF AND OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS AND OTHER MOTIONS SUBMITTED 
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P.2d 997 (1978). Similar authority exists under the federal counterpart to I.R.C.P. 56. See 
generally 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 5 2720 (1973)." Barlow 's, 
Incorporated v. Bannock Cleani~zg Corporation, 103 Idaho 3 10,3 12,647 P.2d 766,768 (Ct. 
App. 1982). 
Admissible Facts and Incorporation of Prior Affidavits and Briefs: 
Specific facts admissible in evidence, from which the Court should determine that there are 
no genuine issues of material fact, are contained in the Third Affidavit of Dan Carscallen filed 
concurrently herewith and the Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Defendants' Second Record Supplement in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Affidavit of Larry Hodge, Second Affidavit of Dan Payne, Second Affidavit of Dan Carscallen, 
Defendants' Answering Brief to Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment filed September 
19, October 6, and October 21,2008, Affidavit of Dan Payne, Affidavit of Orland Arneberg, 
Affidavit of Dan Carscallen, Defendants' First Record Supplement in Opposition to Plaintiffs' 
Motions for Partial Summary Judgment filed September 19, October 6 and October 2 1,2008, all of 
which were previously filed herein and all of which are incorporated herein by this reference not 
only for purposes of the factual record but, as appropriate, also for the legal analysis of issues 
addressed in this Answering Brief A concise statement of dispositive, admissible material facts not 
at genuine issue is set forth on pages 4 - 12 of the Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
Analysis of Plaintiffs' Due Process and Takin. Claims: 
Fifteen (1 5) of Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Motions, being those found in paragraphs 1.1, 
1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.10, 1.13, 1.13, 1.15, 1.16 and 1.19 arerelatedin that eachis 
based, in principal part, on Defendants' alleged interference, in one alleged form or another, with 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERING BRIEF AND OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS AND OTHER MOTIONS SUBMITTED 
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Plaintiffs' property rights and/or violation of Plaintiffs' due process rights under federal andor state 
law and constitutions arising from (i) the District's widening of Camps Canyon Road and/or (ii) its 
temporary issuance of a driveway permit to Plaintiffs' neighbor. These issues are more specifically 
addressed on pages 12-26 of the Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
and are incorporated herein as if set forth in full. 
Plaintiffs' paragraph 1.14 summary judgment motion, in effect, requests, without submittal 
of additional facts, reconsideration of the Court's Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs' Motions for 
Surnmary Judgment filed December 8,2008. These issues are also specifically addressed in 
Defendants' Answering Brief to those motions which is incorporated herein as if set forth in full. 
In summary response, the District and individual Defendants have, at all times relevant to 
this action, conducted and discharged the District's duties and responsibilities in accordance with 
settled law in Idaho as to the establishment, use, maintenance and administration of prescriptive 
public highways. Plaintiffs' have not produced any admissible, material facts to raise a genuine 
issue to the contrary, rather, Plaintiffs have made factual assertions that either do not establish the 
District's breach of any legal duty or that lack personal knowledge and are, therefore, inadmissible. 
Analysis of Plaintiffs' Idaho Administrative Procedure Act Claim: 
Plaintiffs' paragraph 1.1 1 summary judgment motion asserts a claim under Idaho Code 
sections 67-5201 et seq., the Idaho Administration Procedure Act ("IAPA?'), seeking judicial review 
of "agency" action. This motion should be denied for the reason that this issue has not been 
asserted in Plaintiffs' complaint. This motion should also be denied because the District is not an 
"agency," as that term is defined under Idaho Code section 67-5201(2), and the actions or inactions 
of the District in the "acquisition, establishment and alterations to Camps Canyon Road," as urged 
in the motion, are not subject to or within the purview of IAPA unless made applicable by some 
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other statute, whch is not the case. Arthur v. Shoshone County, 133 Idaho 854, 859,993 P.2d 617, 
622 (Ct. App. 2000). 
111. OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' OTHER MOTIONS. 
Plaintiffs' Paragraph 1.12 Motion Is Without Merit and Should be Denied: 
Although Plaintiffs variously cite Rules 26,36 and 37 I.R.C.P. as authority for their 
paragraph 1.12 motion, the facts alleged by Plaintiffs in support of this motion complain only of the 
District's recordkeeping practices and its alleged destruction of a revoked driveway access permit. 
These alleged facts do not support a claim for discovery abuse under Rules 26,36 and/or 37 
I.R.C.P. There is no showing on the face of this motion that the District has failed to answer an 
interrogatory propounded to it or failed to permit inspection of a requested document. Plaintiffs 
have simply failed to allege a violation of a rule of discovery. 
Plaintiffs also rely upon the "spoliation" doctrine in seeking relief in regard to this motion. 
Plaintiffs argue that the District has failed to keep records of alterations of Camps Canyon Road, to 
survey Camps Canyon Road and to record agreements with private landowners. Plaintiffs cite to 
Idaho Code sections "40-608,40-2302,40-605 and 40-13 10, amongst others" in support of this 
argument, yet none of these statutes support Plaintiffs' position. Plaintiffs read into the law what 
they want, but that is not how the law is interpreted or applied. Under Idaho law, the commissioners 
of a highway district "have exclusive general supervision and jurisdiction over all 
highways.. .within their highway system.. . ." Further, "the highway district shall have power to 
manage and conduct the business and affairs of the district." Idaho Code section 40-13 lO(1). 
Plaintiffs have not shown that any alleged acts of Defendants in regard to this motion violate any 
Idaho statute. 
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The spoliation doctrine also applies only in situations in which a party does not want the 
evidence available to an adverse party. Courtney v. Big 0 Tires, 139 Idaho 821, 824, 87 P.3d 930, 
933 (2003). Plaintiffs' assertion, that the District's alleged failure to maintain written records of 
agreements with private landowners, presumably the alleged agreement with Plaintiffs' predecessor 
in 1996, or failure to survey alterations on Camps Canyon Road invokes the spoliation doctrine, is 
without merit. There is not even a scintilla of evidence that the District has done anything in regard 
to its recordkeeping to keep information from Plaintiffs. "Moreover, the circumstances of the act 
must manifest bad faith. Mere negligence is not enough, for it does not sustain the inference of 
consciousness of a weak case." Id. (citing McCormick on Evidence, 4th Ed. 5 265, pp. 189-194, 
[1992]). Again, there is not the slightest proof or inference of bad faith. As to the singular event of 
the initial Wagner driveway permit having been discarded or not being locatable, the District has 
admitted the permit was issued. There is no dispute as to that fact. Plaintiffs' theory in pursuing 
this motion is without merit and the motion should be denied. 
Plaintiffs' Paragraph 1.18 Motion Should Be Denied: 
Plaintiffs' paragraph 1.18 motion is not accompanied by the "certification" required under 
Rule 37(a)(2) I.R.C.P. that "the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the 
party not making the disclosure in an effort to secure the disclosure without court action." Id. 
Whle a so-called Plaintiffs' First Certification of Compliance with I.R.C.P. Rule 37(a) was filed 
with the Court on January 26, 2009, this document fails to set forth the required "good faith" 
information. Rather, that document is a self-serving dissertation not relevant to the "certification" 
required prior to bringing a motion to compel. Defendants' counsel first became aware that 
Plaintiffs were pursuing a Rule 37 motion as to any discovery matter in this case when Plaintiffs' 
Motions were delivered to counsel after having been filed. Because Plaintiffs failed to provide the 
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required certification, the motion should be denied and Plaintiffs should be required to do as Rule 
37(a)(2) mandates. 
Further, as to the merits of the motion and without waiver of the objection set forth above, 
Defendants assert that each and every interrogatory, request for admission and request for 
production of documents referenced in Plaintiffs' paragraph 1.18 motion and as contained in 
Plaintiffs' Vxrd Record Supplement was answered as required by applicable discovery rules. 
Plaintiffs have not even attempted to demonstrate why Defendants' responses are allegedly evasive 
or insufficient. The only mention of this discovery motion in Plaintiffs' Brief is set forth on pages 
151-154 which specifically addresses only two (2) interrogatories and one (1) request for admission 
to Defendant Orland Arneberg. There do not appear to be any other specific references to this 
motion in Plaintiffs' Brief despite the list included as part of the paragraph 1.18 motion itemizing 
numerous, other discovery responses appended to Plaintiffs' Third Supplement. In addition, as to 
the only three (3) responses that Plaintiffs do discuss in their Brief, Plaintiffs merely engage in 
argument over the application of those disclosures to the law of the case which does not support the 
motion to compel. Plaintiffs have completely failed in all respects to justifjr the prosecution of a 
motion to compel. 
Plaintiffs' Paragraph 1.20 Motion Should be Denied: 
Although Plaintiffs' paragraph 1.20 motion is brought under Rule 57 I.R.C.P. and seeks 
declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C 5 1983, it is in fact the same motion, referencing the same alleged 
facts, the same authorities and the same relief that was requested under Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment'Adjudication of the Issue of the Cause of Action Under 42 U.S.C. 1983 filed 
October 21,2008 ("Plaintiffs' October 21 Motion"), which was denied by this Court in its Opinion 
and Order filed December 8,2008. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in support of Plaintiffs' October 21 
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Motion read, in part, "[ilt is now, as a matter of law, then that Plaintiffs' petition ths  court to 
declare their rights, status, immunities, andlor privileges under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and such Federal and 
State of Idaho constitutions.. . ." This language also constitutes the substance of Plaintiffs' 
paragraph 1.20 motion. 
This matter, therefore, has been previously and l l l y  briefed and ruled upon. There is no 
need to waste counsel's time and the Court's time dealing with a previously decided issue that is 
brought forward again with no additional citation of authority and no additional factual support. 
Defendants incorporate their prior submittals in this matter and respectfully request that the Court 
deny this motion for the reasons expressed in the Court's Opinion and Order of December 8,2008, 
as to Plaintiffs' October 21,2008 Motion and also for the reasons that, if this declaratory judgment 
claim should survive Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, which Defendants opine it 
should not, judicial economy, convenience, efficiency and expediency will be served by 
determining this matter at trial, as was also explained by the Court in its Opinion and Order filed 
June 9,2008, deciding related declaratory claims made by Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs' Para.maph 1.17 Motion Does Not Request Specific Relief and Should be Denied. 
Plaintiffs again waste the resources of Court and counsel by making the paragraph 1.17 
motion under Rule 15(b) I.R.C.P. to amend their Complaint in this action without specifying the 
substance of any proposed amendment to their Complaint. It would appear that Plaintiffs are 
attempting to assure themselves of the opportunity to pursue any possible or potential legal claims at 
any time they desire in this process without providing proper notice of those claims to Defendants. 
Such an approach is not countenanced under Idaho law and for good reason. An informative 
decision of the Idaho Supreme court illuminates the underlying rationale for not allowing this 
haphazard approach to litigation: 
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Under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court was not limited to deciding 
the case on the issues as Eramed by the pleadings. However, the court's authority 
under I.R.C.P. 15(b) and, consequently, I.R.C.P. 54(c), to determine a case upon 
unpleaded theories is limited by the proviso in I.R.C.P. 15(b) that for the court to 
consider unpleaded issues those issues must have been "tried by express or implied 
consent of the parties.. .." Although I.R.C.P. 15(b) permits a court to base its 
decision on a theory fully tried by the parties, an issue not tried either express or 
implied consent cannot be the basis for the decision. See, e.g., 6 Wright & Miller 
Fed. Practice & Procedure, Civil s 1493 (1971). 
The requirement that the unpleaded issues be tried by at least the implied consent of 
the parties assures that the parties have notice of the issues before the court and an 
opportunity to address those issues with evidence and argument. Cook v. City of 
Price, Carbon County, Utah, 566 F.2d 699 (10"' Cir. 1977); Cox v. Frernont County 
Public Building A u t o ,  4 15 F.2d 882 (1 0"' Cis. 1969); Utness v. United States, 
23 F.R.D. 279 (D. Alaska 1959). 
"Implied consent to the trial of an unpleaded issue is not established merely because 
evidence relevant to that issue was introduced without objection. At least it must 
appear that the parties understood the evidence to be aimed at the unpleaded issue." 
MBI Motor Co., Inc. v. Lotus/East, Inc., 506 F.2d 709, 71 1 (6' Cir. 1974). 
Where the proof taken at trial is relevant to the pleaded issue in the case it would be 
manifestly unjust for the court to decide the case on theories not considered by the 
parties which may be inferentially proven by the evidence. 
MK. Transport, Inc. v. Grover, 101 Idaho 346,349-350,612 P.2d 1 192, 1 196-1 197 (1 980). 
Plaintiffs' errant attempt to circumvent Idaho pleading rules should be surnrnarily rejected. 
Plaintiffs' Para.ua~h 1.2 1 Motion to Enlarge Time Should be Denied. 
Plaintiffs erroneously cite Rule 7(b)(3) I.R.C.P. in support of what appears to be a motion to 
amend the deadlines and/or, possibly, the trial date set forth in the Court's Order Setting Case for 
Trial and Pre-trial Conference filed September 5,2008, as amended by the Court's Amended Order 
filed November 20,2008. Plaintiffs do not support this motion with any showing of good cause. It 
is noted that a portion of the petition seeks an enlargement of time to "name expert witnesses," 
which act was required by the Amended Order to be done on or before December 3 1,2008, and a 
request for relief fiom such failure requires that a motion be granted under Rule 6(b) I.R.C.P. upon 
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demonstration of "excusable neglect." No such showing of excusable neglect has been attempted or 
made by Plaintiffs in this motion and, accordingly, that relief is not warranted. 
Defendants respecthlly request that tlvs motion be denied in its entirety. 
IV. DEFENDANTS MOVE FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES. 
Defendants move for an award of attorney fees against Plaintiffs, as follows: 
1. In regard to Plaintiffs' Motions, or any of them, under: 
(i) Rule I 1 (a)(l ) I.R.C.P., on the grounds that Plaintiffs' motions, or any of them, are not 
well grounded in fact and not warranted by existing law or of a good faith argument 
for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law and that Plaintiffs' motions, 
or any of them, were interposed for an improper purpose, including to harass and to 
cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, as more fcllly discussed in this Briefi 
and 
(ii) Idaho Code section 12-120 (1) on the grounds that Defendants are the prevailing 
parties; and 
(iii) Idaho Code section 12-121 on the grounds that Defendants are the prevailing parties 
and that Plaintiffs' motions were pursued unreasonably or without foundation, as 
more fklly described in tlvs Brief; and 
(iv) Idaho Code section 12-123 on the grounds that Plaintiffs' motions, or any of them, 
serve merely to harass Defendants and are not supported in fact or warranted under 
law or by a good faith argument for extension, modification or reversal of existing 
law, as more fully described in this Brief. 
2. In regard to Plaintiffs' paragraph 1.12 and 1.18 motions, under Rule 37(a)(4) I.R.C.P. on the 
grounds that the making of these motions, or either of them, was not substantially justified. 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERING BRIEF AND OBJECTIONS TO PLAmTTIFFS' MOTIONS 
FOR PARTIAL SUhIMARY JUDGMENTS AND OTHER MOTIONS SUBMITTED 
JANUARY 26,2009 -- I I 
3. In regard to Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Motions, or any of them, under Rule 56(c) 
I.R.C.P. on the grounds that good cause exists to impose attorney fees against Plaintiffs, as 
more fully described in this Brief 
DATED this 13th day of February, 2009. 
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certiQ that on this 13th day of February, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of 
this document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below: 
DON HALVORSON [ XI U.S. Mail 
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON [ 1 Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail 
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD [ 1 FAX (208) 322-4486 
KENDRICK, IDAHO 83537 [ ] Hand Delivery 
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CLERI( OF D1SiE:i;T COURT 
RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 3001 
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C. 
693 Styner Avenue, Suite 9 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-1 505 
FAX (208) 883-4593 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON ) 
(Husband and Wife), ) Case No. CV 2008-1 80 
? 
Plaintiffs, ) DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
) TO STRIKE AND BRIEF 
VS. ) 
1 
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY 1 
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR ) 
THE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY 1 
DISTRICT, ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICHARD ) 
HANSEN, SHEMAN CLYDE, in their individual ) 
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official capacity and ) 
in his individual capacity, 
Defendants. 1 
Defendants North Latah County Highway District, Orland Arneberg, Richard Hansen, 
Sherman Clyde and Dan Payne, through counsel, move this Court to strike portions of Plaintiffs' 
Affidavit filed herein on January 26,2009, as follows: 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE iZND BFUEF -- 1 
1. All statements attributed to any person othei- than Plaintiffs and all testimony offered by 
Plaintiffs as to a matter without their personal knowledge of the matter in paragraph 8, 
which are either inadmissible hearsay or lack adequate foundation. 
2. All statements attributed to Mr. Wagner in paragraph 9, which are inadmissible hearsay. 
3. All statements attributed to Mr. Munson in paragraph 10, which are inadmissible hearsay. 
4. All statements attributed to Patsy Wagner and Gary Osborn and all testimony offered by 
Plaintiffs as to a matter without their personal knowledge of the matter in paragsaph 13, 
which are either inadmissible hearsay or lack foundation. 
5. All testimony offered by Plaintiffs in paragraph 14, which are inadmissible hearsay. 
6. All statements attributed to Mr. Wagner in paragraph 15, which are inadmissible hearsay. 
Defendants also move to strike from the record factual assertions by Plaintiffs made without 
their personal knowledge or that constitute inadmissible hearsay set forth in Plaintiffs' Motions for 
Pai-tial Summary Judgments and other Motions submitted January 26,2009, and Brief, the specific 
identification of which in Plaintiffs' rambling, 173-page document are too numerous to efficiently 
mention. 
This Motion is based, in part, upon Rules 56(e) and (g) I.R.C.P. which require that evidence 
submitted in summary judgment proceedings "shall set forth facts.. .admissible in evidence." 
Based upon the foregoing, Defendants request the Court strike those items listed above as 
inadmissible and/or not to be considered in connection with Plaintiffs' pending Motions for Partial 
Summary Judgrnent and other Motions submitted January 26,2009. 
Defendants request oral argument in support of this motion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th day of February, 2009. 
RONA&J. LAhIDECK, P.C. 
I 
BY: id.uL~.i\ 4 I C L ~ ~ C - L L  
~o$ ld  J. Landeck 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of February, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of 
this document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below: 
DON HALVORSON [ XI U.S. Mail 
CHARLOTTE WALVORSON [ 1 Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail 
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD [ IFAX 
KENDRICK, IDAHO 83 53 7 [ ] Hand Delivery 
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RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 300 1 
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C. 
693 Styner Avenue, Suite 9 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-1505 
FAX (208) 883-4593 
Attorneys for Defendants 
-.- p!pT c-,\ !--- CLERK 13;F Dfy i ttiv i ,ii i 
t * ' ry t . :  F*!,l i-Hr kt! l vuLitJiY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON 1 
(Husband and Wife), ) Case No. CV 2008-1 80 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) THIRD AFFIDAVIT 
) OF DAN CARSCALLEN 
VS. 1 
1 
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY ) 
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR ) 
THE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY 1 
DISTRICT, ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICHARD ) 
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their individual ) 
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official capacity and ) 
in his individual capacity, 1 
) 
Defendants. 1 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Latah 1 
Dan Carscallen, upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am over eighteen (1 8) years of age, am competent to testify to the matters set forth 
herein and make this affidavit upon my personal knowledge. 
THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF DAN CARSCALLEN -- 1 
2. I am the Secretary of the North Latah County Highway District ("'District") and, as 
such, custodian of and responsible for the District's official records. 
3. Attached to this Affidavit are true and correct copies of documents maintained by the 
District in its public records as follows: 
1) Minutes of Regular Meeting of the District Board of Commissioners on July 9, 
1986, including a copy of District Resolution No. 2, Series 1986. 
2) Affidavit of Publication of District Resolution No. 2, Series 1986. 
3) Affidavit of Publication of Proposed Official Map of Public Highway System 
in North Latah County Highway District, Latah County, Idaho (This is only a 
partial copy, in two pages, of the Proposed Official Map, the actual copy on file 
with the District's records being a complete copy of the published document). 
4) Minutes of Regular Meeting of the District Board of Commissioners held on 
August 13,1986. 
5 )  Minutes of Regular Meeting of the District Board of Commissioners held on 
August 29, 1986. 
6) District Resolution No. 3, Series 1986. 
The above statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
Dated this 9th day of February, 2009. 
SWORN TO before me this 9th day of February, 2009. 
,@-? 
\ & +f,I.t' c: .c Z/&?, 
NOTARY PUBLIC for the State of Idaho 
My commission expires: X - / 7-2013 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of February, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of 
this document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below: 
DON HALVORSON [ XI U.S. Mail 
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON C ] Federal Express Standard Ovemigbt Mail 
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD [ 1 FAX (208) 322-4486 
KENDRICK, IDAHO 83537 [ ] Hand Delivery 
Ron d J. Landeck ap 
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ITEM 1 
T h e  r - g g t j l a r  m e e t j r l g  of t h e  N o r t h  L a t a t !  C o u n t y  Hight. : .!ay C f j r t r j c t  
Eoard t=tf Ca: tmmj.z .s ior tcr .z .  w a s  he1t-j at t h e  M t = t s e g w  iIiff i c e  t=tn J I J L Y  9 ,  
1'3:5:& a t  7:30 P.M. .  F r e z . ~ r i t  w e r e  C h a . i r m a . r t  t : lrlanfj & p r l e b e r g ?  
corr~rr~i ssi arter- S t ~ ~ r m a r t  tI:l::..de, f o r e m a r t s  H a r t 2 1  12 S t t j h t t s ,  Ra.1 p h  Payr te ,  
D a v e  A r t d e p s o r ~  ant j  M e r 1 e  t < i n g .  
The m i  n u  t e s  elf t h e  r e g u t  a r  m e e t i n g  a=lrf J u n e  25: lc3e,& \.,,IEv~ 
-3. p p r t:, F. d . 
c . - . t t e ~ ~ ~ r & n '  fT:iyde rrratje a r r t o t i o n  arid 1 ] r l a r t d  f i r n e b e r g  secctrtded i t yi1 
pa!/ t h e  h i  1 1 . 5  a s  1 i ~ t e d  tsn t h e  b;zrC: of t h i s  p a g e .  The  m c t t i ~ n  t,.,r.~..~. 
p a s s e d .  
Fort L a n d e c K  a t t e n d e d  t h e  m e e t  i rtg and d i  s c i ~ s s p ~ d  Resol l j t i o r l  # 2 
w i t h  t h e  C t x r t r n i s s i o r t e r s .  Sherm.3.n C l y d e  m.2.de  a m o t i G r ~  a n d  O r l s . r t d  
k rne t l e rg  ,zecorided i t  t o  p a s s  R F ~ . ~ I Z ~ \ I , J ~ ~ Q ~  # 2 1 i s t e d  t ~ ~ ] c ~ i . . , . . t .  ~ t ~ ~ 1 .  
m o t  i ctn ~3:s. pa.=secj . 
Rort L c ~ r t g ?  D a r t  Payrte and Rartdy t'or.5 Crorrt t h e  H i  ght,.!a;~. D i  s t p  i c f  c:rei.! 
a t  t ended  t h e  m e e t  i nq  a n d  ask t h e  C o r n m i  ss  i 0 n e r . s  t o  ,-orlsi  d e r   the^! 
f o r  1 0 %  r a i s e  irl t h e  t ~ p  c o m i r r g  t ~ l ~ d g e t .  ~ t ~ e  Conrmi.s.,~.ior1er.s s a i , - ~  
t h e y  w o u f  d w c i r k  u p  t h e  budqe t  .3.n12 g i v e  t h e m  t h e  j r an2.&ep on J" 1 ;rr 
3f:t a t  8:1:tQ P.M..  
Ceir t l r rJ  rto f u r t h e r  t l c r s i n e s s  t h e  me,r-tjriij  i .?. jas a ~ j j o ~ j r r t e d  at ?:S[lF' 
P.M.. 
NORTII I.rtTAIf COUNTY 
EIIGII\VAY DISTItICT 
LATAH COUNTY, IDAIIO 
ItESOLUTION NO. 2,  SERIES 1986 
A RESOLUTION O F  INTENTION 
TO ADOPT THE ACCOMPANY- 
ING MAP AS THE OFFICIAL 
MAP 01: TffE NOIlTlf LA?'AH 
COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT 
SYSTEM FOLLOWING PUBLIC 
l-IEARING O N  (3, 1986 TO 
DETERMINE T H E  I'UBLIC IN- 
TEREST. 
BE 1T RESOI.VED by the  Board 
of Cornmissioners of the North Ln- 
tah Coitnty ITighway District of b- 
tah  County. Idaho: 
NOTICE is hereby given that the 
Board of Commissioners of North 
I n t a h  County Highway District  
("District") has catised the map  ac-  
companying this Resolution No. 2,  
Ser ics  I986 to be prepared showing 
each hightvay in the District's jjuris- 
diction and that the District's Board 
of Commissioners intcnds to adopt 
tire map a s  the official map  of the 
District highway sys tem a s  requircd 
by Idaho Code Section 40-202 upon a 
Cinrlinji th;it rhc prlhlic irltcresr iv i l l  . . . _ .  C _. 
A public hearing will be  held to 
determine whether the  public inter- 
es t  will be served by adoption of the 
m a p  a s  the  official m a p  of the  Dis- 
tr ict  highway system and at  \vhich 
all interested persons may bc  heard. 
T h e  public hearing is to be  held a s  
follows: 
DATE: Wednesday, August 13,1986 
TIME: 7:30 p.m. 
PLACE: Nor-tf~ f,?tah County High- 
way Uistrici offices i I32 'iilhi:e ilve- 
nue, hloscow, Idaho 838.13 
i l f t c t  ihe  public hcrtriilg, the Dis- 
trict's Board of Commissioners s l~a l l  
adopt the map. tvith arly charigcs or  
revisions considered by thein to be 
advisable in the public interest ,  a s  
the official map of the  District high- 
way system, 
DATED this 3rd day of July,  1986. 
Nortit Latall County fl ighway Dis- 
tr ict  Iloard of Commissioners: 
Orland Arncberg. Chairman 
Sherman Clyde, Commissioner 
'iVayne Fiemmelinan, Commissioller 
ATTEST: Merle  King 
District Secre tary  
ITEM 2 
" -, 
NORTH LATAH COUNTY i& 
Affidavit of 
Publication 
STATE OF IDAHO ss. 
County of Latah 
Ray Rosch 
being first duly sworn, on oath, 
deposes and says: 
That he  is the printer of The 
IDAHONIAN, a newspaper of 
general circulation, printed and 
published daily except Sunday a t  
Moscow, Latah County, Idaho, in 
compliance with Sections 60-106, 
60-107, and 60-108 of the Idaho 
Code p d  the amendments there- 
to; that the notice of which the 
annexed is a full, true and cor- 
rect printed copy was published 
in the regular and entire issues 
of said newspaper and not in a 
supplement thereto, upon the fol- 
lowing dates: 
the same being the dates desig- 
nated for the publication of said 
Iegal n c . E m  
subscrib& and sworn to before 
v-PJ 
n e  t h i s 3 0  day of 
Notary Public, 
residing at  Moscow, Idaho 
HIGHWAY DISTRICT 
LATAH COUNTY, IDAHO 
RESOLUTION NO. 2, SERIES 19 
A RESOLUTION OF I N T E N T I O ~ ~  
TO ADOPT T H E  ACCOhlPANYING:%cC 
MAP AS T H E  OFFICIAL 
T H E  NORTH LATAH 
H I G H W A Y  D I S T R I C T  
FOLLOlVING PUBLIC HEA 
AUG. 13, 1986 TO DETERM 
PUBLIC INTEREST. 
ay District offices 1132 White Ave- 
c hearing, the Dis- 
ommissioners shall 
ith any changes o r  
red by them to be 
public interest, a s  
of the District high- 
ndeck, Westberg & Gould 
s fo r  North Latah County 






The r e g u l a r  mee t ing  0-f the  N~:trth Latah County Highwar D i s t r i c t  
Board uf Corr~rnissi t~ners  was h e l d  a t  the  Mc~scuw Off i r e  ctn Aug. 1 3 ,  
1986 a t  7:30 P.M.. P r e sen t  were @ha.irman Or1 and Arneberg ,  
commi ssi oner  Sherman C l  rde  , Wayne Hemme 1 man, f  oremans H a r ~ l  d 
S t u b b s ,  Ralph Payne, Dave Andersen and Merle King. 
The minu t e s  ct+ the  r e g u l a r  meet ing an J u l y  23, 15'86 were 
approved.  
Sherman C l  r d e  made a mot i on and Wayne Hemme 1 man secczr~ded i t  tct - 
p a y  the  bi 1 1  5 a s  1 i s t e d  1 x 1  t he  back ctf th  i c, page. I he mist i on was 
passed .  
The b i d s  t o  p a i n t  t h e  P o t l a t c h  River  Br idge  were opened a t  7:00 
and went as f u l  lows;  George Germer b i d  $tlP75.OU t o  p a i n t  the  
b r i dge .  Ear l  Russe l l  Const b i d  9 fS33 .UU t o  p a i n t  the  b r i d g e .  
Hadge and Assac.  s a i d  they w i l l  taKe t he  b i d s  and l o ~ k  them over 
and then l e t  them know t h e i r  d e c i s i o n .  
The pub1 i c  h e a r i n g  t o  adt2pt an a f f i c i a . 1  map f o r  the  Murth Latah 
Coun t r  H i  ghway D i  s t r  i c  t shorhri ng the r o a d s  t h a t  the  H i  gh~.~!a:i 
D i s t r i c t  is g~zting t o  ma in t a in  and be 1 i a b l e  f o r  w a s  h e l d  a t  7 : 3 0  
F.M.. There were appro>:irnatel;v -Fort;.. prop1 e  a t  ter~tjirtg the  
mee t ing .  Ron Landeck the  Highway D i s t r i c t s  a t  t~ztrner s t a r t e d  o u t  
t h e  meet ing by esp l  a i n i  rig t h a t  the  ntap st~ctihted the  r o a d s  t h a t  t h e  
Highwa.~ D i s t r i c t  is going tt:~ ma in t a in  and be 1 i a b l e  f o r  and 
e x p l a i n e d  t h a t  t h i s  i s  not  a  mass abandonment a+ any r o a d s .  Then 
t h e i r  was a 1 i s t  r e a d  of ro.3.d~ t h a t  w e r e  l e f t  o f f  of the  map 
i rradver ten1 y s.nd wctu l b be added bacK on.  
B i l  1 B a r t l e t  ask abuut  the  road  t h a t  goes  o n  f u r t h e r  t o  the  
p r o p e r t y  he purchased i n  T42,H4W,SIP,20,17 than what the  m a p  
shows. B i  1 1  w a n t s  t o  Krttz~w w h r  the  road w a s  l e f t  o f f  of- the  map. 
Foreman Harald  S t u b b s  s a i d  t h a t  he ha+ never  done any mainter13.nce 
on the  r0a.d an? f u r t h e r  than what t h e  map r hows  s i n c e  1172 and 
does  nett knok.~ what happened be-Fore t h a t .  
Me1 T a g ~ a r t  gave the  Cornmissitx-ters a p e t i t i o n  s i gned  br 21 people 
a s k i n g  them t o  m a i n t a i n  road #460 and wan t s  t h e  road p u t  ctn the 
o + f i c i a l  ma,p. Me1 alsct sa id  h e  wanted t o  g~ sn r e c u r d  3.5 a g ~ e e i n g  
w i t h  B i l l  t i a r t l e t  i n  t h a t  h e  s hou ld  have a ro3.d til~ h i s  p r c t p ~ ~ t y .  
L a r r y  Lacy ask about  g e t t i n g  h i s  rc1a.d put  o n  the map. He s a i d  h e  
h a s  dune a l o t  cl+ wc~rk tztn t h e  r oad  and h a s  a t t e n d e d  s e v e r a l  
mee t i ngs  a.sking f o r  t h i s  t c ~  be done. Lar ry  gctt a. l u t  of suppo r t  
from Barbra  Hztrrison. Fc~rernan Harold Stubbs. s a i d  he h a s  not  
ma in t a ined  the  road  i n  o v e r  14 year excep t  f o r  csne c o u r t e s v  
g r ad ing .  
Lee L i she r  p r e s e n t e d  t he  Commissioners w i t h  a l e t t e r  l i s t i n g  some 
r o a d s  t h a t  i n  h i s  op in ion  were l e + t  o f f  csf t he  m a p .  The r u a d s  a r e  
t he  Long C r e e k  Road, g a l l a r d  H i l T  R c ~ s d ,  and the  road qctirlg ttz1 
Lar-ry Lac y s  . 
James Cooly a s k  some q u e s t i o n s  or[ l i a b i l i t y  ant3  hot/.^ a p e r s ~ r ~  1 of 3 
w o u l d  K ~ I I Y A  i f  a raad i s a c o u n t y  road 12r nett. R G ~  L a - n d e e k  
a n s w e r e d  s o m e  0 4  h i.2. q u e s t i o n s  
T e r r y  W a l  s e r  s s k  Earl L a n d e r k  .3.bout  t h e  d i  f f  e r e n t  w a y s  t o  a b 3 r l t j ~ n  d 
a ro.3.13. 
Me1 T a g g a r t  g a v e  t h e  Cummi ssi c x n e r s  s o m e  131 d p e t  i t i o n s  a n d  road 
d e s c r i p t i ~ z s n s  o f  a rc,ad t h a t  w e n t  u p  t h e  P a l o u s e  R i v e r  a b ~ c t v e  L a i r d  
Park  t h a . t  ws,s r e p l a c e d  b y  t h e  r n 3 . d  t h 2 . t  goes o ~ e r  t h e  t a i l  i n 6  
p i  1 e 1 r f  t f r o m  t h e  d r e d g e .  A s p ~ s k e s r n a n  f o r  J ames  Sue1 sai  d h e  
o b j e c t . 5 .  ~ I Z I  a r t y t h j r l g  be in13  t jc~r te  t o  t h e  rJ road  <M:533:3?!. 
S h e r m a n  C l r d e  a s k  t h e  p e o p l e  i f  t h e y  w a n t e d  t h e  c o u n t y  512 
m a ;  r r ta i  n a1 1 of t h e  i l l  d r a a d s  i n  t h e  c o ~ ~ r t  t:>>. Most pECtp1 e  t h a t  
5.p0Ke u p  di  d n '  t t h  i nb: t h e y  s h o u l  d .  
Scemecine s a i d  t h e y  t h u u q h t  t h e  Highwa::.* D i s t r i c t  sh t :~u ld  p u t  a 1  1 I Z I ~  
t h e  o l d  r i g h t  a+ w a y s  o n  t h e  m a p .  J a m e s  D u e r  s p o K e  u p  a n d  sa id  h e  
d i d n ' t  w a n t  a n y  o f  t h e  t a x  p a p e r s  d c ~ l  a p s  s p e n t  o n  r e s e a r i h i n g  
a1 1 o f  t h e  o l  rf ro.313~.  
B a r b r a  H a r r i s a n  s a i d  s h e  w a n t e d  t h e  C o m m i s s i ~ n e r s  t u  go o u t  a n d  
l o o k  a t  L a r r y  L a c y 5  r12a.d. S h e r m a n  C l y d e  s a . i d  t h e y  w o u l d ,  
F i c t r d  T r a i l  ask i +  t h e  C o ~ ~ r t t ; y  c a n  e s c a p e  a n y  1 i a b i l  i t y ,  
T e r r y  W a l s e r  s h u w e d  t h e  C ~ m m i s s i u n e r s  a rc13.d t h a t  w a r  l e + t  u f f  oi 
t h e  m a p .  T h e  C o m m i s s i o n e r s  added t h e  raad t o  t h e  m a p .  -#d 
Les P i x l e y  a n d  M i l d r e d  P i x l e y  a r k  a b o u t  t h e  road t h a t  g c ~ e s  a n  
p a s t  t h e  M a r s h a l  R a a d  t ~ t  h e  Vart H u 1 3 h e s  e s t a t e .  T h e  C ~ z ~ r n m i s s i c t n e r s  
s a i d  t h e y  w i  1 1  c h e c k  a n d  s e e  i f  t h e  rrtad s h ~ ~ u i d  h a v e  b e e n  p u t  g=sn 
t h e  map. 
B i  1 1  B a r t 1  e t   aid h e  w a n t e d  ~ I Z I  ~ I = I  o n  r eco rd  4ha . t  h e  p r c ~ t e s t e d  h i s  
road n o t  b e i n g  1 i s t e d  u n  t h e  map. 
T e r r y  W a l s e r  s a i d  t h a t  t h e  road 4ha . t  gt:les t o  t h e  O r i  l e y  p l a c e  
t h a t  r-l_rrts t h r o u g h  t h e  ! . 4 a l s e r  p l a c e  s f i r s r ~ l ~ J  n o t  h e  o n  t h e  rrrap s.nd 
w a n t s  i t  t a k e n  o f f .  Fopeman H a r o l d  S t u b b s  s a i d  t h a t  h e  P;ficiws t h e  
c i i u n t y  has w t z t r k e ~ j  I:I~ t h e  r o a d  f o r  a t  1 e a s t  28 ;.-  r a r s  . T e r r y  w a s  
t o l d  t h a t  he  w a u l d  h a v e  tct p e t  i t i n n  t h e  r c ~ a d  c l o s e d .  
Ron  L a n d e c k  r e ad  1 e t t e r s  r e r e  i v e d  film Lo1 a C l y d e ,  F r a n c i s  
D u p o r t t ,  E e n f r e w ,  B e n n e t t  L u m b e r  Co., Me1 T a . g g a r t ,  J o e s e p h  
E r e c k n e r ,  Ron M a h o n e y ,  J a m e s  C o o l  e y ,  a n d  L e e  t i  s h e r .  A1 l 1 s t t e r s  
a r e  e n  f i l e .  
G r a n t  M o r t o n  f r o m  t h e  P l a n n i n g  a n d  Z n n i r ~ q  C u r n m i s s i ~ ~ n  u . tan ts  t h e  
H i g h w a y  D i s t r i c t  t o  w a i  t u n t r i  l t h e y  c.2.n g i v e  t h e m  w r i  t t e n  
t e s t  i m o n y  b e f o r e  t h e y  make a dec i s i  I Z I ~ I .  
2 T h e t - c  w a s  a 1 1 ~ t  of d i s c i j s . z . i o n  t h a t  w.3:~. g o i n g  cltn c , i m ? l l  t a r t e u u - ; l ; i  
a b o u t  v a r i o u s  t h i n g s .  
2 of 3 
T h e r e  i s .  a w r i t t e n  t r a n s c r i p t  of t h e  m e e t i n g  u n  ii l e .  
T h e  Cctmmi ssi s r i e r s  c l n s e d  p ~ ~ b l  i c h e 2 . r  i rig a t  9 : 5 0  P.M. and w i  1 ? 
t a k e  w r i t t e n  t e s t i m o n y  u n t i l  t h e i r  n e x t  m e e t i n g  un hug. 27. 
Sherman Clyde made a m o t i o n  and Wayne Hemme1rna.n s e c a r i d e d  i t  4 0  
h a v e  Gu i 1 f o r  I n s u r a n c e  g e t  1 iabi  l i t y  i n s u r a n c e  -For t h e  Hi g h w a r  
D i s t r i c t  f o r  a p p r o x  %420110.00 T h e  m o t i o n  wa-3 p a s s e d ,  , 
Wayne Hemmel man rn.2de a m o t  i on and !She rman  C l  y d e  s e c o n d e l j  i t t c ~  
g e t  t h e  e l e c t r i c a l  s e r v i c e  i .~ ,~~rb:  d o n e  i n a1 1 t h r e e  rrew fsu i 1 dings. 
T h e  mot i ~ n  w a s  p a s s e d .  
Be i n o  f u r t h e r  bus; ne5.5  t h e  m e e t  i riq w a s  ad . - i13urned i 1 : 0 7  
P.M..  
f fha  i r m a n  \.J 
3 of 3 
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ITEM 5 
T h e  r e g u l a r  m e e t i n g  of t h e  N o r t h  l a t a h  121:ri~nty Hiiqhw.3.y - D i s t r i c t  
Baa.rJ o f  Csmmi i g r t e p s  w a s  h e  l a t  t k f e  Mo.s.c~w I]+ f i c~ an k u t ~ .  Zs5, 
1'78.5 a t  7 : 3 E i  P.M. .  P res .e r i t  w e r e  C h a i  rm3.n 1 3 r l  A r n e b e r g ,  
c o r n m i s s i o n e r  !3herman C I  ~ ~ 3 2 ,  W a y n e  Hrmmpl r i tan ,  fnrem.3.rt.s. Harol 13 
S t u k t t ~ ~ ~  R a l  p h  P a y n e ,  Dave  & r l ~ d e r s ~ = ~ n  a r i d  H e r ]  e I< i n q .  
The m i n i ~ t e s  of t h e  rpgu t . 3 . r  m e e ~ i n g  t=,n ~ u g .  112, 138 ,~~  w e r e  
a p p r o v e d ,  
T h e  8 1 ~ t d g e t  H e a r i n s  - w a s  h e l t d  7 : 3 0  P.I..l.. Chai r r r rar i  i ~ l r l a r ~ d  
A r r ~ ~ b e r g  a s k  i f  t h e r e  w3.s s . r~y  c o m m e n t s  $:in t h e  k t i ~ d g e t .  T h e r e  w3.s  
n o n e .  SI-1erm.3.n C l y d e  made .3. m a t  i o n  art13 Wa;c,r~e Hemmelrnan sect:tnded i t 
to p a s s  a n d  .s.dt=hpt t h e  budqe t as a d v e r t  i se13. The m o t  i o n  waz. 
p .3.5:5e d . 
E d d  f r - o m  H a d q e  a n d  A s s o c ,  a t t e n d e d  t h e  m e e t i n g  a n d  5..3.id t h a t  t h e  
t i id  f r o m  E a r l  R i ~ . ~ . s e l l  t o  p a i n t  t h e  F o t l a . t i = t i  Rii..>er E r i d s e  - i s  i n  
r l l r d e r  a r i d  b r o u g h t  t h e  r o r ~ t r - a c t . % .  i n  t i 1  be .;.igned. i:a..fayrte Hemrnelmart 
made a m a t  i o n  a n d  Sherma.rt C l  y t j e  s e c o n d e d  i t ~ I Z I  a c c e p t  E a r l  
R u s s e l  l s b i d  a n d  t o  s i  grt t h e  c o n t r a c t - ; .  T h e  m o t  i art 1;.!.3.s p a s s e d .  
The pub1 i c  h e a r i n g  t o  t a k e  w r i t t e n  t e s t i r n a n y  f o r  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  
an 12-f  i c i 31 map 13gterled. Ron L a r l d e c k  t h e  H i  qhw.3.y D i  str= i ~: ts 
a t t o r n e y  r e a d  1 e t t e r s  r e c e  i v e d  f rc tm t h e  $01  l~~* . . i i  rtq pel:ipl e .  M r .  4.5 
M ~ E . .  P a l m e r ,  C l  i f f i g r d  F r e n c h ,  D e a n  E l  1 i o t ,  B i l l  B a r t l e t t ,  E y r c t n  
Fi t c h ,  p e t  i t i  o n  f ~ z t r  rt3a.d r e f e r r e d  t o  as M e c k e l  Rclad, a.nd p e t  i t i  c~rt 
f r q m  Me1 Taggar t f o r  rcsad # 460 .  L e t  ter.2. a r e  on f i l e  , 
T h e  B a r  t l  e t t s  a n d  C o o l  e y s  a r i d  a c o u p  1 +? o t h e r  p e ~ p  l e a t t e n d e d  t h e  
m e e t i n g  and a s k  a f e w  q u e s t   ion^. b u t  t h e i r  i.!.!as ri13 mrl1r-e o r a l  
t e s t  i m o n r  t a k e n .  
Ctz~rnm iss i u n e r s  h.3.d S c ~ r e m a r ~  Haj-0 l 13 S t u t t t t s  c h e c k  t h e  poad,2 E:tn t j - ie 
map m a r k e d  e x h i  b i  t B c o l o r e d  i n  h rawr t  a n d  say i f  t h e y  have been  
rna.intained by t h e  Higt1wa.y [ j i s t r i c t .  H2rol t -J 5.ait-J t h a t  t h e  
road i n  h i s  d i s t r i c t  t h a t  has. h e e n  m a . i n t a i n e t 3  s i n c e  1972 is. t h e  
f i r s t  q u a r t e r  m i l e  a f  t h e  E a r t l e t t  R a a ~ j .  T h e  C i = t m m i . ~ . ~ . i o r ~ e r ~ .  ask
C. a e c .  M e r l e  K i n g  tcg 1ctciK a t  t h e  r e rn .3 . i n i ng  ro.3.d.s m a r k e d  i n  b r o w n  o n  
t h e  map  a n d  s a y  i f  t h e y  h a v e  beer1 m a i n  t2 . i  n e d  by t h e  di.:.tr i c t .  
M e r t  e s a i d  t h a t  t111 b e s t  I Z I ~  h i s k r l a w l  e d g e  t h a t  t h e  j-na.1j.3 i n t h e  
Moscow D i s t r i c t  h.3.ue n s t  k ~ e t n  maj j - l t .%. i r led ~ . i r ~ c e  h e s t a . p t e d  wt3r-k 
h e r e  i n  1967 and s i n c e  1972 i n  t h e  D e a r y  [ > i s t j - i c f - .  
r- aher rnan  C l  y d e  made a mt=i t i on  and Wa;r>r~e Hemme 1 m.3.n secondel -J  i t to 
adczlpt t h e  map m.3,rked as e x h i b i  t A w i t h  t h e  ,:h~.nges ma.rged 
YF.1 lo!.<.! as t h e  i i f f  i c i a l  High~,,ray D i s t ~ i c t  map zrttj t u  S ~ Q F I ~  
R e s a l i ~ t i o n  t.lo.3 S e r i e s  1P:36 th.2.t: i s  .3.tta,-tIet j  t o  t h e  t131:k I:+ w, i .~.  
page.  T h e  m a t  i  ,=tri wa.5. p a ~ . ~ . e l ~ .  
M i k e  McGahn a.nd P r e r e l  f r o m  t h e  C i t y  Q+ M o 5 . c ~ ~ ~  a t t e n t j e d  t h e  
m e e t i n g  artd wa .n ted  She Ci4:rS t3f MCI~CKEW arfd t h e  Hi9hwa.y  D i s t r i c t  4 , ~  
cfo a . j c l i n t  o i  1 i n g  j t z lb  rlrn t-lt.O,'eiv.;r, ...jo.'.~.pfj S t ,  a n i j  D s t ,  Shprma-,  
Clyde made a m c t t i o n  a n d  !.l.2.:i.rte Hi.mirr1eim.3.r! s e c s r i d e d  i t I~,:I a jc j i  n t  
a i l  i n g  jots o n  P l r .  Veisz.! a.nd J o s e p h  t & i ~ t  t.qi 1 2  ctlp,-li' or1 [? s t  t l e f a r e  
t h e y  do a n y  w o r k  on i t .  The  r n t z ~ t i a r ~  w a s  Fias-%.~d. 1 of 2 
R o n  Landecli s a i d  t h a t  D w a i r f  Waterm.3.r1 w.s.rit.5 t h p  Hightg.3.y D i s t r i c t  : 
t o  w a i v e  t h e  9 1 0 0  r e v i e w  f e e  f ~ z * ~  ~ . t ~ ~ . r ~ ~ ~ ~ = ~ j - j i r l i ~  - rt: a~ s, Warr ,e ,$ 
Hemme Iman rns.de a m a t  i on and S h e r m a r ~  C1 y d e  s e c a r r d e d  i t r iot t ,> . 
g 
w a i  ve the 4ee. T h e  mtztt i w a s  pa.sspd.  A 
ITEM 6 
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT 
Latah County, Idaho 
RESOLUTION NO. 3, Series 1986 
A RESOLUTION ADOPTING THE ACCOMPANYING HAP AS THE OFFICIAL 
MAP OF THE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT (5'DISTRICT'f) 
SYSTEM 
RECITALS : 
1. Idaho Code Section 40-202 (1) (a) (b) provides as follows: 
(a) The board of county or highway district 
commissioners shall cause a map to be prepared showing 
each highway in their jurisdiction, and the 
commissioners shall cause notice to be given of 
intention to adopt the map as the official map of that 
system, and shall specify the time and place at which 
all interested persons may be heard. 
(b) After the hearing, the commissioners shall adopt 
the map, with any changes or revisions considered by 
them to be advisable in the public interest, as the 
official map of the respective highway system. 
2. On August 13, 1986, after legal notice was given, a 











hearing was held, at which written comments were received from 
the public and staff comments were received regarding the public 
input at the August 13, 1986 hearing. Thereafter, the District's 
Board of Commissioners approved this resolution. 
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I BE IT RESOLVED by the Board of  omm missioners of the North 
- Latah County Highway District of Latah County, Idaho: 
Upon review of all testimony and evidence, the District's 
Board of Commissioners makes the following findings of fact: 
A. The map accompanying this ~esolution No. 3, series 1986 
describes each highway within the jurisdiction of the North Latah 
County Highway District. 
B. Each highway described on the accompanying map has been 
maintained regularly by the District since the ~istrict's 
organization in 1972. 
C. Those roads which any member of the public requested be 
included on the accompanying map and were not so included have 
not been maintained by the District since at least 1972 and, 
further, no m e n h e r  of the public produced evidence indicating 
public maintenance for five (5) consecutive years immediately 
prior to 1963. 
D. The public interest is served by the adoption of the 
accompanying map as the official map of the North Latah County 
Highway District System. 
E. The adoption of the accompanying map as the official 
map of the North Latah County Highway District System shall in no 
way impair, hinder or affect private rights of access on roads 
within the boundaries of the North Latah County Highway District 
System, the rights of access to which have been obtained by 
public or private use or both. 
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NOW THEREFORE, the map accompanying this Resolution No. 3, 
Series 1986, is adopted as the official map of the North Latah 
County Highway District System, which o f f i c i a l  map bears our 
signatures and is on file at the offices of t h e  North Latah 
County Highway District, 1132 White Avenue, Moscow, Idaho 83843, 
DATED this .2/ day of September, 1986. 
North Latah County Highway District 
Board of Commissioners: 
, V S h i l ~  .j& c; - -- 
Clyde, (C&n"1":sikner 
2.drr~.~~%& r&%. *.**"+ /;,p*&.L,
Wa@e Hemtimen, Commissioner 
Attest: 
~ & l e  Xing, Oistrict Secretary 
Prepared by: 
Ronald J. Landeck 
Siebe, Landeck, Westberg & Gould 
Attorneys for North Latah County 
Highway District 
P.O. Box 9 3 4 4  
Moscow, I D  83843 
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RONALD J. LANDECK, ISB No. 3001 
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C. 
693 Styner Avenue, Suite 9 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883- 1505 
FAX (208) 883-4593 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DON & CHARLOTTE HALVORSON ) 
(Husband and Wife), ) Case No. CV 2008-1 80 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) DEFENDANTS' DISCLOSURE 
) OF EXPERT WITNESSES 
VS. 1 
1 
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY ) 
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR ) 
THE NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY 1 
DISTRICT, ORLAND ARNEBERG, RICHARD ) 
HANSEN, SHERMAN CLYDE, in their individual ) 
capacities; DAN PAYNE, in his official capacity and ) 
in his individual capacity, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Defendants, through counsel and pursuant to the Court's Amended Order Setting Case for 
Trial and Pre-Trial Conference, hereby disclose Defendants' expert witnesses whom Defendants 
reserve the right to call as expert witnesses at the trial of this matter, as follows: 
DEFENDANTS' DISCLOSURE OF EXPERT IVITKESSES -- 1 
1. Larry J. Hodge 
Hodge & Associates, Inc. 
405 S. Washington St. 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 882-3520 
(licensed professional engineer and licensed professional land surveyor) 
2. John L. Dunn 
Rim Rock Consulting, Inc. 
1 15 South Washington St., Suite 3 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-5339 
(licensed professional land surveyor) 
3. Susan Peterson 
Latah County Clerk/Auditor/Recorder 
Latah County Courthouse 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-2249 
4. Pat Vaughan 
Latah County Assessor 
Latah County Courthouse 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-5710 
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of February, 2009. 
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C. 
\, 
By: 
DEFENDANTS' DISCLOSURE OF EXPERT QrITNESSES -- 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of February, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy of 
this document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below: 
DON HALVORSON [ XI U.S. Mail 
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON [ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail 
1290 AMERICAN RIDGE ROAD [ ] FAX (208) 322-4486 
KENDRICK, IDAHO 83537 [ 1 Hand Delivery 
Ro fl ald J. Landeck 
DEFEh-DANTS' DISCLOSURE OF EXPSRT WITNESSES -- 3 
2009 FEB 1 7 AH l l : 31 
Don Halvorson 
1290 American Ridge Road 
Kendrick, Idaho, 83 53 7 
(208) 289-5602 
Plaintiff, Pro se 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
Don & Charlotte Halvorson (Husband and Wife) 
Plaiiltiffs 
vs. 
North Latah County Highway District; Board of 
Commissioners for the North Latah County 
Highway District, Orland Arnehesg, Richard 
Hansen, Sheman Clyde, in their Official 
Capacities, and in their Individual Capacities; 
Dan Payne, in his Official Capacity and in his 
Case No. CV 2008- 180 
PL-4INTIFFS' ANSWERING 
BRIEF TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGh4ENT AND REPLY TO 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERING 
BRIEF AND OBJECTIONS 
TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY 
Individual Capacity ) JUDGMENTS AND OTHER 
Defendants ) R4OTIONS SUBMITTED 
'I JANUARY 26,2009 
I. Introduction 
This Answering Brief to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is supported by Ed 
Swanson's Affidavit, Ole Hanson's Affidavit, Joe Yockey's Affidavit, Plaintiffs' Fourth Record 
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Supplement, Plaintiffs' Affidavit is Support of Plaintiffs Answering Brief to Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Reply to Defendants' Answering Brief and Objections to Plaintiffs 
Motions for Partial Summary Judgments and Other Motions Submitted January 26,2009. 
Defendants seek summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs' claims. However, the Court has 
already given sufficient reason for denial of Defendants' Motion- '-Specifically, the 
determination of the width of the right of way of Camps Canyon Road must be addressed." (see 
Opinion and Order On Plaintiffs Motions For Summary Judgment And Defendants' Motion For 
Protective Orders, For Enlargement Of Time And For Attorney Fees (hereafter Opiniorz), at 9). 
The width of the Camps Canyon right of way has not been factually determined-this is 
undisputed. The Court confirms this. Plaintiffs allege this has harmed theni-they have not 
been afforded due process. However, Defendants claim they are authorized "to improve" and "to 
maintain", each or either of which includes as Defendants state adding additional width to the 
road surface and supporting structures of a claimed unrecorded prescriptive right of way (see 
Defendants ' BrieJ; at 7 par. 6; see Payne Second Afidavit, pars. 4 and 5 )  without a factual 
determination of the width of the easement. It is here, on the undisputed facts that no evidentiary 
hearing has been held and that Defendants say it is witliin their policies/customs that they are not 
required to give Plaintiffs an evidentiary hearing that Plaintiffs petition for Partial Summary say 
based on these undisputed facts that this dispute requires due process. Without the evidence in 
the record, Defendants findings and conclusions are arbitrary and capricious and Defendants' 
actions and/or failures to act in these matters are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of the 
Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal (see Complaint pp. 8-25). There is also the issue of the 
first Wagner driveway access and the challenge faced by the 'IVagners in building a driveway 
access when confronted with an 8 foot embankment left by Defendants 1996 alterations to 
Camps Canyon Road (see Plaintijj '  Fourth Recor-dSupplement, Item No. 3, at 17 (photo 
showing the remains of the 8 foot embankment at the surveyed east property line after the 
Wagners had built new driveways on either side of it-the first to the east and south of the 
PLAINTIFFS' ANSWERING BRIEF TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
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property line and the 2"d to the west of the property line); see Ole Hallson Affidavit at 2, par. 7 
(the east property line was well known to people working on both sides of it)). 
Camps Canyon Road has always been an alternative canyon short cut having an early 
start as a road (see Plaintiffs' Fourth Record Supplement, Item No. 3, at 19 (Standard Atlas of 
Latah County Idaho circa 1914 shows Canips Canyon Road as well as other roads in Camps 
Canyon)). However, its early beginning fizzled and it remained a wagon trail (see Plaintiffs ' 
Fourth Record Supplement, Item No. 3, at 18 (Metsker Map of circa early 1950's shows Camps 
Canyon Road only extending west of Little Bear Ridge Road to and stopping at the 3+/- acre 
parcel)). 
Canzps Carzyorz Road has been an unrecordedprescriptive right ofway for over 120 
years, probably 130 years or more. However, if Plaintiffs make this statement, it is conclusory. 
Camps Canyon Road has been a prescriptive right of way since before 1930. Likewise, if 
Defendants make this statement it is conclusory. To establish a public prescriptive way requires 
a public evidentiary hearing as it is on the public's testimony that the NLCHD record is made on 
which the supposedly impartial NLCHD Commissioners make findings and conclusions. It was 
created by public use and its use can only be supported by the evidence the public brings (see 
Homestead Farms v. Board of Comnz 'rs Teton County, state of Idaho, 141 Idaho 855, 1 19 P 3d 
630 (2005); and can only be done by Defe~ldallts under certain circumstances (see Galvin v. 
Canyon County High. Dist. Aro. 4, 134 Idaho 579, 6 P.3d 829 ("Section 40-203A may ollly be 
used to validate an existing highway or public right of way about which there is some kind of 
doubt. It does not allow for the creation of a new public rights").. 
Contrary to Defendants' claim that there are two events from which Plaintiffs' claims 
arise (see Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion For Sununary Judgment (hereafter 
Defendants ' Brief), at 2),  there are many events from which Plaintiffs' allegations arise. There 
are, however, two sides of Camps Canyon Road; and as such, there are two ongoing issues from 
which these allegations arise. The issues arise from the Defendants making two claims adverse 
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to Plaintiffs property and liberty rights of which the Defendants claim they are authorized to do 
and are rightful in denying Plaintiffs due process. On both sides of the road Defendants claim 
they are authorized to invade and occupy Plaintiffs' land and to do so without the civil 
procedures of public hearings and of eminent domain or the positive guaranties of the 5th and idth 
Amendments of the Constitution of the U.S. to the Plaintiffs and/or without any of the statutory 
safeguards and/or remedies for erroneous deprivations. In both instances Plaintiffs claim 
Defendants are in wrongful possession of Plaintiffs' land and that this improper interference with 
Plaintiffs7 property rights is particularly egregious on the south side of the road as the 
Defendants have allowed the invasion and occupation of a third party (see Loretto v. 
Telepror-lpter Manhattan CATVCorp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned 
that an owner suffers a special kind of injury when a "stranger" invades and occupies the 
owners' property, and that such an occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation on 
the use of the property). 
Defendants do not retreat from their claims. Further injury has occurred and both issues 
remain as threats of further irreparable harm. As Defendants claim in their Brief in support of 
their Motion, they contiilue to hold to these claims (Dqfendants ' Brief), at 2 ("'This Brief \\.ill 
s l~ow that the District has, at all tiines relevant to this action, properly discharged its statutory 
responsibilities to improve and maintain the public highway known as Camps Canyon"). 
Defendants' "[discharge of their] statutoly responsibilities to improve" is an autocratic self 
proclamation of Defendants' misplaced "prescriptive right" and is in excess of the authority the 
legislature has intended the NLCI-ID have to maintain Camps Canyon Road, or for that matter 
any unrecorded prescriptive right of way (see PIaintifJs ' Fourth Record Sapplenzent, Item No. 3, 
at 1 (Photo of neighbor's fence along Little Bear Ridge Road, fence now lies buried under gravel 
by the diligent il~aiiitenance of the Defendants (see Defendants' Brief at 9, par. 11)). Defendants 
have lost sight of their responsibilities to the public (i.e. following the rules) and it appears they 
have come to believe that they are tlze Public (see Defendants Affidavits in recent Plaintiffs' 
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petitions for partial summary judgment (Defendants try to hold a public validation proceeding 
without the public, by their own testimony and to even establish Camps Canyon Road as 
"public" by their own decree. Placing Camps Canyon Road on their map requires public 
testimony not solely the Defendants')). The injuries for which Plaintiffs bring suit we related to 
this lack of public input and specifically the denial of the opportunity for Plaintiffs to respond to 
Defendants' adverse actions in regards to Plaintiffs' property. The issues Plaintiffs bring are 
matters of was due process required in these actior~s/failur.es to act, 
Defendants deny that these matters are matters requiring due process; and furthermore, 
Defendants state that these exertions of their governmental power are matters of Defendants' 
policy (see PlaintIfJs ' Third Record Supplenier7t, Itein No. 20, at 8-9 ("The District's policy for 
improving public highways under its jurisdiction is based on Idaho Code $40-23 12 and the 
holdings of i14eservey... ") and based on law. Summary judgment is the order of the day and it 
belongs to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have said that their land has been wrongfully taken and therefore 
their collstitutional rights have been violated. Defendants do not deny these actions, as they 
readily admit that these actions are a nlatter of their policies or customs (see Plaintiffs ' Fourth 
Record Szqplen7ent, Item No. 3,  at 3 and 6 (in the late fall of 2005, but mostly in 2006 
Defendants pushed dirt and gravel illto Plaintiffs' buffer (there was 5-1 0 feet of space between 
the road support and Plaintiffs' fence before this) and covered the wires of Plaintiffs' fence); see 
Pluii?tlffss' Fotlrth Record Szrpplement, Item No. 3. at 5 (in 2006 in order to widen the road, 
Defendants filled the old drainage ditch and pushed tlie old compaction roller into Plaintiffs 
fence and created a new drainage ditch which has undermined Plaintiffs fence and caused 
additional erosion); see Plaintiffs' Fourth Record Supylenzent, Item No. 3' at 4 (the first Wagner 
driveway access was issued for an access wholly on Plaintiffs' propel-ty). They attempt to 
defend their exertions of governmental power by saying they were reasonably negligent and/or 
the state legislature made then1 do it, under statutory a~ithority. Being reaso~lably negligent is not 
rationally based to a legitimate governme~~tal interest, therefore their only valid defense left is 
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that someone else (the state legislature or the Wagners made them do it). Plaintiffs allege 
Defendants are the direct, legal, proximate and substantial cause of these damages of and 
invasions into Plaintiffs" property and that these damages and invasions are within the scope of 
responsibility of Defendants' actions/failures to act (see Complaint). 
Plaintiffs are not here to say that the Defendants can not widen the road if they believe 
that it is necessary, even if the only reason may be that they may lose state and/or federal funding 
if they don't. Their reasoning in this regard, however correct or misguided it may be, is not the 
issue. Likewise, Plaintiffs are not here to say, considering the alterations to Camps Canyon 
Road, that it was not the better idea to put a driveway access heading east through the grassy 
draw rather than going north as the historic driveway approached Camps Canyon Road. What 
Plaintiffs are saying is that the actionslfailures to act in these issues are improper interference 
with Plaintiffs' property rights. The Defendants cannot simply move Camps Canyon Road 
anywhere they want without going through certain civil procedures; nor can they sinlply bury 
Plaii~tiffs' fence and/or fill Plaintiffs' buffer wit11 gravel and dirt to increase the width and/or 
support of Camps Canyon Road, even if it is within the right of way without certain civil 
procedures as Camps Canyon Road is an unrecorded prescriptive right of way and there are laws 
prohibiting damaging Plaintiffs fence and trespassing and creating nuisances on Plaintiffs' land. 
Defendants cannot simply give permission for the neighbors to take Plaintiffs' land for a 
driveway access regardless of which party, the Wagners or the Defendants, prefers it that way. 
Furthermore, Plaintiffs and Defendants agree these interferences are not random acts. 
Also, almost in the same breath in which Defendants claim that the issues for wliich 
Plaintiffs allege harm are matters of their policy, that is, that these alleged wrongful exertions of 
Defendants governmental power are "not unauthorized", Defendants suggest these claims arise 
under the ITCA. However, Plaintiffs point out that these interferences were not only matters of 
policy, final policy makers approval andor official decision; but also, these interferences were 
arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of the Defendants' discretion and/or illegal and these 
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iilterferences have resulted in the invasion of Plaintiffs property (see Complaint). Therefore, 
Plaintiffs deny that ITCA offers an adequate remedy. However, without waiver of this denial, 
Plaintiffs continue. 
When Defendants absolutely confirmed that they were in no way going to coilsides the 
matters of which Plaintiffs alleged they were being harmed (to give Plaintiffs' due process in 
these matters), and that Defendants were not going to take any evidence to consider the 
underlying issue of limits of Camps Canyon Road (allow an evidentiary hearing) unless 
Plaintiffs paid them a $750 fee, and when Defendants said Plaintiffs7 only other choice was to 
get a lawyer, then Plaintiffs, within 30 days of that final decision that the Defendants had no 
viable agency remedy for Plaintiffs' con~plaillts, filed a tort claim notice with the clerk of the 
NLCHD (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplei~zer~t, I em No. 6, at 5-8 (At the 6/16/07 meeting of 
the Commissioners, Defendants give Plaintiffs choice of fee or to get a lawyer, even though 
Plaintiffs say they will represent themselves); see also Plaintiffs ' Third Record SzqJplement, Item 
No. 9, at 20, (Defendants deny Plaintiffs' request to talk directly their counsel as Plaintiffs 
would not have to pay ally inoney if they didn't have a lawyer); see also Defendai?ts ' Brief; at 2 
(Plaintiffs file a tort claim notice in November, 2007)). In the alternative, Plaintiffs plead that 
Plaintiffs' tort claim notice gave Defendants adequate and timely notice. Defendants were given 
fair warning of Plaintiffs objectioil to Defendants actions 011 4/12/06 and kept Defendants abreast 
of Plaintiffs objections throughout the whole time until Plaintiffs filed the Tort Claim Notice 
when Defendants indicated that there were no agency remedies they ~vould consider. 
Defendants have been given the information for them to initiate ididation yroceedillgs 
on their own resolution (see Ha1-r.i~ v. County of Riverside, 904 F.2d 497 (1990); see also Tirare v 
Idaho Stcrte Tax Coinnz '17, 98 Idaho 477, at 383 (1 977) (the Defendants had clearly not fulfilled 
their statutory obligations and were estopped from denying a refund). Establishing an 
unrecorded prescriptive right of way by public hearing is the job of the Defendants and they ha\-e 
permission to do so, if legal establishment is in doubt (see Idaho Code $ 40-203a (1)). 
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Defendants have abused their discretion and violated the law, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants 
were required under Idaho Code tj 40-203a to initiate validation proceedings under their own 
resolution on 4/12/06 when the legal establishment of the road was questioned as the Defendants 
had acted upon their findings and conclusions. Defendants continue to threaten imminent 
irreparable harm and the trespass and nuisance go unabated (see Plaintiffs ' Fourth Record 
Supplenzent, Item No. 3, at 4 and 7 (Wagners first driveway access left the land scarred, bare of 
vegetation and exposed to erosion and the pike of rocks still remain minimally on Plaintiffs land 
as well as scattered over it); (see Plaintiffs' Fourth RecordSupplernent, Item No. 3, at 3, 5 ,  and 7 
(intrusion into Plaintiffs' buffer has not been abated nor has the injuries to Plaintiffs' fence)). 
Defendants continue to threaten more irreparable harm ((see Plaintiffs ' Fourth Record 
Supplemerzt, Item No. 3, at 8 and 9 (Defendants continue to intentionally push snow illto 
Plaintiffs' fence, winter of 2007-8); (see Plaintiffs ' Fourth Record Supplenzent, Item No. 3, at 10 
(damage of Plaintiffs' fence and gravel contained in snow removal is several feet beyond 
Plaintiffs' fence indicating Defendants intentions to place the snow on the fence, spring of 2008); 
(see Plaintiffs ' Fou~tlz Record Suppler;lze~t, Item No. 3, at 11 (winter of 2006-7, notice the space 
between the car tracks and the fence; adequate room for snow without necessary darnage to the 
fence)). Furthermore, on neither side of the road have the Defendants said they could not legally 
or would not conti~lue their activity (Defendants say they impliedly revoked the first Wagner 
driveway access permit. They have not defined what that means. Are abutting land owners 
impliedly restricted to one access to the road? They have not said that they would not again 
issue a permit in the same place. Indeed their Brief indicates they deny negligence; and, that it is 
not only plausible but valid (reasonable) for them to do to issue the permit.) Furthermore, 
Defendants have no good faith immunity (see Owen v. Irzdependence, 445 U.S.622 ("c) The 
application and rationale underlying both the doctrine whereby a municipality was held im~nune 
from tort liability with respect to its "governmental" functions but not for its "proprietary" 
functions, and the doctrine whereby a municipality was immunized for its "discretionary" or 
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"legislative" activities but not for those which were "ministerial" in nature, demonstrate that 
neither of these common-law doctrines could have been intended to limit a municipality's 
liability under 1983. The principle of sovereign immunity from which a municipality's immunity 
for "govemnental" functions derives cannot serve as the basis for the qualified privilege 
respondent city claims under 1983, since sovereign immunity insulates a municipality fiom 
unconsented suits altogether, the presence or absence of good faith being irrelevant, and since the 
municipality's "governmental" immunity is abrogated by the sovereign's enactment of a statute 
such as 1983 inaking it amenable to suit. And the doctrine granting a municipality immunity for 
"discretionary" functions, which doctrine merely prevented courts fiom substituting their own 
judgment on matters within the lawful discretion of the municipality, cannot serve as the 
foui~dation for a good-faith immunity under 1983, since a municipality has no "discretion" to 
violate the Federal Constitution. (d) Rejection of a construction of 1983 that would accord 
municipalities a qualified immunity for their good-faith constitutional violations is compelled 
both by the purpose of 1983 to provide protection to those persons wronged by the abuse of 
goverlunental authority and to deter future constitutional violations, and by considerations of 
public policy. In view of the qualified immunity enjoyed by most government officials, many 
victims of municipal malfeasance would be left remediless if the city were also allowed to assert 
a good-faith defense. The concerns that justified decisions conferring qualified immunities on 
various government officials - the injustice, particulasly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting 
the official to liability, and the danger that the threat of such liability would deter the official's 
willingness to execute his office effectively - are less compelling, if not wholly inapplicable, 
when the liability of the municipal entity is at issue")). 
As this Court has said, the issue of the width (and one can include the location, use, and 
character) of Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent past, pewades the ongoing issues on both 
side of the road. This issue of the width of the easement-the legal establishment of it-is 
complicated by the undisputed alteration in Camps Canyon Road in 1996 (see Plaintiffs Asdavit 
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at 2, par. 8; Ed Swanson Afldavit, at 2-3, pars. 5-12; see Ole Hanson AfJiduvit, at 1-2, pars. 2-8: 
see Joe Yockey AfJidavit, at 2, pars. 4-8; see Plaintijfs ' Third Record Supylentent, Itern No. 1, at 
3, Request For Admission No. 3, subpart c.; see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 2, 
at 4-5, Interrogatory No. 3; see Plailztiffs ' Third Record Supplenzent, Item No. 3, at 16- 17, 
Interrogatory Nos. 40 - 34; (Defendants have altered Camps Canyon Road several times and 
altered the centerline; see Second Payne Affidavit at 2 and 3)). Whatever the eventual outcome 
of the factual determination Defendants disturbed the status quo in 1996 and are claiming the 
same thing they did then which is not plausible. Defendants again starting in the late fall of 2005 
to disturb the status quo. Plaintiffs do not disagree with the court that the limits of the Camps 
Canyon right of way need to be factually determined. However, this only confirms that a dispute 
exists and does not then answer when such factual determination is required. On the issue on the 
north side of the road and the widening of Camps Canyon Road, is governed by I.C. 9 40-605 
and/or I.C. 5 40-1310, and/or I. C. 5 Title 40-Chapter 20, and/or T.C. 5 Title 7-Chapter 7, and/or 
the 5''' and 1 4 ' ~  mendments  of the Constitution, and/or Article I 5 13 and 14 of the Idaho State 
Constitution, and/or the Idalio Doctrine of Quasi-Judicial Capacity, and amongst others and as 
these statutes and constitutions are harmoniously construed, Plaintiffs coiltend when was before 
the widening occurred. 
If not then, and without waiver of this contention, the Plaintiffs contend that due process 
was due on 4/12/06, or inlnlediately thereafter (aside, with the first Wagner driveway access 
permit to be temporarily revoked until that hearing took place). Furthennore: on 4/12/06 due 
process was now called for under I.C. 5 40-203a under the Coinmissioners own resolution as the 
legal establishment was in question. Failure to provide a hearing under I.C. 9 40-203a under 
Cornmissiollers own resolution now became in violation of Plaintiffs' equal protection rights, as 
Plaintiffs have a right to private action under I.C. 5 40-203a as well as a right to due process (see 
Owell, above ("since a ilxunicipality Ins no "discretion" to violate the Federal Constitution")). 
Furtlzermore, Defendants denial of (i) Plaintiffs of predeprivational hearing, (ii) a post 
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deprivation hearing, (iii) Plaintiffs' requests that Defendants initiate validation proceedings on 
their own resolution on several occasions and (iv) Plaintiffs' Requests For Regulatory Takings 
Analysis were arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion and/or illegal and a 
manifestation of Defendants deliberate indifference to the erroneous deprivations of Plaintiffs 
property and property rights. 
Plaintiffs also contend that post deprivational remedies under the ITCA are inadequate 
when the actions were "not unauthorized" and a predeprivational hearing was feasible (see 
Zinermon v. Burch 494 U. S. 113 starting at 124). 
Defendants actions/failures to act are also arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of 
Defendants' discretion and/or illegal as Defendants' exertions of their governmental power, as 
well as Defendants' findings and conclusions, bear no relation to the public health, safety, 
morals, or general welfare; are in excess of Defendants' statutory authority (I. C. tj 40-23 12 does 
not mandate a 50 foot-25 feet fi-om centerline and the holdings of Meservey require an 
evidentiary hearing); are not supported by substantial evidence in the record (an unrecorded 
prescriptive right of way has no public evidentiary hearing to establish the attributes-"public 
interest", width, location, etc.); run counter to the evidence in this case and the agency record to 
the findings and conclusions Defendants make (Defendants acknowledge nunlerous alterations in 
Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part, with no surveys and or accurate descriptions of the 
land required for the alterations, and no records of the Defendants'/Commissioners' orders for 
laying out of and/or for the alterations tl~emselves); are so implausible (Camps Canyoii Road 
cannot rationally be occupying the identical strip of land it did at the end of the prescriptive 
period as it is claimed to be acquired prior to 1996; as in 1996 Camps Canyon Road underwent 
significant alteration with the permission of the then owner (see Ed S~uanso~zs ' First Af$davit, at 
2, par. 7; see Plaint$% 'Affidavit, at 2-3, par. 8); and even if Defendants began the 1996 
alterations with a 50 foot-25 feet from centerline right of way, they have no survey and/or 
accurate record of the lands required for the alteration to support their claim that no private 
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property was taken or that they did not exceed the limits of the original width of the usage of the 
road or that they did not exceed the limits of the old fence line (see Ed Swansorzs ' First ,4fJ;davit, 
at 2, par. I I ;  see Joe Yockeys 's ' AfJidavit, at 2, par. 5 and 8; see PlaintFffs ' AfJidavit, at 2-3, par. 
8); and the old trees (see Plaintiffs' Fourth Record Supplement, Item No. 3, at 2 (1 989 FSA 
aerial photo, showing large trees where fence line stood; large trees were cut down and 
excavated in 1996 by Highway District (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 9, at 
13 (Dan and Gary cut down trees on Camps Canyon Road))), and furthermore, if they do have a 
mandated 50 foot-25 feet from centerline right of way as they do continue to claim, their 
continued claim of 25 feet from centerline would exceed the original 25 feet from centerline 
claim at the outer edges and thus negate their claim that no private property was taken) that they 
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise; are in 
contravention to the statutes and the constitutions of the State of Idaho and the U.S.; are relying 
on factors the Idaho state legislature did not intend (a mandated width which gives them 
authority under 1.C.S; 40-23 12 "to improve" and to "maintain"); and fail to circumscribe their 
broad authority to determine right of way boundaries and legal limitations with the statutory 
safeguards of the requirements of due process and/or the equal treatment under the law (see the 
5'" Amendment to the U.S. Constitution), legally conducted professionally done surveys (see I.C. 
S; S; 40-1 3 10 and 605 and 1.C $5  3 1-2707 and 2709 ), accurate descriptions of the lands required 
for the alterations(see I.C. $5 40-1310 and 605), the recording of the commissioners' orders for 
laying out of and for the alteration itself (see I.C. $5 40-608), and for recording of and conveying 
of the agreements with abutting landowners(see I.C. $ $  40-23021, remedies for erroneous 
deprivations (see Zinermon v. Buvcdz 494 U. S. 11 3 starting at 124; see also Zitnmerrnan v. City of 
Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, (9th Circuit, 200 1); see also Logan v. Zir?~~~errnan Brush Co., 455 U.S. 
422, 435-436 (1 982) (availability of postdeprivation remedy is inadequate when deprivation is 
foreseeable, predeprivation process was possible, and official conduct was not "unauthorized"); 
and/or are in real and ever present conflict with a litany of other statutes, many of which are of 
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criminal and malicious intent (see Roeder Holdings v. Ada County, 41 P.3d 237, citing Idaho 
County Nursing Home v. Dep't ofHealth, 120 Idaho 933,937, 821 P.2d 988, 992 (1991) ("When 
a conflict exists between a statute and a regulation, the regulation must be set aside to the extent 
of the conflict"). 
Whether I.C. $ 40-202 gives effective notice to abutting land owner (see Defendants ' 
Briefat 19-20) is not relevant as Camps Canyon Road had not even been established as being in 
the public interest (see Homestead Farrns v. Board ofComnz 'rs Tefon County, state of Idaho, 141 
Idaho 855, 1 19 P 3d 630 (2005) (establishing the public interest requires an evidentiary 
hearing)). When Plaintiffs gave Defendants fair warning at the 4/12/06 meeting the next step 
was up to Defendants-to provide a hearing as the validity of the right of way was in doubt. 
Defendants have a duty, not to take private property without due process (5& Amendment) or not 
to take private property without trying to make an agreement with Plaintiffs, and without 
surveying and without accurately describing the lands required for the alteration prior to the 
alteration (see I.C. 5 $40- 13 10 and 605 and Title 40-Chapter 20). Defendants' failure to 
establish the right of way (public hearing, they now have been given permission to cossect the 
error, to do so under their own resolution (see 1.C $ 40-203a (l)(a), the "may" turns to "shall" 
(see Oppenlzeirner Industries v. Johnson Cuttle Co., 112 ldaho 423, 732 P. 2d 661 (1986) (in this 
case, the IDAPA had set forth required conduct of a brand inspector in two distinct contextual 
settings. (e.g. When a brand i~lspector is confronted with a "fresh brand", he shall not and when 
he is confronted with two or more brands, he may). The shall not made the mandatory 
when the brand i~lspector was confronted with the conff uence of both circumstances) as they 
have already acted), and thus those failures added to the failure to lay out (survey and describe), 
and failure to keep records of orders for laying out and for alteration (I.C. $5 40-608) has left 
Defendants without substantial evidence in the record to make a finding or draw a conclusion 
that they in 1996 or in 2005 or in 2006 or even now as they continue widen as a matter of policy 
"to improve and to maintain" Camps Canyon Road, or for that matter any and all unrecorded 
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prescriptive rights of way (see Plaintiffs' petition for facial invalidity of Defendants' standard 
operating procedure to widen prescriptive ways), have a 50 foot-25 feet from centerline right of 
way or ever did or that they have not taken private propel-ty (whether gifted or not) or that they 
are not now taking private property or that they will continue to do so with their diligent 
maintenance policies (see Second Payne Affidavit, at pars. 3-5; see Defendarzts ' Briefat 9, par. 
I I).  The evidence to support Defendants' conclusory "ADMISSIBLE MATERIAL FACTS 
RELEVANT TO PLAINTIFFS' CLAII\/ISm is distinctly absent, intentionally done, and blatantly 
arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants discretion, and or illegal. Plaintiffs have not 
requested this Court to tell the Defendants that they must validate Camps Canyon Road (see 
Court's Opinion denying Plaintiffs petition to reconsider Plaintiffs' requests for declaratory 
judgments), they have said that the Defendants have violated Plaintiffs' rights to due process and 
equal protections as the Defendants have no rational basis for the constitutional violatio~ls they 
effect on Plaintiffs. At a minimal requirement, Defendants need at least a rational basis for a 
legitimate governmental interest. At the declaratory judgment hearings, Defendants did not 
show any relation of their actions/failures to act to the public health, safety, morals, and/or 
general welfare. 
Indeed the litany of allegations grows and grows as Defendants defend and deny all 
matters on a legal interpretation of Idaho Code 5 40-23 12. Plaintiffs agree with the Court's 
findings that the right of way needs to be factually determined. E-Iowever, Plaintiffs allege that 
the timeliness of that factual determination underlies the factual determinatio~l itself. If it is then 
eventually factually determined that the right of way of Camps Canyon Road is indeed 50 feet- 
25 feet from centerline and that however irrational it may be to say that the present claim is 
identical to the original claim or that indeed a new claim has g r o ~ a  nd it is eventually 
determined that the new claim is valid, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants could not do what they 
did. For if these exertions of governmental authority are as Defendants claim ". . .the District 
has, at all times relevant to this actiom, properly discharged its statutory responsibilities 
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improve and maintain the public highway known as Camps Canyon" (Defendants ' BrieA at 2), 
and "The District's policy for improving public highways under its jurisdiction is based on 
Idaho Code 540-23 12 and the holdings of Meservey ... ", and "The District is well within its legal 
rights to widen a road (have Defendants conveniently left out the words unrecorded 
prescriptive?) without holding a public hearing (deeded rights of way may not require a public 
hearing as they are not established by public testimony; however, are not then, the Defendants 
discriminating against abutting land owners abutting to unrecorded prescriptive rights of way as 
there is no record of attributes of the right of way in the case of the unrecorded prescriptive right 
of way as there is in the case of the deeded right of way) when that activity occurs within the 
area of the District's right of way" (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 20, at 8); 
then, either Defendants have invalid policies/customs, as they fail to identify their own 
disclaimer-"under usual circumstances"-that as applied to Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' situation, 
Defendants' policies andlor customs are invalid; or Defendants' policies andlor customs are 
invalid facially; andlor 1.C.g 40-23 12 is overly broad and/or vague. 
Defendants have no valid legal theory under which they defend their actions/failures to 
act as neither have the Wagners mandated the Defendants to do what they did, nor has the state 
legislature mandated that the width of Camps Canyon Road or any unrecorded prescriptive right 
of way be 50 feet-25 feet from centerline. Furthernlore, Defendants' counsel cannot mandate 
what it is that Plaintiffs plead (see Defendants' Brief, at 4 ("Plaintiffs' claims in this action arise 
almost exclusively from two (2) occurrences.. ."). See Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule ff8 
(b) which reads' "Rule 8(b). Defenses - Forin of denials. A party shall state in short and plain 
terms the defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon which the 
adverse party relies. If a party is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as 
to the truth of an averment, the party shall so state and this has the effect of a denial. Denials 
shall fairly meet the substance of the averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to 
deny only a part or a qualification of an averment, the pleader shall specify so much of it as is 
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true and material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends in good faith to 
controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, the pleader may make denials as specific 
denials of designated averments or paragraphs, or n~ay,generally deny all the averments except 
such designated averments or paragraphs as the pleader expressly admits; but, when the pleader 
does so intend to controvert all its averments, including averments of the grounds upon which the 
court's jurisdiction depends, the pleader inay do so by general denial subject to the obligations 
set forth in Rule 11." Nowhere does it say that Plaintiffs must change their pleadings to meet 
Defendants chosen denials. Defendants have generally denied on the grounds of "good faith". 
There is no such defense and Defendants' petition for summary judgment must be denied and 
Plaintiffs petition for partial summary judgnlent should be granted. The Defendants request for 
suininary judgment and their defense to Plaintiffs petition for partial summary judgment for 
Defendants' liability under 1983, 1988, et seq. are frivolous andlor without merit. IVithout 
waiver, Plaintiffs continue. 
The Defendants have disrupted the status quo on both sides of the road and have invaded, 
occupied Plaintiffs' land and permitted the intrusion of third parties onto Plaintiffs' land, and 
have improperly interfered with Plaintiffs property rights (see Plair~tiffs 'Fozlrth Record 
Supplement, Item No. 3,  at 1-1 1). On the south side of the road, the first Wagner driveway 
access perinit was issued for an access wholly on Plaintiffs' land (see Plaint@ ' Fourth Record 
Supplement, Itznl No. 3, at 4 (Plaintiffs have the fee in the land whether or not it is eventually 
kctually determined that the Defendants have a 50 foot-25 feet from centerline right of way) 
which has been shown to be so, B-holly on Plaintiffs' land by a valid, professionally done sur.cey 
by a licensed Idaho Land Surx-eyor and there has been no other sur\:ey, admissible as evidence, 
to rebut this finding. Defendants intentionally issued, continued, failed to revoke the first 
Wagner drive way access permit; trespass is illegal and an intentio~lal tort (Defendants immuility 
to liability. no malice or criminal behavior, is inisplaced (see Defendants' Brief at 12-16)). On 
the north side of the road. the intrusions into Plaintiffs' buffer are admitted to as "not 
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unauthorized" actsifailures to act and for which Plaintiffs have colorable claim to and for which 
Plaintiffs have positive constitutional guaranties to equal protection and due process (procedural 
and substantive). It is then this issue, the physical invasions of Plaintiffs' land, whether 
colorable and/or factual, as no reasonable person would find otherwise, and that these invasions 
were so arbitrary and capricious andlor not for public use that have denied Plaintiffs due process 
and equal protection to which Plaintiffs ascribe the harm as effected by Defendants' 
actionsifailures to act and for which the eventual factual determination of the width of the right 
of way may mitigate some of the damages claimed by Plaintiffs (see Logun v. Zirnmerman 
Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422, at 432 (1982) ("Each of our due process cases has recognized, either 
explicitly or implicitly, that because 'minimum [procedural] requirements [are] a matter of 
federal law, they are not diminished by the fact that the State may have specified its own 
procedures that it may deem adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse official 
action.' Vitekv. Jones, (1980). See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S., at 166-167 (POWELL, J., 
concurring in part); id., at 21 1 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Indeed, any other conclusion would 
allow the State to destroy at will virtually any state-created property interest. The Court has 
considered and rejected such an approach: 'While the legislature may elect not to confer a 
property interest, . . . it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, 
once conferred, witl~out appropriate procedural safeguards. . . . [Tlhe adequacy of statutory 
procedures for deprivation of a statutorily created property interest illust be analyzed in 
constitutional terms.' Vitek v. Joiiles, 445 U.S., at 490--491, n. 6, quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 41 6 
U.S., at 167 (opinion concurring in part)")) that the Plaintiffs bring suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. 
Plaintiffs' continue to dispute Defendants' claims of a 50 foot-25 feet from centerline 
right of way as well as many other purposely obfuscated contentions of Defendants. Plaintiffs 
will specifically answer these disputed facts and concur that which is not disputed as they arise 
later. However, Plaintiffs petition Court to deny Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment as it 
is easily, obviously, concisely put that the Defendants' "ADMISSIBLE MATERIAL FACTS.. .'' 
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are not even material. However, without waiver of this objection Plaintiffs will observe what is 
disputed. 
First, Plaintiffs emphatically dispute Defendants' thesis of Defendants' Brief. The oilly 
part of this thesis Plaintiffs agsee with Defendants is that they were (i)"acting under the color of 
state law" and (ii) under and as a matter of agency policy at all times relevant. It is a matter of 
Defendants not "properly discharg[ing their] statutory responsibilities" for which Plaintiffs have 
filed this action and are presently in Court and for which Plaintiffs petition, as a matter of law, 
for partial summary judgment for this Court to grant order that Defendants are liable with 
damages to be determined under 42 U.S.C. 5 5  1983 1988 et seq. In Defendants' defenses, they 
have said that all inatters are matters of law, even the 50 foot-25 feet from centerline right of 
way. They have seemingly dropped their contention to have validly issued, contii~ued and/or not 
revoked the first Wagner driveway access permit on the basis it was within the reaches of 
Defendailts' unrecorded prescriptive rigl~t of way (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Szqple~nerzt, Item 
No. 12, at 8 Interrogatory No. 18). They continue with their reasonable negligence ("good 
faith") defense that it was within the road frontage of the Wagner deed (see PlaintiffsJ TThil.d 
Record Supplement, Item No. 12, at 9 and 4-6 Interrogatory Nos. 19, 12, and 8-1 1 (Defendants 
claim the good faith measurement of 699' of road frontage on the Wagner deed and say that it 
was not their decision to revoke the permit, that the 2" permit impliedly revoked the first). 
Without waiver of Plaintiffs' objection that this good faith defense is not of legal merit, Plaintiffs 
simply say that the Defendants knew that the road frontage was not a dependable statistic as they 
had changed the centerline of Camps Canyon Road. Furthermore, no reasonable persons would 
disagree at this point in history or in any linear applications of Euclidean geometry that the 
distance between two points is not a straight[ened] line. If one changes the centerline one can no 
longer rely on it being accurate. If one straightens the centerline one can no longer rely on it 
being accurate, the same length andlor longer. Shorter is the only answer unless you live in a 
non Euclidean world, which may be true but Defenda~lts have shown no evidence of this and we 
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are confined to settle this case within well established law (property lines are confined to a two 
dimensional system) which a reasonable person could understand. 
To recapitulate, Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all the preceding paragraphs in this 
document, that in all of these matters and at all times relevant and at all times acting under the 
color of state law, that Defendants, in their individual capacities and in their official capacities 
were performing "not unauthorized" functions under the policies, customs, and/or standard 
operating procedures of the NLCHD andlor all such action/failures to act were with the 
expressed and implied approval of and/or were the actual actions/failures to act of the final 
policy makers of the agency (see Monell v. Department ofSocia1 Services, 436 U.S. 658,694 
(1978); see also Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346 (gth Cir. 1992) (per curim), cert. 
denied, 114 S.Crt. 1345 (1993) (Municipal liability may be established in one of three ways) and 
that both the issues for which Plaintiffs ascribe to and/or allege to having been harmed by (see 
FVilliamson County Regional Plannivtg Comm 'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 US 172, 193 (1 985) (The 
matter of the "issue that inflicts the actual, concrete injury" determines the necessary proofs); see 
also Harris v. County of Riverside, 904 F.2d 497 (1990) are within the scope of responsibility of 
and/or the actual actions/failures to act and/or were done with the approval of the final policy 
makers of the NLCHD. Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants are the direct, proximate, 
legal and substantial cause of these physical invasions of Plaintiffs' land and the denial of due 
process (substantive and procedural) and equal protection to Plaintiffs as well as "taking, seizing 
of, and or conversion of Plaintiffs' land for a not for public use. Without waiver of anything 
Plaintiffs have said, Plaintiffs continue. 
As to the second level issue, in the underlying issue of the factual determination of the 
right of way of Camps Canyon Road, Plaintiffs allege that the mandated 50 foot-25 feet from 
centerline prescriptive right of way as applied to their property abutting to and underlying the 
easement across their land is unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious, bears no reasonable 
relationship to the public health, safety, and welfare, an abuse of the Defendants' discretion, 
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and/or is illegal. Furthermore, in the underlying issue of a factual determination of the right of 
way of an unrecorded prescriptive right of way, Plaintiffs allege that the mandated 50 foot-25 
feet from centerline prescriptive right of way is invalid facially. Further, Plaintiffs allege that 
any policy, custom standard operating procedure which includes a mandated 50 foot-25 feet 
from centerline right of way and/or a presumed 50 foot-25 feet from centerline right of way 
without an evidentiasy hearing and an opportunity for a meaningful rebuttal at a meaningfbl time 
and a rational response in matters relevant to Camps Canyon Road as it traverses the SENE 
Section 15 T39N R3WBM is invalid whether it is formulated under I.C. 5 40-23 12 or any other 
statute to the extent it authorizes "improving" and/or "maintaining" (in the sense that 
maintenance (including the addition of cut slopes; that is if Plaintiffs give Defendants permission 
to work on the slopes it does not imply that the Plaintiffs or any abutting landowner has waived 
his constitutional rights) does not mean preservation of and means widening, straightening, 
altering, changing, extending the fill slopes by pushing gravel over the edge of the traveled 
surface and adding suppost, and/or relocating the centerline of (see Defendants ' BrieJ; at 7-8, pas. 
6, pars. 4 and 5, and par. 8), straightening, altering, changing, widening and/or relocating the 
centerline of Camps Canyon Road. Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that the denial of a hearing to 
determine the limits of the Camps Canyon Road right of way though the SENE Section 15 
T39N R3 WBM under that statute and/or the holdings of h4eservey or any other form of 
authorization when Plaintiffs' land, fence property rights and or liberty rights are adversely 
affected by the findings, conclusions, actions and/or failures to act by the Defendants and/or the 
defined right of way of Canlps Canyon Road are invalid, a taking without due process and/or 
equal protection guaranteed by the jth and lilt" Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
Any such policy so derived is invalid on its face andlor as applied to Plaintiffs. 
There is no dispute amongst Defendants and Plaintiffs that Defendants have acted upon 
their claim of a 50 foot-25 feet from centerline right of way-they have widened the road, 
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issued and failed to revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit and determined that damage 
to Plaintiffs' fence is a result of the fence being within the right of way. The dispute is ripe. 
Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege, that in all matters as Plaintiffs allege harm (i.e., that due 
process was due), Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the improper interference with and 
the deprivation of Plaintiffs property rights whether as a matter of approval of a subordinate' 
actionslfailures to act, as a matter of official acts, and/or as a matter of a failure to train 
employees in light of obvious constitutional violations. 
Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege, that in all matters as Plaintiffs allege harm (i.e., that due 
process was due), Defendants were acting under well established law any reasonable person 
could understand. ("The District's policy for improving public highways under its jurisdiction is 
based on Idaho Code $40-23 12 and the holdings of Meservey ... "). Idaho Code 440-23 12 is 
unambiguous; that the matter of the width of an unrecorded prescriptive right of way is expressly 
not mandated, that clearly a choice of 50 feet, greater than 50 feet or less than 50 feet are 
possible and as harmoniously construed with the U.S. and Idaho State Constitutions and Idaho 
State statutes and with the holdings of Meservey; that 50 feet is a place to start, unless there is a 
fence or some other way the landowner limited the width, then that is the starting width; and the 
width is to be factually determined wirh a "consideration of the facts peculiar to the case". 
Plaintiffs' petition for partial summary judgment can stop right here (see Roberts v. 
Transportation Department, 121 Idaho 727(1991) the agency cannot subvert the legislation by 
promulgating its own rules); see Chevron US.A., I~zc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984) (if the court finds that Congress had a specific intent then that 
is the end of the inquiry, the statute is enforced regardless of the agency's interpretation)). 
Defendants can contemplate the 'width of the road" all they  ant and insure that the road to their 
house is paved while other members of the public struggle to get out of the canyon from their 
newly built homes; however, if they act on their decision, a mandated 50 foot-25 feet from 
centerline right of way, they have made a "flnal decision" and must follow the law (see Czaplicki 
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v. Gooding Joint School District iVo. 231, 116 Idaho 326, 775 P.2d 610 ("[D]iscretionary 
function does not shield negligent implementation of statutes.. ."); see also Gooding Highway 
District v. Idaho Irlaigation C., 30 Idaho 232, 165 P 99 (1917) ("In order that act of county 
comrnissioners in laying out of highways be valid, whether upon public domain or private 
property, board must conform to law giving such authority, as power to establish highways rests 
in legislature and right may be exercised only in such manner as legislature provides"); see also 
Owen, above)). Without waver that we could also stop right here also, Plaintiffs continue. 
Defendants have exceeded their authority under Idaho Code 540-23 12; (i) this statute 
does not give Defendants the authority "to improve" and/or "to maintain", to alter, to straighten, 
to widen, to change andlor to "improve7' and/or to "n~aintain" an unrecorded prescriptive right of 
way; (ii) furthermore, Idaho Code 540-23 12 speaks to Defendants' discretion to determine "tile 
width" (a noun) of a highway; (iii) the statute does not mandate a 50 foot width; (iv) the statute 
does not mandate or mention a 25 feet from centerline width; (v) the statute does not deny an 
abutting landowner due process and/or equal protection or an evidentiary hearing when the 
Defendants choose to alter, to straighten, to widen, to change and/or to "improve" and/or to 
"maintain" andlor to determine a fence is encroaching on an unrecorded prescriptive right of 
way; (vi) the statute does Plaintiffs contend that the only path from the statute determining "the 
width" (Idaho Code 540-23 12) to the statutes authorizing the actions of such notions of "to 
in~prove", such as to widen, to straighten, to alter, and/or to change a highway (as to be found in 
Idaho Code 540-1 3 10 and/or Idaho Code 540-605) is through the hallowed halls of a public 
evidentiary hearing and Plaintiffs dispute that the Defendants are in any way, shape or form 
"properly dischargling their] statutory responsibilities". 
Defendants have no rational basis for which to denv PIaintiffs rights to due process 
(substantive and procedura1) and lor equal protection of the law. Furthermore, as 
Defendants have violated Plaintiffs' substantive 5'l' Amendment rights they are compelled to 
show reason for the ends which would necessitate such means. 
PLAINTIFFS' ANSWERING BRIEF TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' ANSWERING BRIEF AND OBJECTIONS 
TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS AND OTHER 
MOTIONS SUBMITTED JANUARY 26,2009 
22 
Plaintiffs begin first with answering Defendants' claim that these matters may be settled 
under the ITCA without waiver of Plaintiffs' objections that the ITCA is an adequate remedy. 
11. Defendants affirmative defense of the time bar of the 180 day notice requirement of the 
ITCA and /or ITCA as an adequate remedy-Plaintiffs dispute that the ITCA is adequate 
and therefore the only course of action is under 42 U.S.C. (5 1983. 
Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all proceeding paragraphs of this document and 
continue. First Plaintiffs seek action under 42 U.S.C. 5 1983, 1988, et seq. and such tort claim 
notice is not required (see Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 13 1 (1988) (state laws requiring pre-suit 
notification prior to initiating an action against the state or its subdivisions do not apply); see also 
Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U.S 496 (Plaintiffs need not exhaust agency remedies 
before bringing $ 1983 suit)). 
Secondly, the intentional tort of trespass and the tort of nuisance are not covered under 
the ITCA (see Cobbley v. City of Challis, 13 8 Idaho, at 159). 
Third, Plaintiffs reasonably approached the Defendants on 4/12/06 at the regular meeting 
of the NLCHD Commissioners and gave them fair warning that Plaintiffs did not agree with their 
action to issue the first Wagner driveway access permit and/or with Defendants' refusal to get a 
professional survey done to resolve the matter and/or with Defendants' failure to require the 
Wagners to get a profcssio~ially done survey, and/or with Defendants' failure to revoke the 
permit when Plaintiffs said that they would call for a survey n-lien Defendants refused to. 
Plaintiffs also gave the Defendants fair warning that Defendants' entrance into Plaintiffs' buffer 
was an improper interference with Plaintiffs' property rights as was the action oflfailure to act of 
the issuancelrevocation of the first UJagner driveway access permit. Plaintiffs have kept 
Defendants abreast of Plaintiffs complaints and sincerely sought resolution of the issues with 
Defendants, although Defendants rebuffed any attempt Plaintiffs made at agency remedy, 
claiming in effect that Defendants' "prescriptive right" of a 50 foot-25 feet from centsrline 
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right of way gave Defendants authority to deny Plaintiffs due process. Neither actiodfailure to 
act has been abated. Defendants continue to occupy Plaintiffs buffer and continue to further 
encroach and impinge on Plaintiffs' fence; as well as the Defendants have not acknowledged the 
revocation of the first Wagner driveway access permit, nor have they denied their claimed 
statutory right to issue a permit across the east property line of the 3+/- acre parcel (see 
Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 17, at 5-6, 10-1 1 Interrogatory Nos 10- 14 and 23- 
24). Accrual does not begin until abatement has occurred and/or the injurious actsifailures to act 
have ceased (see McCabe v. Craven, - Idaho - (2007), Docket No. 32219) (a continuous 
tort). Defendants claim of "prescriptive right "to inlproperly interfere with Plaintiffs' property 
rights and the wrongful taking of and damage to Plaintiffs7 property continues unabated and 
threatening of further irreparable harm. 
Fourth, a post deprivation action under the ITCA is not "adequate" when the 
actionsifailures to act are "not unauthorized" and a predeprivation hearing is feasible (see Parratt 
v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); and see Zinerrnon v. Burch 494 U .  S. 113 starting at 124; see also 
Zirnmerman v. City ofoakland, 255 F.3d 734, (gt" Circuit, 2001); see also Logan v. Zimmrrman 
Bruslz Co., 455 U.S. 422,435-436 (1982) (availability of postdeprivation remedy is inadequate 
when deprivation is foreseeable, predeprivation process was possible, and official conduct was 
slot "unauthorized"). 
Fifih, Defendants are now estopped from the defense that these matters are now time 
barred af3er receiving the benefit of the defcilse of "no final decision" on Plaintiffs' Motion for 
declaratory judgnlent on I.C. 5 67-8003(3). Defendants have sought and received the benefit of 
the defense that these allegations that Plaintiffs make are matters of Defendants discretion (that 
they were legislative in nature) and they now are claiming they are not discretionary and 
therefore time barred (see also h e n ,  above). 
Sixth, Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants have violated Plaintiffs property and liberty 
rights from the execution of Defendants governmental policies, customs and/or standard 
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only are Defendants the NLCHD final policy makers they have endorsed all incidents of action 
and/or failures to act and/or all acts/failures to act are a result of Defendants policies, customs, 
and/or standard operating procedures (see Defendants ' Briefi, at 2, above) (Defendants' thesis is 
that at all relevant times Defendants were acting within their statutory duties)- 
issuance/revocation of the first Wagner driveway access permit and invasion of Plaintiffs' buffer 
and encroachment on Plaintiffs' fence. The potential liability under 42 U.S.C. 1983 is not 
disputed (see Wade xCity oflnglewood, 108 F.3d 1387 (9th Cir. 1997)) as the Defendants say, it 
is a matter of law, that Defendants have done and may continue their arbitrary and capricious, 
irrational, unreasonable and vindictive actions and/or failures to act. Plaintiffs are not 
complaining of matters which even Defendants believe to be random acts. 
Seventh, Plaintiffs' allegations of due process violations (substantive and procedural) as 
well as alleged equal protection violations are based on the situation Plaintiffs find themselves in 
as a result of Defendants' irrational and vindictive actions andlor failures to act. Plaintiffs were 
singled out for differential treatment causing mental and physical anguish, as Defendants sole 
purpose in allotting time on the agenda for Plaintiff, Don Halvorson, to speak was to ram the first 
Wagner driveway access permit through at a public meeting, to give the permit an air of legality 
and to paint the Haivorsons as the sole cause for the Wagners not getting a driveway access to 
their property rather than the Defendants accepting responsibility for having destroyed the 
historical driveway access iiz the 1996 alteration, calling for a survey and properly carrying out 
any necessary deed changes to resolve the problem(see PlaintiffsJ Third Record Supplement, 
Item No. 10, at 1). After having to go to the expense of obtaining a survey and once again trying 
to work things out with the bTagners, the Defendants, on Plaintiffs' information and belief, as 
told to Plaintiffs by Bob Wagner; the Defendants refused to accept deeded easement to resolve 
the driveway issue (see Plaintiffs Af$davif at 9, par. 15). Plaintiffs have alleged and Defendants 
do not dispute that Defendant and Chairman of the NLCHD Co~nmissioners, Orland Arneberg is 
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the fiiend, neighbor and business partner of Ridgeview Farms, whose owners are the brother-in- 
law of Bob Wagner and the relative of Defendant Dan Payne. Plaintiffs claim that they have 
been victimized by the Defendants, who have acted under the color of state law, and do not have 
the ability of an adequate resolution under traditional recognized categories of causes of action, 
such as negligence, malicious trespass, inverse condemnation, amongst others as the Defendants 
flagrantly abused the procedural processes of statutory safeguards and remedies for erroneous 
deprivations (see Plaintiffs Affidavit, at 12, par. 28), (see Lingle v. Cllzevron US. A. Inc., (04-163) 
544 U.S. 528 (2005) 363 F.3d 846, ("'Conversely, if a government action is found to be 
impermissible--for instance because it fails to meet the 'public use' requirement or is so arbitrary 
as to violate due process--that is the end of the inquiry. No amount of co~npensation car1 
authorize such action.") 
Plaintiffs filed their tort claim notice within 30 days of the time that Defendants had 
issued Plaintiffs the ultimatum, that Plaintiffs had only two choices: (i) pay a $750 fee and file a 
petition for validation of Camps Canyon Road, or (ii) get a lawyer. Plaintiffs filed their tort 
claim notice in a timely manner as Defendants had indicated that the Plaintiffs had exhausted 
agency remedies. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have only sougl~t cause of action solely under the 
theory of negligence in the alternative. 
Plaintiffs allege that the policies, customs, standard operating procedures and/or 
Defendants' exertion of their governmental powers are facially invalid as well as invalid as 
applied to Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs' situation. Not only have Defendants discriminated to.cvard 
abutting land owners abutting to unrecorded prescriptive rights of way as opposed to similarly 
situated abutting land owner of recorded rights of way (as in deeded), Defendants have also 
discriminated against Plaintiffs in the determination of the legality of the first Wagner driveway 
access permit. Furthermore, when the survey showed they lost the argument they simply ignored 
the resolution and in retaliation pushed dirt, gravel, and snow upon Plaintiffs' fence. There are 
proper civil procedures for determining whether Plaintiffs' fence is u.~ongfully positioned, but 
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ignoring those procedures in lieu of retaliation is actionable criminally as well as under $ 1983 
(see Villiage of Willowbrook v. Olech 528 U.S. 562 (2000)). 
Plaintiffs have responded to Defendants claims of a mandated 50 foot-25 feet from 
centerline width for an unrecorded prescriptive right of way and continue their allegations that 
not only do Defendants not have a 50 foot-25 feet from centerline right of way; that even if it is 
found that they do, the Defendants could not do what they did-widened the road, issued, 
continued, and failed to revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit and determined that 
damage to Plaintiffs' fence is a result of the fence being within the right of way without the due 
process of an evidentiary hearing and an opportunity for Plaintiffs to meaningfully respond at a 
meaningful time (see Bivens V. Six Unkno~)n NamedAgents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), (United States 
Supreme Court ruled that an implied cause of action existed for an individual whose Fourth 
Amendment freedom from uilreasonable search and seizures had been violated by federal 
agents); see McCulloch v. Glasgow, 620 F. 2d 47 (5th Circuit 1980), (plaintiff was entitled to 
Due Process before road was built over land of disputed ownership); see F u e ~ t e s  v. Shevin, 407 
U.S. 67, 92S.Ct. 1983,32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972), (14th Amendment property right even though 
dispute exists); see Carey v. Piphzns, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) 
("...right to procedural due process is 'absolute' in the sense it does not depend upon the merits 
of a claimants' assertion. . . "); see Cooper v. Board of County Conzmissioners of Ada Cou~ty,  10 1 
Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980), (the test for functioning in a quasi-judicial capacity and due 
process requirements); see also Lingle v. Chevron, US. A. fnc. (04-163), 544 U.S. 528, 363 F.3d 
846, (2005) ("Conversely, if a government action is found to be impermissible for instance 
because it fails to meet the public use requirement or is so arbitrary as to violate due process that 
is the end of the inquiry. No amount of compensation can autlzorize such action"); see also 
Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 506 F.3d 851, 855-56 (9th Cir. 2007)). Plaintiffs 
allege that these "not unauthorized" actions/failures to act required a predeprivational hearing; as 
such was feasible, practicable, and predictable (see Parratt v. Twlor, as compared to 
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"unauthorized" actions not found in Zinermon v. Burch 494 U. S. 113 starting at 124) 451 U. S. 
527 (198 1). Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege once again that the denial of a hearing to determine the 
limits of the Camps Canyon Road right of way though the SENE Section 15 T39N R3WBM 
violates their 5th Amendment rights to procedural due process, equal protection, and substantive 
due process as guaranteed by the 1 4 ~ ~  Amendment to the United States Constitution. In this 
form, Defendants' exertion of their governnlental powers, their customs, policies, and/or 
standard operating procedures are invalid facially in the first instance, andlor as applied to 
Plaintiffs, their situation and/or to their property as Defendants do not circumscribe their broad 
authorities with statutory safeguards and remedies for erroneous deprivations and/or Defendants 
have admitted to the actionslfailures to act for which Plaintiffs claim harm and damages and for 
which Defendants claim they were within their legal right to deny Plaintiffs due process and/or 
equal protection. Furthermore, Defendants have shown no rational basis to regulate Plaintiffs' 
property or to deprive Plaintiffs of their rights to peacefully enjoy their land, their right to restrict 
others from their land and their right to a clear and marketable title to their land. Defendants 
have violated Plaintiffs sth Amendment rights and as such are compelled to bring forth such ends 
which 1%-ould justify such means to deprive Plaintiffs of due process in the invasion of Plaintiffs' 
land by the Defendants and third parties and to wrongfully take Plaintiffs land for not a public 
use and to destroy Plaintiffs' property. These actionslfailures to act of Defendants are far from 
"properly discharg[ing their] statutory responsibilities"; rather they are arbitrary and capricious, 
an abuse of Defendants' discretion andlor illegal. Defendants bring forth an argumentative 
justification for their admitted to actions and/or failures to act, based on unreasonable legal 
conclusions and findings which are not supported by substantial evidence of their agency record 
and which run contrary to the evidence of their agency record and/or of the record of this case. 
Defendants' affidavits are conclusory and brought forth in bad faith. 
Defendants are liable under 5 1983, on an individual basis as well as on an official basis 
and have shown no objective standard of a law u7hicl1 has not been well established or that a 
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reasonable person could not understand the adherence to which would legally justify their 
actions/failures to act. The correct cause of action in the present case is 42 U.S.C. 5 1983. 
111. Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Admissible Material Facts Relevant To Plaintiffs' 
Claifizs rFacts'9 
To begin with Defendants opening remarks again misstates the situation, as Plaintiffs have 
already said. "Plaintiffs' complaints in this action arise from almost exclusively from two (2) 
occurrences, the first being improvements made by Defendant North Latah County Highway 
District ("the District") in 2005 and 2006 to an area of Camps Canyon Road, located primarily 
between property owned by Plaintiffs ("Plaintiffs' real property") and Robert Wagner and Kate 
Wagner, husband and wife ("Wagners' real property"), approximately 700 feet in length, and the 
second being the District foreman Dan Payne's (i) issuance and revocation and (ii) reissuance of 
a driveway approach permit to Robert Wagner in 2006 to access Wagner's real property" (see 
Defendants' Brie5 at 4). 
Defendants again want to redefine Plaintiffs' pleadings to fit their denials and as such 
Plaintiffs incorporate all previous parts of this document by reference (see Owen, above). 
Plaintiffs allege and bring forth specific evidence that Defendants' claim of a 50 foot-25 
feet from centerline right of way is arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants discretion, 
and/or illegal; as I.C. 5 40-23 12 does not mandate a 50 foot-25 feet from centerline right of 
way, does not deny an abutting land owner a right to due process in alterations to an unrecorded 
prescriptive right of \yay; does not deny an abutting land owner a right to due process in 
determining if a fence is located within an unrecorded prescriptive right of way, does not deny an 
abutting land owner a right to due process if the Defendants issue/fail to revoke a driveway 
access permit wholly on another abutting land ow~ler's propei-ty; as I.C. 5 40-23 12 and the 
holdings of Meservey intends that an unrecorded prescriptive right of way may be presumed to 
be 50 feet or any other width and may not be presumed to be fifty feet if an abutting land owner 
had limited the width of an unrecorded prescriptive right of way, or uvlless the highway was of a 
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lesser width; as Defendants admit that there have been no evidentiary hearings on the matter of 
Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part; there is no substantial evidence in the record to 
support Defendants' claims and all evidence in the record runs contrary to their continuation of 
the original prescriptive claim as they have admitted to moving and then widening the section of 
road in dispute. Furthermore, Defendants admit that they have done no surveys and have made 
no accurate descriptions of the required lands in any of the alterations admitted to (see Idaho 
Code $5 40-605 and 40- 13 10) nor have they any agency record of Commissioners orders to lay 
out andlor make the alterations they admit to (see Idaho Code $$40-608). Furtl~errnore, 
Defendants have not shown that Camps Canyon Road has been worked and used as it is now for 
a period of 5 years. 
1) Defendants' first material fact: Establishment of Camps Canyon Road as a public 
highway under the jurisdiction of the District. This is conclusory. The District does not have 
substantial evidence in the agency record to support this conclusion and finding as there has been 
no public evidentiary hearing to show that a finding or conclusion that Cainps Canyon Road in 
the SENE Section 15 T39N R3 WBM is a public highway. 
(a) Plaintiffs do not dispute nor aver that Camps Canyon Road is a public 
highway, and that its status as an unrecorded prescriptive right of way may predate the formation 
of the 3+/- acre parcel and may extend as far back as to the pre-homesteading period into the 
1870s as the road itself was the only access to the Einmett Geinmill homestead entry of 1890 
(see Plaintiffs ' Fourth Record Supplement, Item No. 2 (BLM Homestead Entry Records of 
Emmett J. Cemniill) However, there is no substantial evidence in the agency record to establish 
Camps Canyon Road as a public highway or to conclude that the present road occupies the 
identical strip of land that the original prescriptive claim did; or that the original prescriptive way 
was 50 feet-25 feet from centerline wide (see Homestead Farms v. Board ofCovtznz 'rs Teton 
County, sstate ofIdaho, 141 Idaho 855, 119 P 3d 630 (2005) (Justice Eismann SPECIALLY 
CONCURRING) (Highways in this unrecorded category require evidence showing that the road 
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was used for a period of five years and worked and kept up at the expense of the public, with the 
exception of those unrecorded ways which may have been established before 1893 when no 
public upkeep was required. Such evidence must be taken at an open public meeting and 
therefore should be part of the public record). 
(b) Furthermore the evidence in the agency record and this present case runs 
contrary to such a claim as the present claim does not occupy the identical strip of land that the 
original claim did as the Defendants have altered Camps Canyon Road on several occasions (see 
Plaintiffs Afidavit at 8; see Swanson ilfidavit). This is undisputed as Defendants admit to no 
evidentiary hearings and to altering the physical location (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record 
Supplement, Item No. 2, at 4-5, Interrogatory No. 3) of the pertinent part of Camps Canyon Road 
as well as having widened it numerous times (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 
1, at 3, Request For Admission No. 3, subpart c.; see Plaintiffs' Third Record Supplement, Item 
No. 3, at 16-17, Interrogatory Nos. 40 - 44; (Defendants have altered Camps Canyon Road 
several times and altered the centerline; see Second Payne Affidavit at 2 and 3). 
(c) It is also undisputed that there are no known alterations to Camps Canyon 
Road prior to 1996. 
(d) Whether Orland Arneberg can aver, at the age of 4 years and based on his 
own knowledge, that Camps Canyon Road was worked at the expense of the public and used by 
the public for a minimum of five years which includes a year before Mr. Arneberg was born is 
irrational and this affidavit is made in bad faith. Furthermore it is h4r. Arneberg's elected duty, 
and he has taken oath to obey and enforce the laws of the land to do so, to impartially consider 
the establishment of Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part, and it is not his duty, on his own 
testimony, to self proclaim the establishment of unrecorded prescriptive right of way, Camps 
Canyon Road, in the pertinent part, to be Public (Idaho Code 8 40-203a prohibits this). Mr. 
Landeck has been to law school, we assume and it appears to be an admission of a weak case and 
an attempt to abuse the process of discovery that he brings forth such affidavits. 
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(e) The material fact here is there that is no agency record, no public evidentiary 
hearing, on which Defendants can base their conclusions andlor findings whether Plaintiffs do 
not dispute it or not. This is conclusory and Defendants bring forth no evidence to support this 
statement. Such attempts to deceive this Court (see Opinion at 9 (The Defendants have 
submitted affidavits from the commissioners of the Highway District which have stated that the 
Commissioners actions regarding Camps Canyon Road have been within the lawful authority of 
the Highway District")) are subject to sanction. 
2) Although improved over the years, Camps Canyon Road follows the same 
approximate centerline now that it has since the early 1930's. 
(a) Defendants do not define what approximate might mean, or how one might 
measure approximate, or estimate the significance of approximate. This is conclusory and is not 
probative and is meant only to add confusion. A taking is not limited by its size (see Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 41 9 (1 982) (the space occupied by a cable t.v. 
box is considered a taking). It is the physical invasion and/or occupation of the land which 
defines taking and not whether it was approxinlately done or not done. Therefore Defendants' 
statement is meaningless and of no probative value. One could say that Mathews (see Mathews 
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 3 19, 335 (1976)) speaks to this and suggests that fairness is a matter of 
weighing the deprivation with the reliability of the process and probable value of new procedures 
and even the public interest of the social costs. However, Plaintiffs are not suggesting new 
procedures. Plaintiffs suggest that there are ample statutory safeguards and remedies for 
erroneous deprivations for which Defendants simply circumvent (establish the right of way 
before altering, including talking to the abutting owner, survey and describe, come to an 
agreement record and convey, keep records of Commissioners orders, etc.). One ca~mot 
conclude the process does not work until one tries it. Defendants' actions imply malicious 
compliance and arrogance. Defendants ha.ire not brought forth a costlbenefit analysis of the 
comparison of obtaining private property at fair market value (on the cheap) with paying the full 
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extent of common law damages (at the expense of the public purse-not at the expense of the 
Defendants to achieve their political and private goals and the additions to Mr. Landeck7s 
pocketbook). They have not chosen to avail themselves of this defense with any evidence that 
the old procedures do not work and/or the new ones might be costly 
(b) Defendants statement is conclusory. Defendants bring forth no admissible 
survey to support Defendants conclusion. The Rimrock survey is in contradiction to the 
conclusion that the centerline of Camps Canyon Road is identical to what it was in 19 1 1. It is 
irrational for Defendants to suggest that they can "accurately determine" the location of the 
public right of way (see Idaho Code 5 40-302a(l)(b) "If the location of the public highway or 
right-of-way cannot be accurately determined due to numerous alterations.. .") through this aerial 
photo. "Approximate centerline" is not the intention of the statute and state legislature or of a 
per se taking. 
(c) Plaintiffs object to the admission of the aerial photos as material evidence. 
The aerial photos of 1940 and 2004 are of questionable origin and validity. Mr. Hodge avers that 
the 1940 photo is from the Latah County Assessors office (Hodge Afldavit, at par. 8) and the 
Defendants only represent all the items in their Second Record Suppleinent as "Latah County, 
Idaho Records", and as such, have identified the source of the documents and/or photos for 
verification. However this aerial photo indicates that Doug Kelly owils the old niining claim in 
1940 (if this is indeed a 1940 photo and Doug Kelly did not pick up the old mining claim to the 
north of the Harris place until 1944 (Plaintiffs ' FoFou Record Supplement, Iten1 No. 1, at 1-3). 
Further, the attempts by Defendants at the 312 1/07 meeting of the NLCWD Conzmissioners to 
bring forth this aerial photo as evidence (identified there as circa 1949 (see Plaintiffs ' Fourth 
Record Supplenzent, Item No. 5, at 2-3) without first allowing Plaintiffs any attempt to analyze 
the data and to deny Plairztiffs any procedural due process by transcribable verbatim record of the 
meeting is exemplary of their contempt for ally fair and democratic procedures. Plaintiffs object 
to the admission of this plioto on the basis of its obvious inacc~~racy to its date of origin. 
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(d) Without waiver of Plaintiffs objection to the admission as evidence of the 
aerial photos, Plaintiffs continue to state that an analysis of the photos, whether they are valid 
and/or of sufficient accuracy to determine movement of Camps Canyon Road, shows movement 
of the portion of the road in question and that the movement occurred between 1989 and 2004 
(see Plaintiffs AAfJidavit, at par. 19,20, and 23). 
(e) Without waiver of Plaintiffs objection to the admission as evidence of the 
aerial photos and without waiver that a proper analysis of the photos shows movemel~t, Plaintiffs 
object to the admission of the aerial photos as evidence as they are argurneiltative and without 
any probative value to "accurately determine" the location of the centerline of the Camps 
Canyon Road right of way. Neither of the photos is shown to be orthogonally rectified and many 
of these aerial photos are mosaics. The weight given to these photos must be greatly reduced to 
afford any fairness of determining the accurate location of the centerline of Camps Canyon Road 
right of way. The east property line of the 3+/- acre parcel was well lcnown (see Ole Hanson 
Affidavit at 2, par. 7), and Mr. Hodge has no foundation for his claim and/or personal knowledge 
of the east property line to express that its locatioll is debatable via a 1940 aerial photo showing 
someone arbitrarily drawing lines of farm lines on it. 
(f) The Rinlrock survey shows (as compared to the 19 1 1 Deed description) that 
the centerline of Camps Canyon Road has moved 84+ feet to the north at its intersection with the 
east property line of the 3+/- acre parcel and 50 feet to the north at its intersection with the west 
property line of the 3+/- acre parcel (see Plaintiffs ' TThivd Recorpd Supplement, Item No. 4. at 2 
(at 312 1/07 meeting of the NLCHD Conimissioners Plaintiffs movement to Defendants). 
(g) At 7, Mr. Hodge states that the County Road is a de facto monument for 
surveying purposes and the distances between the points on that road should take precedence 
over other calls in the 19 11 deed. However the law determines the centerline of the road to be a 
monument, Plaintiffs see the logic in making such a claim and have requested this Court for an 
adverse evidentiary ruling against the Defendants for spoliation of evidence and Mr. Hodge's 
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testimony is in line with Plaintiffs' petition. This is supportive of Plaintiffs' clainl that the 
Defendants' random alterations of Camps Canyon Road centerline without survey and/or 
accurate descriptions of the required lands for the alteration puts the road as a moilument at risk 
and as well as ail Idaho Statute as being overly broad and/or vague to allow for per se takings in 
the event that I.C.6 40-23 12, I.C.6 40-13 10, I.C.6 40-605 or any other statute do not prohibit this 
action. Such statutory interpretations which would allow for the deliberate indifference to 
private property lines would require a rational basis to a legitimate governmental interest. 
Defendants have sl~own o relation to the public safety, n~orals, health, or general welfare that 
would justify such means. The civil process of eminent domain, surveying and recording are 
legitimate governmental interests and are the intended governmental interest and do not prohibit 
the legal acquisition of land for alterations. The alteration in an unrecorded prescriptive right of 
way, in the present case Camps Canyon Road, without a prior survey destroys a survey 
monument as per Mr. Hodge. This is illegal and furthermore the recovery of a lost monument 
requires a hearing, (see Elenrickson v. Nampa Highway District, Idaho , (2004). 
This is in support of Plaintiffs overall objection to the wrongful procedures of the Defendants. 
(h) At 8, Mr. Hodge suggests that the excess road frontage not to be measured 
along the road but somewhat randomly out into the Wagners or Plaintiffs fields according to a 
1940 aerial photo. This can no longer be done as the road no longer extends into that area as the 
curves at the east end of the 3+/- acre parcel were straightened and the road bed was moved to 
the northeast. Mr. Swanson avers that the Defendants asked to straighten curves (see Swanson 
Affidavit) and the Defendants have admitted to straightening the curves and the straightening 
was done under the watch of Defendants Payne and Arneberg (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record 
Szipplernent, Item No. 13, at 10- 1 1, Interrogatory No. 16). There is no probative value in asking a 
witness to suggest that an unreliable statistic, the road frontage of the 3+/- acre parcel, a fact to 
which no one disputes has been altered, is now reliable. To what purpose does Mr. Landeck 
subject Mr. Hodge to, to aver to a fact that Mr. Landeck knows to be inaccurate? 
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(i) At 6, Mr. Hodge faults Mr. Dunn for not including the road frontage in his 
survey. Mr. Hodge states that all the distances described in these distances need to be recognized 
and notes the east property line and the road frontage as not identical to the deed. Mr. Hodge 
conveniently leaves out the first call in the deed. The intersection of the west property line with 
Camps Canyon Road has moved 50 feet to the north. This is a fact that is in line with the 
undisputed facts that in 1996 the curves of Camps Canyon Road were altered and thus shift all 
lines to the north 50 feet (see Plaintiffs' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 3, at 16-17, 
Interrogatory Nos. 40 - 44; see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 1, at 3, Request 
For Admission No. 3, subpart c.). Plaintiffs made no attempts to influence Mr. Dunn in any way 
to make the survey come out a certain way. An Idaho Land Surveyor works for the public to 
make legal determinations of property lines, even though they may be paid by an individual. 
Furthermore, Mr. Dunn was chosen for his fairness and lmowledge of the subject. 
Cj) Further Mr. Hodge also leaves out that the acreage on the photo reads 3.4 
acres which is not in congruence with the deed description of 3 acres (see Plaintiffs' Third 
Record Szipplernent, Item No. 4, at 6) (Latah County Assessors map with deed which indicates 
the acreage to be 3 acres). Where do the extra 0.4 acres come from? Who is it that is making 
these acreage determinations? The southeasterly course of the outline of the south boundary of 
the 3.4 acre fann parcel is not the south property line of the 3+/- acre parcel (see Hodge Affidavit 
at 3, par. 8). The Swansons farmed the adjoining land by extending the farmable ground from 
the mutual southwest corner of the 3+/- acre parcel and the heading east and swinging south to 
avoid the grassy water draw at the bottom of the hill (see Plaintiffs ' Fourth Record Supplement, 
Item No. 3, at 2 (the same farm line continues through 1989). Mr. Hodge has no personal 
knowledge of those who have created this farm line or why they farmed as they did; there is no 
reason to conclude this southerly direction is a property line. This southeasterly course made a 
farm line which was inaccurately and/or made not indicative of a property line and hence the 
recording of the additional 0.4 acres. The actual property line heads due east from the southwest 
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corner of the 3+/- acre parcel (see Plaintiffs' FourtJz Record Supplement, Item No. 3, at 15 (the 
FSA aerial photo in 2007, shows the addition with computerized technology the addition of more 
accurately placed property lines which enables the FSA to better estimate the acreage and who 
owns what). The deed calls for a due east direction of the south property line and Mr. Hodge 
now denies his own recom~nendation that all calls be recognized (see Hodge Affidavit at 3, par. 
6). 
(k) At 8, Mr. Hodge does not indicate where on the photo that he sees Charley 
Harris' driveway through the 3+/- acre parcel. If he is referring to the light colored area at the 
east end of the parcel that is where the seasonal runoff creek dumps illto the road ditch. It is not 
the old driveway access as it is the drainage of the grassy draw (see Plaintiffs' Fourlh Record 
Supplement, Item No. 3, at 4, 12, 13, and 14 (photos showing the hardened area where the 
original road ran and where the runoff drainage met the road)). 
(1) Aerial photos are informative but they are limited by a lot of variables. Mr. 
Dunn went out of his way to accommodate Mr. Wagner and investigated whatever evidence Mr. 
Wagner u~ould bring in. Idaho Code S; 3 1-2709 reads, "SURVEYS MUST CONFORh4 TO 
UNITED STATES h4ANUAL. No surveys or resurveys hereafter made shall be considered legal 
evidence in any court within the state, except such surveys as are made in accordance with the 
United States manual of surveying instructions, the circular on restoration of lost or obliterated 
corners and subdivisions of sections, issued by the general land office, or by the authority of the 
United States, the state of Idaho, or by mutual consent of the parties." The only survey here is 
the Rimrock survey; Mr. Dunn's credentials are impeccable. If h4r. Hodge truly wishes to 
confront Mr. Dulm's CONFORM[ANCE] TO UNITED STATES MANUAL, let him bring in a 
survey of his own. There is no probative value in Mr. Landeck's attempt to subvert the issue of 
whether the Defendants arbitrarily and capriciously issued and/or continued andlor failed to 
revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit, and/or whether they abused their discretion in 
doing so, andlor did so illegally into an issue of whether t ~ \ ~ o  surveyors may have reasonably 
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considered the road frontage of the 3+/- acre parcel differently when the issue is not even 
disputed. The material facts are; (i) The curves were straightened and the road bed was relocated 
in 1996; (ii) how much is not recorded; (iii) The Rimrock survey is admissible evidence; (iv) The 
Wagner and/or Payne "surveys" are not admissible evidence; (v) The shortest distance between 
two points as in the intersection of the east and west property lines with Camps Canyon Road is a 
straightcened] line; (vi) What Mr. Hodge opines is put in doubt as to him being accurately 
informed (what does Mr. Hodge opine if he is informed that the centerline of Camps Canyon 
Road has been altered-does he then contend the road frontage call prevails; or does it fall out of 
the equation?). As Mr. Hodge opines that &lJ distances be recognized described in the 
instruments and this may reasonably be accomplished by the recognition of the undisputed fact 
that Camps Canyon Road has had its physical location and centerline altered in 1996. 
Furthermore, Defendants suggestion here that maybe two surveyors might disagree on how to do 
the survey is admissible without a survey by Mr. Hodge and the subject is immaterial (see Owen 
above, (a good faith defense is not relevant)). 
(m) Plaintiffs on 4/12/06 requested that the Defendants and the Wagners obtain a 
professional survey (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 10, at 1) (Plaintiffs 
request Defendants get a professionally done survey and Defendants relied on the surveys that 
Mr. Wagner and Dan Payne and others performed ((see Plairftiffs ' Third Record Supplement, 
Item No. 1, at 12, Request for Admission No. 27 (Defendants knew Wagner had done his own 
survey). Neither hlr. Hodge and/or the Defendants have a survey on which may be considered 
legal evidence and no one says they cannot conduct their own survey. Mr. Dunn's survey stands 
as the only legally admissible evidence. The Dunn survey showed the Wagner driveway access 
to be wholly on Plaintiffs' land and the Defendants (as final policy makers) decision to issue 
and/or to continue andor not to revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit was arbitrary 
and capricious, an abuse of Defendants discretion, and/or illegal. They issued, continued, and/or 
failed to revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit which was trespassing based on 
PLAINTIFFS' ANSWERING BRIEF TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUhfh4ARY 
JUDGMENT AND REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' ANSWERING BRIEF AND OBJECTIONS 
TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS AND OTI-IER 
A4OTIONS SUBMITTED JANUARY 26, 2009 
3 8 1297 
insufficient evidence in the record and/or on not legally admissible evidence. Furthermore, they 
knew the centerline was no longer accurate as they had altered it and their attempt now to say 
that the centerline issue is now debatable is an admission to the arbitrary and capricious 
acts/failures to act. Defendants are estopped from claiming both (i) the evidence in the record is 
substantial enough to support the Defendants, as final policy makers, issuance, continuance, 
and/or failure to revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit and (ii) now to claim that it is 
debatable. 
(n) Rather than making the deed description meet the wants of the Defendants, 
there is a plausible explanation for which all variables fit and/or are allowable, &l survey lines; 
as well as the aerial photos. Furthermore, it not only fits with what the Plaintiffs allege and with 
what the Defendants admit to-Camps Canyon Road has been altered, straightened, and 
widened. Its centerline in the pertinent part is not where its centerline originally was. Indeed 
this still leaves room for discussion of how much movement has occurred. That is where the 
argument lies; not in whether the right of way was changed and continues to be altered; but how 
much it has been changed; however unimportant that might be (see Loretto (small is not relevant, 
in per se invasions and/or occupations).. 
(0) Plaintiffs have done an analysis on these and other photos under the 
assumption that what the Defendants averred to on 3/21/07 should be accurate (see Plaintiffs ' 
Third Record Szdpplenzent, Item No.5, at 2-3 (Defendants and Defendants' counsel state that the 
aerial photos should show the alterations Plaintiffs allege and without any rational basis for their 
claim, as to how they made the determination that there %-as no evidence of movement of Camps 
Canyon Road in the aerial photos). In doing so Plaintiffs have found the results to show that the 
road location has changed as Mr. Durn's survey would suggest and Defendants admit to having 
altered (see Plaintiffs Third Record Supplement, Item No. 4, at 1 through 9 (Plaintiffs' letter 
explains the changes in location of the east and u7est property lines of the 341- acre parcel with 
Camps Canyon Road); see also Plaintiffs Third Record Supplement, Item No. 5, at 2-3 
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photos show no movement in the road); Plaintiffs' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 6, at 5-6 
(Plaintiffs were allowed time on the agenda to show their analysis of the aerial photos which 
showed movement of the road and Plaintiffs are then denied the right to show the evidence). 
(p) There is a more reasonable answer to the problem posed by Mr. Hodge-that 
the road frontage distance be recognized and this recognition can be granted without the sacrifice 
of the other measurements and angles. This present case is not premised on the fact that two 
reasonable minds can differ, it is premised on the claim of the Defendants that they can decide a 
debatable question on an invalid policy and make co~lclusions and findings arbitrarily and 
capriciously not supported by the evidence in the record and can after the fact create a record to 
support their claims. One only needs to consider that Defendants have admitted to making 
changes in the road and that the alterations are significant enough to show both the loss of a 
quarter acre of land area and a loss of 200 feet of road frontage and that these alterations may 
only show as slight variations in the path of a line across the aerial photos (the area on a map 
scaled to be 40 acres = 4 square inches would require a total of 0.25 square inches to show the 
loss of acreage from the original deed to the Rimrock survey). Furthermore, Defendants' denials 
of significant change are irrelevant as the U.S. Supreme Court in states that the physical space a 
small cable T.V box occupies is a taking (see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 
458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
(q) John Durn, the Latah County Surveyor, ~ ~ h o  perf rmed the Rinlrock survey 
of July 2006, and whom Mr. Hodge reprimands for not including a destroyed measurement in his 
survey, was in the same situation that Plaintiffs are in now and that Bob Wagner also shared in. 
All three of us are at the mercy of an agency which is deliberately indifferent to what is valid 
private property and Defendants arbitrarily alter lines within easements they have arbitrarily 
determined and all three are then required to prove what is no longer there or adequately 
recorded u-hether it is a straightened road, a driveway access, or a fence. If Mr. Durne writes on 
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his survey "Camps Canyon Road (County road) is shown with a 50 foot wide prescriptive R/W. 
The physical location of the road is on a side hill and appears to be stable with little, if any, 
change occurring over time", he must make some basic assumptions whether Mr. Arneberg 
chooses to be truthful or not about previous alterations (see P l a i n t ~ s  ' Third Record Supplement, 
Item No. 5 ,  at 3 ("Orland Arneberg said he's lived out there his whole life and can testify that the 
road hasn't moved.") or if Dan Payne call successfully conceal andlor adequately destroy the 
necessary evidence (Plaintiffs' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 6, at 7 "Dan Payne said that 
unless Mr. Halvorson could prove the highway district pushed the tree through the fence he 
should drop the issue"). Any investigation has a beginning and as so assumptions are made, 
whether such assumptions are out of the prevue of Mr. Dunn (he is not the one who determines 
the width of the easement of Camps Canyon Road, nor is he an archeologist) or simply a matter 
at where a rational investigation begins. Mr. Dun11 notes his beginning assumptions and that he 
will "show[nJ" his findings as a 50 foot prescriptive right of way in a stable enviroilrnent. 
In regards to Defendants' " ADMISSIBLE MATERIAL FACTS RELEVANT TO 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ('Facts')" # 1 &2, it is not clear as to what Mr. Landeck intends bv 
questioning the validitv of Mr. Dunn's survey or the implications that there might be 
reason for dispute whether the Defendants had reason to believe that the bare area on a 
aerial photo a t  the east end of a arbitraritv drawn farm field line which was the seasonal 
creek (see Plaintiffs ' Fourth Record Szpplenzent, Item No. 3, at 4, 12, 13, and 14 (photos 
showing the hardened area where the original road ran and where the runoff drainage met the 
road)), to be Charlie Harris' historic driveway when his summary judgment is to be denied 
on such disputed facts and Plaintiffs petition for summary iudgment is to be granted bv 
those disputes he proposes. However it is that Mr. Landeck seeks to prove his Defendants 
might be reasonablv negligent, he is again proving Plaintiffs case that that reasonable 
negligence as viewed as a "not unauthorized'' action is not relevant to a constitutional tort. 
Once again Mr. Landeck must come forth with a rational basis to a legitimate 
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governmental interest to burden Plaintiffs with carrying the load of the Wagners' driveway 
access and/or the additional width of the road. There is no legitimate governmental 
interest to deny Plaintiffs their 5th Amendment rights and/or to be reasonably negligent. 
3) Mr. Payne's conclusions and findings are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of the 
Defendants' discretion and/or illegal. Idaho Code does not mandate an unrecorded prescriptive 
right of way be fifty feet wide nor does it mention a 25 feet from centerline right of way and if it 
did it would be uncol~stitutional (see Keidel V. Rask, 304 N.W. 2d 402 (N.D 1981); see also 
Barfnecht v. Town Board of Nol lp~ood Tp., 232 N. W.2d 420 (Minn. 1975)). Defendants must 
seek a constitutionally valid interpretation of the Idaho statutes ("An appellate court is obligated 
to seek an interpretation of a statute that will uphold its constitutionality. Cobb, 132 Idaho at 197, 
969 P.2d at 246. In addition, 'a statute should not be held void for uncertainty if any practical 
interpretation can be given it.' Id. at 197, 969 P.2d at 246", State of Idaho v. John Doe, 
- I d a h o ,  (2004) (Opinion No. 69)). Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants policies, 
customs, standard operating procedures andlor exertion of their governmental powers are invalid, 
facially and/or as applied to Plaintiffs (see Parratt v. Taylor, 45 1 U.S. 527 (1 98 1); and see 
Zinermon v. Burch 494 U. S. 113 starting at 124; see also Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 
F.3d 734, (gth circuit, 2001); see also Logan v. Zirnmermun Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435-436 
(1982) (availability of postdeprivation remedy is inadequate when deprivation is foreseeable, 
predeprivation process was possible, and official conduct was not "unauthorized"). Mr. Payne's 
opinion is conclusory. Mr. Payne shows no criteria on which he relies on to make a judgment 
that 50 feet implies public safety and or convenience, nor is any such judgment rationally related 
to the burden placed upon the servient estate (see Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255,260 (1980), 
("The determination that governmental action constitutes a taking is, in essence, a determination 
that the public at large, rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state 
power in the public interest"). There is no de minimis applicability in this situation of where 
such gains from the application of the statute are being weighed against the administrative 
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burdens to the Plaintiffs, as implied authority to make cost-benefit decisions must be derived 
from statute and not from a general de minimis doctrine. Mr. Payne's affiances here are 
conclusory and not meant to lead to admissible evidence. 
4) Same as 3) above; This is conclusory and not meant to lead to admissible evidence 
Mr. Payne simply states that he is following the policies, customs of the Defendants. This is 
repetitious rebutted testimony . Mr. Payne's Affidavit confirnzs there is a dispute over the 
permission of Mr. Swanson (see Ed Swanson Affidavit at par. 7). Defendants' conclusions and 
findings in Mr. Payne's inference is that Mr. Swanson conferred with him at Mr. Payne's 
initiation so that Mr. Payne could make Mr. Swanson aware of the abusive action of which Mr. 
Payne was about to undertake is somewhat obscure (see Pr~yne AfJidavit, par. 4 and Ameberg 
AfJidavit, at par. 10); Defendants ' Second Record Supplement, Iteins 2 and 3, (Swansons had fee 
in the land in 1996 and Plaintiffs acquired fee in the land; colorable evidence that the Swansons 
then and the Plaintiffs now have a right to a nleaningful response at a meaningf~ll time; however 
it is that Defendants arrogantly believe they absolutely rule the road. The question here is do the 
Defendants have the right to alter the road not only at their decree, but also can they do it without 
engaging the abutting land o~vners in affording them due process and equal protection or to even 
ignore the intentions of the abutting landowners \+;hen they seek them out. Whatever it is that 
Mr. Payne and/or h4r. Arneberg believe about the issue of whether due process and equal 
protection are required or not is not relevant to the question; it is strictly an objective question of 
well established law and how a reasonable person would view it-not Mr. Arneberg or Mr. 
Payne. These affidavits are simply their coilclusions of law and not evidence of lack of dispute. 
For the Defendants to prevail they must show no requirement of due process not sinlply admit 
they didn't provide it. As arrogant as this stance is it is also frivolous. Defendants have brought 
forth no substantial evidence here to support any theory that they did not need to pro~ide  Mr. 
Swanson then or the Plaintiffs now due process and the record runs contrary in this case as in all 
instances the Defendants are intending to adversely effect a land owners' propesty and liberty 
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rights with per se violations (at this point the only defense Defendants have is to claiin they are 
quelling a nuisance (see Idaho Code 5 22-4504 (proscribes such declaration). Defendants are 
liable, in their official capacities for their invalid policies (see Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 
1342, 1346 (9'" Cis. 1992) (per curiam), cert. denied, 1 14 S.Crt. 1345 (1 993) (Municipal liability 
may be established in one of three ways). Defendants are liable in their individual capacities 
weighed on an objective standard of reasonableness (see Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 
(1987) (held, "...may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally 
turns on the 'objective legal reasonableness' of the action, assessed in the light of the legal rules 
that were clearly established at the time the action m7as taken", citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 
U.S. 800)). Defendants have only confirmed their official and individual liabilities and hang 
both heavily on I.C. 5 40-23 12 for the ongoing harmful issue on the north side of the road, as 
they rely heavily on an mandated 50 foot-25 feet from centerline right of way to preclude due 
process and/or equal protection for the widening andlor property damage in widening andlor 
encroacl~ment of a fence. On the south side of the road the Defendants rely on I.C. 5 40-23 12 to 
authorize the issuance of, continuation of, and/or the failure to revoke of a driveway access 
permit for a permit wholly on Plaintiffs' land and that denial of Plaintiffs' objections to the 
actions/failures .to act adverse to Plaintiffs' property and liberty rights and to the positive 
guaranties of the U.S. Constitution are rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. 
Defendants' affiances provide no rational basis for their findings and conclusions; they are 
co~~clusory, and are unreasonable and not rationally related to a legitimate gover~mental interest 
andior bear no relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare and are arbitrary 
and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion and/or illegal. iMore specifically: 
(a) Second Affidavit of Dan Payne, at 4; is an admission ofthe issue for which 
Plaintiffs allege as to be harmful, the only step necessary to grant summary judgment in favor of 
Plaintiffs is, as a matter of law, to determine if such actions/failures to act require the due process 
of law, an evidentiary public hearing in this case (see Williar;l?son County Regional Plarz~ing 
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Comm 'n I]. Hamilton Bank, 473 US 172, 193 (1 985) (The matter of the "issue that inflicts the 
actual, concrete injury" determines the necessary proofs); see also Harris v. County of Riverside. 
904 F.2d 497 (1 990); 
(b) Arneberg Affidavit, at 10; Defendants' policies, customs, standard operating 
procedures are invalid as Defendants fail to circumscribe their broad authority to determine right 
of way boundaries and legal limitations with the statutory safeguards of the requirements of due 
process and/or the equal treatment under the law (see the 5th Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution), legally conducted professionally done surveys (see I.C. $9 40- 13 10 and 605 and 
1.C $9 31-2707 and 2709), accurate descriptions of the lands required for the alterations(see I.C. 
$5 40- 13 10 and 605), the recording of the commissioners' orders for laying out of and for the 
alteration itself(see I.C. $5 40-6081, and for recording of and conveying of the agreements with 
abutting landowners(see I.C. $5 40-2302), remedies for erroneous deprivations (see Zinermon); 
(c) Defendants Second Record Supplement, Items 2 and 3; Defendants have 
provided evasive answers and have failed to ansurer Plaintiffs' discovery requests for the 
information, documents, agency records, facts and opinions of fact on which Defendants base 
their findings and conclusion of law. There is nothing in either the Wagner or the Plaintiffs deed 
which says more than a public, county road passes over the SE % NE 54 and the centerline forms 
the northeast boundary between the two. This boundary has a determined length R-hich starts 
and ends at two determinable points that is where two imaginary geographic lines cross said 
road. If said road is altered and these monument points are destroyed by moving the centerline 
of the road are these points then not retrievable, simply because they are now 50 and 84 feet, 
more or less south of the now centerline of Camps Canyon Road. One could by meets and 
bounds discover these points; yet no rational person would say the road is still there, nor would 
he say that a straightened line is as long as a convoluted one. How does the road gets from point 
a to point b without certain statutory safeguards including positive constitutional guaranties, and 
remedies for erroneous takings? It is unreasonable to conclude that this type of clandestine 
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alteration was the unainbiguous intent of the legislature when it enacted I.C. 5 40-23 12. Nor was 
this activity, which would clearly be banned in the broad daylight of the open court rooin (a 
waiver of constitutional right requires both knowledge and intent to do so), be the unambiguous 
intent of the Idaho State legislature when it enacted I.C. $6 40-13 10 and 605 and prohibited the 
taking of private land without prior survey, accurate description of the lands required, and 
admonishing the commissioilers to endeavor to come to an agreement with the abutting 
landowners. None of those statutes carries the inference that the government official may tell the 
abutting landowner of his intended adverse actions, if it be convenient to do so, and either way 
the official is authorized to do as he so decides, however capriciously, irrationally and/or 
arbitrarily he decides; with the mandate that if she should complain the official shall have the 
authority to ignore her with the unabashed deference and comity of the court. 
5) Same as 3) above; Defendants conclusions and findings are no supported by 
substantial evidence in the record and/or run contrary to the record of this case and the agency 
record and/or are unreasonable and not rationally related to a legitilllate governmental interest 
and/or bear no relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare and are arbitrary 
and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion andlor illegal. Defendant Payne's affiances 
are to be stricken for improperly augmenting the agency record. More specifically: 
(a) Payne Affidavit, at 5; Defendants' affidavit is made in bad faith; Dan Payne 
supplements his required record keeping to fit his claims. There is no evidence in Defendant 
Payne's log to substantiate the specific claims he makes. There is no evidence in the records of 
the agency to support any conclusion that Defendants were in compliance wit11 the laws (see I.C. 
5 s  40-13 10 and 605; see I.C. $5 40-608; see 1.C 5 s  3 1-2707 and 2709, and see I.C. $5 40-2302). 
(b) Defendants records and logs are admissible evidence, however empty they 
may be. 
6) Same as 3) above; Defendants conclusions and findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence in the record and/or run contrary to the record of this case and the agency 
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record and/or are unreasonable and not rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest 
and/or bear no relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare and are arbitrary 
and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion and/or illegal. More specifically: 
(a) Payne Second Affidavit, at 4; Defendants' affidavit is made in bad faith; Dan 
Payne supplements his required record keeping to fit his claims. There is no evidence in 
Defendant Payne's log to substantiate the specific claims he makes. There is no evidence in the 
records of the agency to support any conclusion that Defendants were in compliance with the 
laws (see I.C. $5 40-1310 and 605; see I.C. 55 40-608; see 1.C $5 31-2707 and 2709, and see I.C. 
$5 40-2302). 
(b) Defendants records and logs are admissible evidence. 
7) Payne Affidavit at 7; If you take Mr. Payne's two previous affiances in 5) (see Payne 
Affidavit, par. 5) and 6) (see Payne Affidavit, par. 6), specifically that he added 4' to the north 
side of Camps Canyon Road in 1996 and again added 4' to the road in 2005 and 2006 and then 
subtract those additions from what Mr. Payne now ascribes to be the width of the road; that 21 
feet - 4 feet -4 feet = 13 feet; and then subtract from that the additional 2 feet of width (see 
Payne Second Affidavit, par. 4); that is 13 feet -2 feet =11 feet. One now arrives at what 
Plaintiffs state the original right of way was in width (see Plaintiffs Affidavit submitted in 
support of partial summary judgments and other motions submitted January 26,2009 (Plaintiffs ' 
Afidavit), at 8; The width of the road was less than 12 feet including supporting structures, 
Defendants have no evidentiary hearing and/or substantial evidence in their record to support a 
finding and conclusion of a fifty foot-25 feet from centerline right of way. Prior to all these 
alterations Camps Canyon Road was a narrow, little used, canyon road; it was steep and winding 
at the west end of the SE114 NE114. These facts are undisputed. The question is, as a matter of 
law, can this original unrecorded prescriptive right of way be mandate to have a width of 50 
feet-25feet from centerline? 
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8) and 9) Payne Affidavit at 9 and at 10; I.C. $40-1 14 (3) "'Maintenance' means to 
preserve from failure or decline, or repair, rehrbish, repaint or otherwise keep an existing 
highway or structure in a suitable state for use." There is no reference at all to widening, 
straightening, altering, or changing in anyway, in fact the implication of maintenance is to 
preserve the present conditioli and not allow it to change. The intention of keeping the physical 
extensions of a right of way distinguishable from the required activities of repair and 
refurbishment is apparent and consistent (compare to I.C.9 40-605). Mr. Payne brings forth no 
evidence of or a rational basis for the need for enveloping additional land without the proper 
interference with Plaintiffs property rights-eminent domain. There is no apparent need to 
increase the burden on the servient estate by enveloping more land than is necessary. The 
dominant estate can effect repairs to the road without any increase in the burden to the servient 
estate but simply asking and communicating what repairs are necessary. If there is reason to, 
that is a rational basis for increasing the burden of the servient estate, the legitimate 
governmental interest is to spread that burden amongst the public (see Pennell v. City ofSan 
Jose, 485 U.S.l, 9 (1988) ('"[ilt is axiomatic that the Fifth Amendment's just compensation 
provision is 'designed to bar Government fiom forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.' First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Gleizdale v. Coun f y  of Los Angeles, 482 U. S. 304,482 U. S. 
318-319 (1987) (quoting Armstrong v. United States. 364 U. S. 40, 364 U. S. 49 (1960))"; See 
also ~Monongahela Nav. Co. 11. Ukited States, 148 U.S. 3 12, 325 (1 893); See County of 
Sacranzento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (stating that the Due Process Clause is intended, 
in part, to protect the individual against "the exercise of power without any reasonable 
justification in the service of a legitimate government objective"). Plaintiffs land andlor fence is 
neither immoral, unsafe, unhealthful, nor do they cause a diminution in the general welfare of the 
public or the Wagners; Defendants have no rational basis for regulating any harmful effects of 
the land use provided Plaintiffs by the County of Latah. Defendant Payne brings forth no 
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rational basis for the increase burden to the servient estate, simply a conclusion that the District 
"nzust maintain". 
In  regards to Defendants' "ADMISSIBLE MATERIAL FACTS =LEVANT TO 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ('Facts') #s 3 through 12, it is not clear what Mr. Landeck' s 
intentions are, as he seems to argue iust for the sake of arguing.. Mr. Landeck's argument 
simplv begs the question, "Is the envelopment of more land permissible without due 
process and equal protection?" Whether it is called width, widen in^, straightening, 
altering, "to maintain" andlor "to improve", the name does not mandate an action 
prohibited by law and constitution. The "as is, where as" precedent conditions must first 
be determined and established before the action is permitted as it is a per se taking. 
Furthermore all Mr. Pavne's affiances are conclusory. Mr. Payne brings forth no points of 
discussion of whv maintenance requires extension of the easement and hence the increase 
burden on the servient estate. He simply savs in effect maintenance mandates a 50 foot- 
25 feet from centerline right of way. The Defendants bring forth no public opinion that for 
their convenience o r  easement of travel maintenance o r  statute mandates a 50 foot-25 feet 
from centerline right of way, that maintenance can not adequately be performed by 
reasonable persons and permission of lando~vners. What is a t  stake is the clandestine 
extension of width and burden upon the senrient estate without due process of law. 
Furthermore, Mr. Pavne and Defendants ' counsel PO out of their wav to state that none of 
these matters have anything to do with the public (see Defendants' Brief at 8, par. 11 
f"While the fence does not interfere with the public traffic on the traveled surface of 
Camps Canvon Road, the District's maintenance activities, primarily grading and snow 
removal, a re  affected by the fence's placement)). There are no complaints from the public 
listed. 
10) "The entire stretch of Camps Canyon Road used by the District for public 
highway purposes in the vicinity of Plaintiffs' real property, including cut slope to fill slope 
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of saying, "intermittently conclusory, speculative, argumentative, generalized, repetitive and 
disorganized" (see Defendants ' Brief at 2) statement, which "relies on factual assertions that are 
not admissible in evidence, primarily for lack of foundation and hearsay" (see Defendants' brief 
at 2 )  and are not supported by substantial evidence in the agency record and for which 
Defendants Iiave provided no rational basis or relation to a legitimate governmental interest 
(Plaintiffs, having no legal education, do not require anything is excess of what a reasonable 
person might expect of governmental officials-a rational basis). To the extent that Camps 
Canyon Road lies on a naturally occurring slope as it traverses Plaintiff real property, the road 
surface would logically require support as it is not in any way suspended and detached from the 
physical structure of the earth beneath it. Furthermore, that supporting slope itself is not in any 
way suspended from or detached from the rest of the naturally occurring slope at approximately 
50 feet or the draw beneath the slope itself. It is then no further stretch of the imagination to see 
that indeed the County of Latah as well as the State of Idaho is supportive of that draw and 
naturally occurring slope also. These matters, such as the County of Latah and the State of Idaho 
are defined on the basis of their limitations, that is, they have a rationally and/or legally defined 
border, soniewhat permanently established. If the Defendants are saying that the border or 
limitation of Camps Canyon Road is legally established at 50 feet, this has no relevance to the 
slopes above or below the road surface as, it is a matter of law and this question has previously 
been discussed as being not bound in any statute and is arbitrary and capricious an abuse of 
defendants discretion and/or illegal. On the other hand if Defendants are saying that the support 
of the road ends at 25 feet from centerline on the downhill side or that the slope which extends 
above the road surface is supportive, then these inferences or statements are irrational 
conclusions and findings without substantial evidence in the record and run contrary to any sense 
of rationality and are therefore arbitrary and capricious an abuse of defendants discretion and/or 
illegal. Plaintiffs have in no way sought to interfere with the status quo of the support of Camps 
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Canyon Road as it traverses their land. The complaint Plaintiffs have is that the Defendants have 
admitted to increasing the burden on Plaintiffs land (both in the road surface itself as well as the 
support that is required for an ever increasing size of road); and as the Defendants admit (see 
Payne ,S'econdAffidavit at 4). Plaintiffs' complaint is that this is, as are other matters, an 
improper interference with Plaintiffs' property rights as it is done without the due process and/or 
equal protection of the law. Defendants' statements and affiances are conclusory and not meant 
to lead to adnlissible evidence. 
11) and 12) Snow plowing and gravefing and road grading as enveloping more land 
and damage to Plaintiffs' fence; Once again Defendants admit to (Payne Affidavit, at 12) the 
issue to which Plaintiffs ascribe to as being harmful and egregious. Tlie only step necessary to 
grant summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs is, as a matter of law, to determine if such 
actions/failures to act require the due process of law (see Williamson County Regional Planning 
Comrn 'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 US 172, 193 (1 985) (The matter of the "issue that inflicts the 
actual, coilcrete injury" determines the necessary proofs); see also Harris v. Cou~ty  ofRiverside, 
904 F.2d 497 (1990). Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants have physically invaded their land 
and damaged their fence. These actions are not disputed. Furthermore, Defendants 
argumentatively state, as here that Plaintiffs' fence lies within their right of way. There is no 
dispute that Plaii~tiffs have fee in the land in question. The issues then Lie in whether the land in 
question lies within the right of way and if such right of way exists do the Defendants have the 
right to encroach and injure Plaintiffs fence. Defendants do not have substantial evidence in 
their record to support such a claim that they have a 50 foot-25 feet from centerline right of 
way; and, all evidence ill the record of this case and as well as the agency record consist on 
repetitious, rebutted testimony of Defendants claims, and all evidence in this case as well as the 
agency record runs contrary to the claims of the Defendants and most importantly so Defendants 
have stated emphatically so that no due process and/or equal protection is required. They bring 
forth no rational basis for the burden they place on Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs' land nor do they show 
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any ends which would justify the means they take-to physically invade and occupy Plaintiffs 
land without any recourse available to Plaintiffs. When their encroachments now have surpassed 
the intended protection of Plaintiffs' buffer there may be reason for the defendants to halt their 
intrusive, vindictive behavior. 
(a) In the first instance Plaintiffs fence is protected from malicious injury by 
statute. Defendants policies, customs, standard operating procedures are invalid as to the extent 
that they are proscribed by law (see Czaplicki v. Gooding Joint Sclzool District No. 231, 1 16 
Idaho 326, 775 P.2d 640) ("[D]iscretionary fu~lction does not shield negligent implementation of 
statutes.. ."); see also Owen, above). 
(b) Furthermore, this action requires notice and hearing before action is taken- 
due process is required by I.C. $$ 40-23 17, and 23 19, many legal doctrines, including but not 
limited to the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Defendants claims of reasonable and 
diligent behavior is denied by their own admissions as Camps Canyon Road as an ulirecorded 
prescriptive right of way has a history of probably in excess of 100 years. During that time until 
1996 maintenance and use resulted in a 1 1-12 foot road surface including supporting structures 
(calculated by Defendants' own figures; average width of the road now=2 1 feet (see Defendants' 
Brief, at 7, par. 7) minus 2005 and 2006 and 1996 additions of 10 feet (see Defendants' Brief, at 
7, par. 5 and 6). During the years (2005-2006) of Mr. Payne's diligent maintenance and under 
the policies of the NLCHD, the width has grown by six feet (see Payne Second Affidavit, at 4,5; 
see also Defendants ' BrieJ; at 7, par. 5 and 6); at that rate the road surface would be well over 
three hundred feet now (1 00/2x6=300). Defendants deny their disclaimer-absent special 
circumstances-it is apparent circumstances are other than they were. There are no exigent 
circumstances. Defendants' authority "to improve" and "to maintain" is unstoppable. 
Defendants claims are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants discretion, andlor illegal. 
Plaintiffs' fence as well as Plaintiffs' buffer is wholly northeast and beyond the original road 
surface and supporting structures and is wholly northeast and beyond the original line fence and 
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is northeast and beyond the original 25 feet from centerline right of way if such right of way 
existed is most if not all save for a small section northeast of the old logging road and the 
Plaintiffs left the buffer to protect their fence and allow for snow removal, adequately "sized" for 
the road accomplished by the Highway District in 1996 (see Plaintiffs ' Fourth Record 
Supplement, Item No. 3, at 16 (photos showing the area left by Plaintiffs and as already reduced 
by the extensions to the road by Defendants and as photographed in 2007)) and not at all 
required by Plaintiffs to leave. Plaintiffs could have built their fence at the edge of the road (see 
Ed Swnnson Afldavit, at par. 12). 
(c) "That is, given the steepness of the slope on Plaintiffs' property, it is virtually 
impossible to properly maintain Camps Canyon Road without some gravel or snow reaching 
Plaintiffs' fence" (see Defendants ' Brief at 8, par. 11). First of all, Plaintiffs are not talking 
about a sinall amount of incidental snow (see Plaintiffs ' Fourth Record Supplement, Item No. 3, 
at 8, and 9 (photos showing the pushing of snow with deliberate indifference into the fence, 
winter of 2007-8). Secondly, Plaintiffs and the neighbors plowed the snow on Camps Canyon 
Road for years without difficulties (see PlaintiSfsJ .4fldavit par. 2). Third, most of the several 
miles of fences that Plaintiffs maintain are in the South Latall County Highway District. Of the 
mile and half of fence on this farin, all is out of the reach of the NLCHD save for this 700 feet 
(see Plairztiff 1s Af$davit par. 27). This stretch of fence requires more time and expense to repair 
then at least a mile of fence unexposed to the Defendants. If Defendants have reached an 
operational conclusion that it is indeed "virtually impossible", excluding any malicious 
compliance, "to properly maintain", then their approach to widen the road and use up Plaintiffs' 
buffer rather than to maintain it as intended for snow storage is irrational. If one does not have 
space enough for storage for snow now why would you both increase the need for more storage 
by widening the road (more roadzmore snow) and decrease the availability for the storage 
already needed by widening the road (more road =less buffer)? "While the fence does not 
interfere with the public traffic on the travelled surface of Camps Canyon Road, the District's 
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maintenance activities, primarily grading and silow removal, are affected by the fence's 
placement" (see Defendants' Brief at 8, par. 1 I). Plaintiffs' land and fence is not unsafe, 
unhealthful, immoral, nor does it cause a diminution in the general welfare of the public. 
Defendants have many options. The choice they take is illegal to damage the fence rather than 
follow the statute, give notice and/or hold evidentiary hearing on the width of the easement. This 
is deliberate indifference esroneous deprivation. 
13) through 18) The first Wagner driveway access permit, the south and the east 
property lines of the 3+/- acre parcel (Plaintiffs address Defendants statements of material 
facts without waiver that Defendants measurements and claims of real property lines are 
not base on relevant evidence which would lead to admissible evidence; Defendants have 
not submitted any surveys (see I.C. 5 31- 2709): 
(a) Defendants' couilsel and Defendant Payile seem to relate difficulties related to 
the south property line of the 3+/- acre parcel. Altl~ough the south property line is less involved 
in the Conzplaint Plaintiffs have with the Defendants u~ongfully taking of Plaintiffs' land, it is a 
matter which should also be addressed (see Plaintiffs' Fourth Record S'upplement, Itein No. 3, at 
4, 12, 13, and 14 (photos showing the south property line as established by the Riinrock 
Survey-marked by the posts-and the original line-as marked by the field line). Mr. Wagner 
had difficulty in establishing the position of the south property line due to a lot of possible 
reasons; he started from a point not in section 15, he had to use his inagnetic compass under a 
15000 volt power line, and had to confront an 8 foot embankment (see Plaintiffs Fourth Record 
Suppleunent, Item No. 3, at 17 (photo looking south along the east property line; with Mr. 
Wagner's "post" in the distance at the edge of the road, sl~owing how far he was off in his 
survey). 
(b) Furthermore, the 3+/- acre parcel is tied to the centerline of Camps Canyon 
Road as a flea to a dog's tail. Whenever the centerline of the unrecorded prescriptive right of 
way waged so went the 31.1- acre parcel as no recorded survey of the 3+/- acre parcel was found 
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the west line of the SE114 NE114 of section with Camps Canyon Road has changed over the 
years (see Plaintiffs' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 1, at 3, Request For Admission No. 3, 
subpart c.; see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplenzent, Item No. 3, at 16-1 7, Interrogatory Nos. 40 - 
44; (Defendants have altered Camps Canyon Road several times and altered the centerline; see 
Second Payne Affidavit at 2 and 3); and, with the undisputed fact that the road in the pertinent 
part was esseiltially a narrow, little used and stable steep canyon road until 1996 (see Plaintiffs' 
Affidavit at 2-3, par. 8; see Joe Yockey's Affidavit, at 2, par. 8) and, that most other parts of 
Camps Canyo11 Road in section 15 remained so until 2005. For all intents and purposes the 
major shift in that intersection, as is supported by the evidence, occurred in 1996 and absent any 
other known alterations; and, without any survey or accurate description of the lands required for 
said alteration in 1996, and thus no recording of survey and/or agreeilleilts or conveyance 
occurred, resulted in the shift of the southern property line of the 3+/- acre parcel to the north by 
approximately 50 feet. Had the Defendants done a survey and recorded the results in 1996, the 
majority of this shift could have been avoided (see Hodge Affidavit, the road is a monument). 
This emphasizes Mr. Hodge's point that the road lies as a lllonulnent and requires the respect of 
the Highway District. This also emphasizes that the Wagners were also victims of the 
Defendants. This also emphasizes the difficulty Mr. Dunn ei~coui~tered with conductiilg the 
survey. Whether the Wagners need to be joined to this action is for the Coui-t to decide. At this 
point Plaintiffs rely only on the fact that the deterlnination of the post h4r. Payne refers to was 
not based on a professioilally done survey and does not appear to lead to admissible evidence for 
whatever reason Defendai~ts rely on it. Defendants' description of the south property line and 
the land north of Mr. Wagner's post, "North of that post was an old driveway that used to lead to 
a home and outbuildings on Mr. Wagner's property" (Dan Payne, see Defendants ' Briefat 9, par 
13) may be disoriented in direction. North of Mr. Wagners' post lies the present County Road; 
fifty feet across the County Road lies yellow pine (ponderosa) trees in excess of 100 years old 
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(see Plaintiffs' Fourth Record Sz~pplement, Item No. 3, at 14 and 2 (photo looking northeast from 
Camps Canyon Road showing 100 year old pine trees north of where Mr. Payne says Charlie's 
old driveway was north andlor in the middle of those trees)). Mr. Payne may mean west instead 
of north as the east property line lays approximately 50 feet west of Mr. Wagner's post and 104 
feet north along that line is where the east property met the centerline of the road (see Plaintiffs ' 
Fourtl~ Record Supplement, Item No. 3, at 4 (photo loolcing ilortheast from Camps Canyon Road 
showing east property line in the middle of the photo about 40-50 feet due west of Mr. Wagner's 
post). West of the property line and in close proximity to it Charlie's driveway entered the road 
heading almost due north [see Plaintiffs ' Fourth Record Supplement, Item No. 3, at 4 (photo 
looking northeast from Camps Canyon Road showing approximate position of the intersection of 
Camps Canyon Road with the east property line of the 3+/- acre Parcel as it %-as when the road 
was higher on the slope)). 
(b) The east property line of the 31/- acre parcel is a different matter, as it 
remains geographically unchanged in position from east to west and its presence is a well known 
fact. Any change here is based 011 the accuracy of technological advances and Mr. Dunn's 
thoughtful consideration to the variables involved. It may have been extended and started in a 
different place as the southern property line was shifted north and the curves at the east end of 
the 3+/- acre parcel were straightened in 1996 (see Plainti$s ' Third Record Suypler?zent, Item 
No. 13, at 10- 1 1, Interrogatory No. 16). These two facts alone account for more tllail 100 feet of 
the loss of road frontage as the change in the curves resulted in the road and the east property 
line paralleling each other for a short distance and the property line had to chase the road for an 
additional 30 feet (more than the shift of 50 feet to the north in the southern property line) (see 
Plaintiffs ' Fourth Record Suppleunent, Item No. 3, at 20 (photo looking due south along east 
property line (this photo was taken in 2006 after the Highway District cleared the last remaining 
evidence of the 8 foot einbankrneilt left by the 1996 alteration in the late summer of 2006)), as 
sited by the two posts showing how the post 1996 road parallels the property line and thus a loss 
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of road frontage; as the calculation of road frontage does not start until the east property line 
crosses the centerline of the road; there may be parts of the old road which are geographically 50 
and 84 feet from the post 1996 road but the distance varies throughout the 700 or so feet of the 
road)) and ,another 20 plus feet as the west intersection moved north 50 feet and the east 
intersection moved north 80 plus feet. This shift to the north resulted in another untoward effect 
in regards to the old historic driveway as north is down hill and the road bed necessarily dropped 
down hill fiom where the height of the historic driveway met the road and left an 8 foot 
embankment (see Plaintiffs ' Fourlh Record Supplement, Item No. 3 ,  at 17(photo looking due 
south along east property line (this photo was taken in 2006 after Wagners built their 2fld 
driveway in June of 2006 and about three months before Plaintiffs ' Fou~th Record Sz~yleizenf ,  
Item No. 3 ,  at 20)). Without the accurate information of the 1996 alterations, the Wagners were 
leA with the impression that the historic driveway headed due east and thus straight into the east 
property line (see Plaint85 ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 1, at 12, Request for Ad~nission 
No. 27). 
(c) The survey that Bob Wagner had done had passed the east property line some 
forty feet before he reached the road and placed the post alol~gside the road (Mr. U7agner's 
survey is inad~~lissible as evidence), whether or not Mr. Wagner had begrul his survey from a 
point located in Section 16 and a fact that Mr. Wagner had spolcen with Ron Munson about 
so~netime around the time Mr. Wagner conducted his survey and that Mr. R/l~mson had told him 
that may not tvork (see PlaintiffS Asdavit par. 12). Neither Defendants nor the Wagners have a 
professionally done survey on which to base any rational decision as to why they positioned a 
post where they did and as such the references Defendant Payne makes in reference to a non 
existent southern property line extending to the road are nonsensical. Bob Wagner had been told 
in the fall of 2005 that his post was not acc~~rately placed and Defendant Payne and Defendant 
Arneberg were well aware of these facts as a result of their close relationship with the Wagners 
and the Ridgeview Farms owners (see PlairztifSs ' Third Record Suppler?zent, Item No. 1, at 10- 1 1, 
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Request for Admission Nos. 23-26; see also Plaintiffs' Third Record Szpplement, Item No. 3, at 
10- 1 1, Request for Admission No. 25-26; see also Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 
12, at 4-1 1, Interrogatory Nos. 6-21). Defendants Payne and Arneberg were well acquainted 
with the Wagners situation, even before the permit was issued and lulew Plaintiffs did not agree 
with the Wagners' survey; Defendants Arneberg, Clyde and Payne were in the same official 
positions now as they were in 1996 when the NLCHD made the alterations to Camps Canyon 
Road and the changes to the centerline of the road, the straightening of the curves and the 
movement of the road bed to the northeast and knew the measurement of the road frontage 
referred to in the deed was not accurate; Defendants conclusions and findings that the first 
Wagner driveway access permit was valid were arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' 
discretion, and/or illegal. Furthermore, Defendants are the final policy makers of the agency and 
they gave their approval of the permit by failing to revoke the permit when they were told the 
Wagner driveway access was wholly on the plaintiffs' land, by refusing to call for a survey to 
resolve the issue, by refusing to require the Wagners to call for a survey to resolve the problem 
and by refusing to revoke the permit when the Plaintiffs said that they would call for a survey. 
Furtlierrnore Defendants failed to afford Plaintiffs due process to resolve the problem when all 
parties were present and time was allotted of the agenda. 
19) There is no dispute that Plaintiffs have considered that matter of paying a $750 fee 
and petitioning Commissioners to validate Camps Canyon Road to be futile and an idle waste of 
Plaintiffs' time money and effort. There is also no dispute that Plaintiffs have supplied 
Defendants with sufficient data for the Conlmissioners to validate Camps Canyon Road on their 
own resolution. Idaho offers two exceptions to tlie requirement to exhaust agency remedies (see 
Fairway Development are applicable to their appeal. This Court in Fairway Development 
acknowledged that the general rule that administrative remedies must be exhausted before a 
district court will acquire subject matter jurisdiction to hear a case, has been deviated from in 
certain cases. The Court stated: In relaxing the doctrine of exhaustion, this Court held that the 
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rule will be departed from under certain circumstances, first, where the interests of justice so 
require and secondly, where the agency acts outside its authority. Fairway Dev., 1 19 Idaho at 
125,804 P.2d at 298 (citing Grever v. Idaho Tel. Co., 94 Idaho 900,903,499 P.2d 1256, 1259 
(1 972). Exhaustion of agency remedies is not required under 5 1983 (see Monroe v. Pape, 365 
U.S. 167, 183 (1 961) (exhaustion of judicial remedies is not a prerequisite); see also Patsy v. 
Florida Board ofRegents, 457 U.S. 496, 501 (1982) (exhaustion of administrative remedies is 
not a prerequisite)). Plaintiffs are not required to engage in idle and/or futile collduct to resolve 
these matters. I.C. fj 40-203a allows Commissioners to initiate validation proceedings under 
their own resolution only if one of three col~ditions exist: (i) On 4/12/06 Plaintiffs questioned the 
legal establishmellt of the Camps Canyon Road right of way (alterations had been made to the 
right of way in 1996 with the permission of the previous owner (see Ed Swanson Affidavit) and 
the Defendants were now claiming prescription (see Plaintiffs ' AAfJidavit, at 8 and 13) and availed 
Defendants of the facts that alterations had been made to Canlps Canyon Road (see Plaintiffs' 
Afldavit, at 8 and 13) and that Defendants were not knowledgeable of the accurate location of 
the right of way if they believed that the first Wagner driveway access permit was not on 
Plaintiffs land (see Plaint$ss' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 12, at 9, (however Dan Payne 
is also know1edg;eable of the 1996 alterations to Camps Canyon Road, as he conducted the 
alterations (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Szlpplement, Item No. 3, at 16-1 7, Request For 
Admission Nos. 40-44). Dan Payne altered the centerline of Camps Canyon Road on several 
occasions; yet he used the measurement of the centerline to determine the validity of the first 
Wagner driveway access permit; (ii) On 3/21/07, Plaintiffs represented the facts of (i) and 
supplemented those facts with the results of the Rimrock survey which showed lliovenient of the 
intersection points of the east and west property lines of the 3+/- acre parcel of greater than 50 
feet. The present location of Camps Canyon Road no longer agreed with the Latah County 
records (our deed) (see Plaintiffs' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 4, at 2-3). The Idaho 
Doctrine of Quasi-Estoppel estops Defendants from asserting reliability of the deed description 
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for issuance/failure to revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit and then denying the 
reliability of the deed in negating the movement of Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 
3+/- acre parcel. All three "permission given" factors of I.C. 5 40-203a for Commissiollers to 
initiate validation proceedings under their own resolutioll had been shown to Commissioners and 
they reksed to respond. It would be futile to believe the $750 fee and the same data would result 
in a meaningful response. Further Defendants demands of the $750 fee and that Plaintiffs apply 
for validation proceedings would only result in the declaration of Camps Canyon Road in the 
vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel as being "in the public interest" or not (a fact not in dispute-the 
only dispute is with the doubts of location, public records, numerous alterations, claim of legal 
establishment as an unrecorded prescriptive right of way). The questions (as a right to private 
action) of doubt are better addressed by the Commissioners initiating validation proceedings 
under their own resolution. See Ware v. Idaho State Tax Conm 'n, 98 Idaho 477, 567 P.2d 423 
(1977). Defendants and Court incorrectly identifies I.C. 5 40-203a as a predeprivation remedy 
and as a post deprivation remedy I.C. 40-203a is inadequate on the grounds: (a) a 
predeprivation remedy is feasible, predictable, and practicable; (b) exl~austion of agency 
remedies is not necessary under $1983; and even if exhaustion of agency remedies was required, 
this case meets both exceptions to exhaustion in Idaho as the Defendants are alleged to be biased 
both in their culpability to improperly altering Camps Canyon Road and their ties to the 
aspirations of and the ex parte communications with the Wagners and it would be unjust to 
require Plaintiffs pay a $750 fee to petition Defendants to validate Camps Canyon Road wlien 
Plaintiffs had already shown them the evidence for questioning the validity of Defendants claims 
and Defendants stated that they were not interested and tlze Defendants were acting outside their 
authority, to operate without a valid right of way; and (c) Defendants are estopped from claiming 
Plaintiffs should file for validation proceedings when it is their duty for providing Plaintiffs with 
a valid right of way (see @'are v. Idaho State Tux Comm 'n, 98 Idaho 477, at 483 (1977) (d) See 
Owen, above). 
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20) See above Plaintiffs have already replied to Defendants Tort claim notice defense. 
2 1) Key Public Records: Defendants identification of Public records as Latah County 
Records are misleading and insufficient for proper identification andlor location of any such 
documents and some may contain unintended and inaccurate information. 
IV. Disputed material facts: Plaintiffs petition Court to deny Defendants Motion for summary 
judgment on Plaintiffs' claims as the following material facts are disputed: 
1) Plaintiffs dispute the width of the easement of Camps Canyon Road right of way, in 
the pertinent part (see this Court's Opinion and Order On Plaintiffs Motions For Summary 
Judgment And Defendants' Motion For Protective Orders, For Enlargement Of Time And For 
Attorney Fees (hereafter Opinion), at 6, 7, and 9); 
2) Plaintiffs dispute the placement of Plaintiffs' fence and Plaintiffs' buffer is within 
Defendants right of wayleasement of Camps Canyon Road right of way, in the pertinent part (see 
Opinion, at 6-9); 
3) Plaintiffs dispute that an unrecorded prescriptive right of way requireslhas a mandated 
a width of 50 feet-25 feet from centerline for maintenance (see Opinion, at 6-9); 
4) Plaintiffs dispute that an unrecorded prescriptive right of way requireslhas a mandated 
width of 50 feet-25 feet from centerline for support (see Opinion, at 6-9); 
5) Plaintiffs dispute that the Camps Canyon Road right of way, in the pertinent part, has 
a width of 50 feet-25 feet from centerline of usage (see Opinion, at 6-9); 
6) Plaintiffs dispute that the Camps Canyon Road right of way, in the pertinent part, has 
a mandatedlrequires a width of 50 feet-25 feet from centerline for maintenance (see Opinion, at 
6-9); 
7) Plaintiffs dispute that the Camps Canyon Road right of way, in the pertinent part, has 
a width of 50 feet-25 feet from centerline (see Opinion, at 6-9); 
8) Plaintiffs dispute that the Defendants have any authority to regulate the use of 
Plaintiffs' land (see Idaho Code I.C. 5 22-4504 prevents the adoption of ordinances or 
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resolutions declaring as a nuisance any agricultural operations operated in accordance with 
generally recognized agricultural practices ("When a conflict exists between a statute and a 
regulation, the regulation must be set aside to the extent of the conflict", see Roeder Holdings 
citing Idaho County hrursitzg Honze v. Dep 't of Health, 120 Ida110 933, 937, 82 1 P.2d 988,992 
(1991))); 
9) Plaintiffs dispute that the aerial photo Mr. Hodge has been given to analyze is from 
the year 1940. 
10) Plaintiffs dispute that the bare area on the eastern edge on the 3.4 acreage parcel on 
the "1 940" aerial photo Mr. Hodge has been given to analyze is Charlie Harris' old driveway 
entrance as that bare spot is the spring run off from the hill and draw to the south and west above 
it. 
I 1) Plaintiffs dispute that the Defendants have "properly discharged [their] statutory 
responsibilities "to improve and to mairztain the public highway known as Camps Canyon". 
12) Plaintiffs dispute that in regards to an unrecorded prescriptive right of way, the 
Defendants have a 50 foot-25 feet froin centerline right of way mandated by any Idaho Statute. 
NONE OF THE ABOVE DISPUTED FACTS ARE MATERIAL TO PLAINTIFFS' PETITION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON THE FOLLOWING UNDISPUTED FACTS: 
VI. Undisputed material facts: Plaintiffs petition Court to grant Plaintiffs' partial summary 
judgment on Plaintiffs' claims of Defendants' liability, under the color of law, as matters of law, 
as the following material facts arc undisputed: 
I )  The width of the easement of Camps Canyon Road has not been factually determined 
(see Opinion, at 6-9). 
2) No public evidentiary hearing has ever been held to establish the unrecorded 
prescriptive highway Camps Canyon Road in SENE Section 15 T39N R3 WBM as a public right 
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centerline and/or other liiniting characteristics of the unrecorded prescriptive highway Camps 
Canyon Road in SENE Section 1 5 T39N R3 WBM. 
4) No factual determination, public evidentiary hearing, of the width of the easement of 
Canlps Canyon Road in SENE Section 15 T39N R3WBM has ever been accomplished by the 
agency, NLCHD, under whose jurisdiction Camps Canyon Road lies. 
5 )  Defendants have 110 material, admissible evidence in the agency's records that Cainps 
Canyon Road has ever been legally established as a 50 foot-25 feet from centerline right of 
way. 
6) Camps Canyon Road in SENE Section 15 T39N R3 WBM has never been laid out, 
surveyed (except as called for by Plaintiffs and accomplished by Rinlrock Consultants in July 
2006 and as amended by Rimrock Consultants in May 2007), and/or recorded by Defendants. 
7) Defendants have not in all matters relevant afforded Plaintiffs in any form or manner 
nor do they contend that they have in any manner attempted to provide Plaintiffs with due 
process, notice of their intended actions, an evidentiary hearing on any matter relevant and have 
furthermore denied and/or not allowed Plaintiffs reasonable access to any hearing, evidentiary 
hearing or due process on any matter relevant. 
8) Defendants have made alterations to Camps Canyon Road in SENE Sectioi~ 15 T39N 
R3 WBh4 which include: 
(a) In 1996, in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel, the straightening of curves, the 
relocation of the centerline to the northeast in varying anlounts and at varying places, and the 
widening of the road surface and supporting structures; 
(b) 111 2006, in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel and on the northeast side of the 
road widening of the road by at least two feet; 
(c) From 2005 until present and as a continuing ~naintenance activity small 
amounts of widening, as gravel moves outward tou.ard the convexity of curves and do\vnhill-in 
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the present instance in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel to the northeast, "which serves to 
support the road but does result in minimal, necessary widening of the road over time is 
widening of the road and has had impacts on the width of the burden on the servient estate. 
(d) None of the amounts of widening due to any reason or no distances of 
movement of the centerline as a result of any widening and/or relocation of the centerline as a 
result of alterations in curves are or have ever been recorded in any agency record keeping. 
9) The only known recorded data to exist to cite any location of the centerline of Camps 
Canyon Road in SENE Section 15 T39N R3TxlBM, specifically in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre 
parcel prior to the aforementioned surveys is Plaintiffs' and/or the Wagners' deed description. 
10) The Wagners and the Plaintiffs have fee simple entitlement to the lands of the SENE 
Section 15 T39N R3 WBM in their attributable portions as described in their deeds. 
1 1) The NLCHD has an unrecorded prescriptive right of way across the SENE Section 
15 T39N R3 WBM acquired prior to 19 16, as circumstantially shown on Plaintiffs' deed and 
which may predate any such "previously existing" status as cited in Meservey as may be 
circuinstantially shown by the time period of homesteadiiig in tlie area. 
12) In all matters relevant and at all times relevant, Defendants have operated under the 
color of state law and in all matters of performance, whether discretionary or operational, as to 
be described as the official acts of tlie final policy makers, and/or as under the customs, official 
policies, or standard operating procedures of the NLCHD, and/or the approved acts/failures to 
act of any subordinate by the official policy makers of the NLCHD. 
13) The presence of Canips Canyon Road in the SENE Section 15 T39N R3 WBhl on the 
NLCHD's road map does iiot establish, without more, as in an evidentiary hearing, the section of 
Camps Canyon Road in the pertinent part, as a 50 foot-25 feet from centerline, or as a public 
highway, whether Plaintiffs choose to dispute Camps Canyon Road as a public highway or not. 
14) The first Wagner driveway access permit was issued early in the year of 2006, on or 
before March, 2006. 
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15) Defendant Payne did intentionally destroy the first Wagner Access permit. 
16) Defendants did intentionally alter, widen, straighten, and/or move the centerline of 
Camps Canyon Road in the SENE Section 15 T39N R3 WBM. 
17) The first Wagner access permit was issued for an access to Camps Canyon Road in 
the SENE Section 15 T39N R3 WBM wholly on Plaintiffs' land. 
18) Defendant Arneberg said that Camps Canyon Road in the pertinent part has never 
moved at the 3/2 1/07 meeting of the Comn~issioners of the NLCHD. 
19) Defendants have no material evidence in their agency records to support a 
conclusion or finding that the width of an unrecorded prescriptive right of way needs to be 50 
feet-25 feet from centerline wide, or in the present case that the width of Camps Canyon Road 
in the SENE Section 15 T39N R3WBM needs to be 50 feet-25 feet from centerline wide as a 
matter of maintenance. 
19) Defendants have nq material evidence in their agency records to support a 
conclusion or finding that the width of an unrecorded prescriptive right of way needs to be 50 
feet-25 feet fi-om centerline wide, or in the present case that the width of Camps Canyon Road 
in the SENE Section 15 T39N R3WBM needs to be 50 feet-25 feet from centerline wide as a 
matter of support for the road, 
20) Defendants have no material evidence in their agency records to support a conclusion 
or finding that the width of the unrecorded prescriptive right of way, Camps Canyon Road in the 
SENE Section 15 T39N R3WBM needs to be 50 feet-25 feet from centerliile wide as a matter 
of usage, that is, was ever used to the extent of 50 feet-25 feet from centerline. 
2 1) Defendants have no material evidence to support a conclusion or finding that the 
width of the easement of Camps Canyon Road in the SENE Section 15 T39N R3WBM, in the 
pertinent part, as presently claimed is within the width of the unrecorded prescriptive right of 
way as was originally acquired by use. 
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22) Defendants have no material evidence to support a conclusion or finding that the 
location of the easement of Camps Canyon Road in the SENE Section 15 T3 9N R3 WBM, in the 
pertinent part, as presently claimed is in the loction of the unrecorded prescriptive right of way as 
was originally acquired by use. 
23) Defendants have material evidence to support a conclusion or finding that the 
centerline of the easement of Camps Canyon Road in the SENE Section 15 T39N R3WBM, in 
the pertinent part, as presently claimed is in the same location of the unrecorded prescriptive 
right of way as was originally acquired by use. 
24) Defendants have no material evidence to support a conclusion or finding that the 
strip of land now occupied by the easement of Camps Canyon Road in the SENE Section 15 
T39N R3 WBM, in the pertinent part, as presently claimed is in the identical strip of land of the 
unrecorded prescriptive right of way as was originally acquired by use. 
VII. PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT ON ALL OF DEFENDANTS' 
DEFENSES AS A MATTER OF LAW OR, ALTERNATIVELY, THERE ARE GENUINE 
ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT THAT PRECLlJDE ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
FOR DEFENDANTS. Furthermore, PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT ON ALL 
OF DEFENDANTS' DEFENSES AS A MATTER OF LAW OR, ALTERNATIVELY, THERE 
ARE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT THAT PRECLUDE ENTRY OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFFS (see Plaintiffs' Motions For Plaintiffs Partial 
Summary Judgments And Other Motions Submitted January 26,2009 and specifically of 
Defendants liability under 42 U.S. C. 5 1983). 
Generally: 
Defendants have not set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial with 
the exception of damages as to be determined or that Defendants are entitled to judgment on 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion is 
conclusory, repetitive, generalized, speculative, confusing and disorganized. Further, 
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Defendants rely fundamentally on factual assertions that are not admissible in evidence, 
primarily because those assertions constitute hearsay or are made without personal knowledge 
and or are not relevant. Defendants' Summary Judgment Motions also ignore responding to 
complaints of Plaintiffs in great part, and briefing their own versions of Plaintiffs' con~plaints in 
this action, and Defendants have again pursued these defenses without supplementing this record 
with additional, admissible facts. Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion serves only to harass 
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of this litigation in violation of 
Rule 1 1 (a)(l)I.R.C.P. 
Moreover, Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion ultimately fails because Plaintiffs 
have shown through Plaintiffs' Answering Brief To Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment And Reply To Defendants' Answering Brief And Objections To Plaintiffs' Motions 
For Partial Summary Judgments And Other Motions Submitted January 26,2009 and Plaintiffs' 
Motions For Partial Summary Judgments And Other Motions Submitted January 26, 2009 filed 
herein that there are genuine issues as to the material facts of Defendants' defenses and that 
summary judgment is appropriate in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendants on all 
Defendants' defenses in this action. 
Alternatively, affidavits and record supplements submitted by Plaintiffs that are part of 
this record set forth specific facts wl~iclz, construed in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, at the 
very least clearly preclude a determination that Defendants are entitled to jud, ~ m e n t  as a matter 
of law as to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs, I~owever, urge the Court to 
determine that there are genuine issues as to any material facts in this action as so defended by 
Defendants and that Plaintiffs are entitled to prevail as to Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment as a matter of law and to enter summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs as the non- 
moving party in Defendants' motion. 
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Disputed Material Facts And Inadmissible Facts and Incorporation of Prior Affidavits and Briefs, 
in regards to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment: 
Specific facts admissible in evidence, from which the Court should determine that there 
are genuine issues as are enumerated in this Answering Brief and as well as in Plaintiffs' 
Motions For Partial Summary Judgments And Other Motions Submitted January 26, 2009, and 
as are contained in Ed Swanson's First Affidavit, Joe Yockey's First Affidavit, and Plaintiffs 
Affidavit In Support Of Plaintiffs' Answering Brief To Defendants' Motion For Summary 
Judgment filed concurrently herewith and the Plaintiffs' Reply To Defendants' Answering Brief 
To Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgments Filed September 19, October 6,  And 
October 21, 2008, Defendants Motion To Strike And Defendants' Motion For Attorney Fees, 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment/Adjudication Of The Issue Of The Cause Of Action Under 42 U.S.C. 5 1983, 
Plaintiffs' First Record Supplement In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary 
JudgmentiAdjudication Of The Issue Of The Cause Of Action Under 42 U.S.C. 5 1983, 
Plaintiffs' Affidavit In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment 
/Adjudication Of The Issue Of The Of The Nullification Of The Original Prescriptive Right Of 
Way And Subsequent Burden Of Proof Of Prescription, Plaintiffs' Affidavit In Support Of 
Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment /Adjudication Of The Issue Of The Cause Of 
Action Under 42 U.S.C. 5 1983, Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment /Adjudication 
Of The Issue Of The Nullification Of The Original Prescriptive Right Of Way And Subsequent 
Burden Of Proof Of Prescription And/or Validatinil Of A Legally Established Right Of Way, 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Sumnlary Judgment /Adjudication Of The Issue Of The Facial 
Validity Of The NLCHD's Standing Operating Procedure For Widening A Prescriptive Right- 
Of-Way, Plaintiffs Third Record Supplement, Fourth Record Supplement, Plaintiffs' Affidavit In 
Support Of Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary Judgments And Other Motions Submitted 
January 26, 2009, Plaintiffs Motion For Declaratory Judgment Under I.C. 5 40-203a, Plaintiffs 
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Motion For Declaratory Judgment Under I.C. 5 67-8003(3), Plaintiffs Motion For 
Reconsideration of Declaratory Judgment Under I.C. 5 40-203a and Under I.C. 5 67-8003(3) all 
of which were previously filed herein and all of which are incorporated herein by this reference 
not only for purposes of the factual record but, as appropriate, also for the legal analysis of issues 
addressed in this Plaintiffs' Answering Brief and Reply To Defendants Answering Brief. A 
concise statement of dispute, admissible material facts at genuine issue is set forth starting on 
page 56 above of this Plaintiffs' Answering Brief To Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment And Reply To Defendants Answering Brief And Objections To Plaintiffs' Motions For 
Partial Judgments And Other Motions Submitted January 26,2009. 
Admissible Facts and Incorporation of Prior Affidavits and Briefs, in regards to Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment: 
Specific facts admissible in evidence, from which the Court should determine that there 
are no genuine issues of material fact as petitioned for in this Answering Brief And Reply To 
Defendants Answering Brief and as well as in Plaintiffs' Motions For Partial Summary 
Judgments And Other Motions Submitted January 26,2009, as are contained in Ed Swanson's 
First Affidavit, Joe Yocltey's First Affidavit, and Plaintiffs Affidavit In Support Of Plaintiffs' 
Answering Brief To Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment filed concurrently herewith 
and the Plaintiffs' Reply To Defendants' Ans~vering Brief To Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgments Filed September 19, October 6, And October 21, 2008, Defendants ihlotion 
To Strike And Defendants' Motion For Attorney Fees, Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Support Of 
Plaintiffs' LMotion for Partial Summary JudgmentIAdjudication Of The Issue Of The Cause Of 
Action Under 42 U.S.C. $ 1983, Plaintiffs' First Record Suppleinent In Support Of Plaintiffs' 
Motions for Partial Summary Judgment/Adjudication Of The Issue Of The Cause Of Action 
Under 42 U.S.C. $ 1983, Plaintiffs' Affidavit In Support Of Plaintiffs9 Motions for Partial 
Summary Judgment /Adjudication Of The Issue Of The Of The Nullification Of The Original 
PLAINTIFFS' ANSWERING BRIEF TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMIMARY 
JUDGMENT AND REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' ANSWERhTG BRIEF AND OBJECTIONS 
TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS AND OTHER 
MOTIONS SUBMITTED JANUARY 26,2009 
6 9 1326 
Prescriptive Right Of Way And Subsequent Burden Of Proof Of Prescription, Plaintiffs' 
Affidavit In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment /Adjudication Of The 
Issue Of The Cause Of Action Under 42 U.S.C. 5 1983, Plaintiffs' h'lotion For Partial Summary 
Judgment /Adjudication Of The Issue Of The Nullification Of The Original Prescriptive Right 
Of Way And Subsequent Burden Of Proof Of Prescription And/or Validation Of A Legally 
Established Right Of Way, Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment /Adjudication Of 
The Issue Of The Facial Validity Of The NLCHD's Standing Operating Procedure For Widening 
A Prescriptive Right-Of-Way, Plaintiffs Third Record Supplement, Fourth Record Supplement, 
Plaintiffs' Affidavit In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary Judgments And Other 
Motions Submitted January 26,2009, Plaintiffs Motion For Declaratory Judgment Under I.C. 5 
40-203a, Plailitiffs Motion For Declaratory Judgment Under I.C. § 67-8003(3), Plaintiffs Motion 
For Recolisideration of Declaratory Judgment Under I.C. 5 40-203a and Under I.C. 5 67-8003(3) 
all of which were previously filed herein and all of which are incorporated herein by this 
reference not only for purposes of the factual record but, as appropriate, also for the legal 
analysis of issues addressed in this Plaintiffs' Answering Brief and Reply To Defendants 
Answering Brief. A concise statenlent of undisputed, admissible material facts at genuine issue 
is set forth starting on page 57 above of this Plaintiffs' Answering Brief To Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment And Reply To Defendants Ansxverilzg Brief And Objections To 
Plaintiffs' Motions For Partial Judgments And Other Motions Submitted January 26, 2009. 
VITI Standard for Surnmarv Judgment 
"Judgment shall be granted to the illoving party if the nonmoving party fails to make a 
showing sufficient to establish an essential element to the party's case." J\fcColun-Trilska v. 
Baker, 139 Idaho 948,950-5 1,88 P.3d 767, 769-70 (2004). 
"The requirement found in Idaho caselaw that a party moving for summary judgment 
'present evidence7 is not a requirement that the party 'present specific facts' as Foster implies. 
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'Evidence' and 'facts' are related but nonetheless different concepts. As a result, the summary 
judgment process imposes different requirements on a movant than those faced by the adverse 
party. Although the party moving for summary judgment must establish through 'evidence' the 
absence of any genuine issue of material fact, there is no requirement the movant present specific 
facts. 'See Srnith [v. Meridian Joint Scli. Dist. No. 21, 128 Idaho at 719, 918 P.2d at 588. Once the 
movant has made and appropriately supported its motion, it is the responsibility of the adverse 
party to come forward with evidence, id., and to 'set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial' I.R.C.P. 56(e)." Foster v. Traul, 141 Idaho 890, 120 P.3d 278 (2005). 
(Emphasis added.) 
IX. Analysis of Defendants Defenses and Plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. Cause of Action 
I11 regards to Plaintiffs' 5 1983 Claim, Defendants bring forth no new defenses and 
reference Defendants' Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summaiy Judgment pp. 12-26 
as set forth in full. 
Plaintiffs have responded to Defendants' Motion and will here recapitulate the elements 
of 5 1983: 
Plaintiffs have alleged Defendants have physically invaded and continue to occupy their 
land and have permitted third parties to invade and occupy Plaintiffs' land in the SENE Section 
15 T39N R3WBM in matters of the easement of Camps Canyon Road traversing their land from 
the late fall of 2005 and up and through the present resulting in irreparable harm and threatening 
imminent future irreparable harm. Plaintiffs claim Defendants are in wrongful possession of 
Plaintiffs land and that Defendants have iinproperly interfered with Plaintiffs' property rights and 
have violated Plaintiffs' liberty rights by arbitrarily and capriciously denying Plaintiffs 
procedural due process and equal protectioil of the law and other statutory safeguards and 
remedies for their erroneous deprivations of Plaintiffs property. In any and all matters 
Defendants have denied Plaintiffs notice and hearing when practicable, predictable, and feasible. 
In any and all matters Defendants have denied Plaintiffs evidentiary hearing when practicable, 
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predictable, and feasible and sought and requested by Plaintiffs. In any and all matters 
Defendants have denied Plaintiffs exhaustion of statutory agency relnedies for the erroneous 
deprivations. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants are the proximate, direct, legal, and substantial 
causes of the invasions of their land and the irreparable harm as thus resulted. 
The matters here are not contested by Defendants; 
1) At all times relevant, Defendants have actedlfailed to act under the color of state law 
(see Lugar v. Edmo~~dson Oil Company, 457 U.S. 922,937 (1 982); 
2) Local governments and individuals, Defendants are persons and subject to suit for 
damages, declaratory, andlor injunctive relief and prospective relief (see City of Oklahoma City 
v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985); see also Kentucky 1,. G~aiiai~z, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). 
3) Defendants liability attaches for actions1 failures to act under agency's 
policies/customs, approval of actionslfailures to act by final policy makers [see Mor?ell v. 
Department ofsocial Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); see also Gillette v. Llelnzore, 979 F.2d 
1342, 1346 (9"' Cis. 1992) (per curiam), cei-t. denied, 114 S.Crt. 1345 (1993) (Municipal liability 
may be established in one of three ways). 
4) Defendants liability attaches for actions1 failures to act when agency fails to train its 
employees and the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to an obvious need for such 
training, and the failure to train will likely result in the enlployee making the wrong decision (see 
City of Canton v. Hu~ris,  389 U.S. 378 (1989). 
5) Defendants liability attaches for policies, customs, standard operating procedures of 
broad authority not circunlscribed by statutory safeguards and remedies for erroneous remedies 
(see Zinernzo12 v. Bur-ch 494 U. S. 1 13 starting at 124; see also Zirnn.zerman v. City of' Oakland, 
255 F.3d 734, (9"' Circuit, 2001); see also L o g ~ n  v. Zimmem?an B a s h  Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435- 
436 (1983) (availability of postdeprivation remedy is inadequate when deprivation is foreseeable, 
predeprivation process was possible, and official conduct was not "unauthorized"). 
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6) Plaintiffs' legitimate claim to entitlement, constitutionally protected property interest 
rests in their deed to the lands of the SENE Section 15 T39N R3 WBM including lands 
underlying Camps Canyon Road save for the 311- acre parcel. 
7) Defendants rest their defense on their policies for improving public highways is 
based on Idaho Code 540-23 12 (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplenzent, Item No. 20, at 8-9) 
("The District's policy for improving public highways under its jurisdiction is based on Idaho 
Code 540-23 12 and the holdings of Adeservey and its progeny. The District is well within its 
legal rights to widen a road without holding a public hearing when that activity occurs within the 
area of the District's public right-of-way. Plaintiffs fail to accept or understand that the District 
is empowered under law to improve and even widen public highways so long as it does not 
exceed, under usual circumstances, the lawful 5- foot width of that highway ")). Defendants also 
claim that all prescriptive rights of way are mandated to be 50 feet-25 feet from centerline by 
Idaho Code fj 40-23 12 (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 18, at 3-4, Requests 
for Admissions Nos. 4,5, and 6). Defendants defenses rest entirely on their interpretation of 
Idaho Code 540-23 12 and the holdings of hfeservey and its progeny citing their authority for a 
mandated 50 foot-25 feet from centerline right of way and denial of evidentiary hearings-due 
process. Defendants' exertions of their goverme~~ta l  powers are in excess of their statutory 
authority. 
8) In regards to Defendants' policy to improve and to maintain public highways as it is 
applied to Plaiiltiffs andlor Plaintiffs' situation is invalid as Canlps Canyon road in SENE 
Section 15 T39 N R3 WBM is claimed to be a prescriptive right of way. As a matter of law 
Defendants have exceeded their authority by mandating a 50 foot-25 feet from centerline right 
of way and thsy have subverted the legislature's intentions by denying Plaintiffs an evidentiary 
hearing. There are no disputed facts in this issue as Defendants say the law says that they do not 
have to provide an evidentiary hearing. Defendants do not have substantial evidence in the 
agency record andlor Defendants were in excess of the authority of statutes andlor had failed 
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follow the provisions of the statutes as the legislature had intended to deny Plaintiffs due process 
and/or equal protection of the law prior to widening Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part. 
Defendants do not have substantial evidence in the agency record and/or Defendants are in 
excess of the authority of statutes to deny Plaintiffs due process when on 4/12/06 Plaintiffs 
complained to Defendants that they did not have a 50 foot-25 feet from centerline right of way to 
widen Camps Canyon Road, in the pertinent part. Defendants actions/failures to act, conclusions 
and findings were arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal. 
9) Defendants did not have substantial evidence in the agency record and/or Defendants 
were in excess of the authority of statutes and/or had failed follow the provisions of the statutes 
as the legislature had intended to deny Plaintiffs due process andlor equal protection of the law 
when on 4/12/06 Plaintiffs conlplained that Defendants had issued the first Wagner driveway 
access permit for an access wholly on Plaintiffs' land and/or to continue the permit and/or to not 
revoke the permit and/or to not call for a survey and/or to not require the Wagners to call for a 
survey andlor when Plaintiffs said they u-ould call for a survey, where a survey would be in 
accordance with the United States manual of surveying instructions. Defendants actions/failures 
to act, conclusions and findings were arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' 
discretion, and/or illegal. 
10) Defendants did not have substantial evidence in the agency record and/or 
Defendants were in excess of the authority of statutes and/or had failed follow the provisions of 
the statutes as the legislature had intended to deny Plaintiffs due process and/or equal protection 
of the law when on 3/21/07 Plaintiffs complained that Defendants had issued the first Wagner 
driveway access permit for an access wholly on Plaintiffs' land and Defendants had failed to 
revoked said permit and had denied it was not within their authority to issue, continue, and/or not 
revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit andlor permit anyone access to Camps Canyon 
Road across Plaintiffs land and/or to add additional width to the road, change the drainage, 
and/or injure Plaintiffs' fence whether the pushing of dirt and gravel into Plaintiffs' buffer and 
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onto Plaintiffs fence was in retaliation for Plaintiffs being correct in the positioiling on the east 
property line of the 31-1- acre parcel, andlor a matter of widening of and/or a matter of 
maintenance and/or a matter of improving Camps Canyon Road. Defendants actions/failures to 
act, conclusions and findings were arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, 
and/or illegal. 
11) Defendants did not have substantial evidence in the agency record and/or 
Defendants were in excess of the authority of statutes and/or had failed follow the provisions of 
the statutes as the legislature had intended to deny Plaintiffs due process and/or equal protection 
of the law when on 312 1/07 Plaintiffs complained that the validity of the Camps Canyon right of 
way was in doubt whether as a matter of the legal establishment of Calnps Canyon Road as a 
public right of way and/or as a 50 foot-25 feet from centerline prescriptive right of way and 
Defendants had issued the first Wagner driveway access permit for an access wholly on Plaintiffs 
land and the Rimrock survey, as performed in accordance with the United States manual had 
shown the intersections of the east and west property lines of the 3+/- acre parcel with Camps 
Canyon Road were not in accordance wit11 the public record of Plaintiffs' deed description and 
the Defendants had made numerous alterations to Canips Canyon Road, including 1996,2005, 
2006, as well as multiple extensions of width as a result of Defendants policies of widening a 
prescriptive right of wajr ;md!or maintenance and/or i~nprovement of a prescriptive right of way 
by denying Plaintiffs a hearing andor by not initiating validation proceedings of Camps Canyon 
Road under their own resolution in accordance with I.C. § 40-203a. Defendants actionsifailures 
to act, conclusions and findings were arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' 
discretion, and/or illegal. 
12) Defendants did not have substantial evidence in the agency record andlor Defendants 
were in excess of the authority of statutes andlor had failed follow the provisions of the statutes 
as the jegislature had intended to deny Plaintiffs due process and/or equal protection of the law 
when in July of 2007, Plaintiffs had hired a lawyer and obtained and agreed on an informal 
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meeting with Defendants and Ed Swanson to determine the width of the easement 011 site of 
Camps Canyon Road and Defendants abdicated their duty to a written response to Plaintiffs of 
their reasoned findings and coisclusions whatever those findings and conclusio~ss may have been, 
Defendants actions/failures to act, conclusions and findings were arbitrary and capricious, an 
abuse of Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal. 
13) Defendants did not have substantial evidence in the agency record and/or Defendants 
were in excess of the authority of statutes and/or had failed follow the provisions of the statutes 
as the legislature bad intended to deny Plaintiffs due process andlor equal protection of the law 
when Plaintiffs filed Requests For Regulatory Takings Analysis for actions which Defendants 
had already accomplished and adversely affected Plaintiffs property rights as alleged per se 
takings and Defendants did not respond. Defendants actions/failures to act, conclusions and 
findings were arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal. 
14) Defendants did not have substantial evidence in the agency record and/or Defendants 
were in excess of the authority of statutes andor had failed follow the provisions of the statutes 
as the legislature had intended to deny Plaintiffs due process and/or equal protection of the law 
when Plaintiffs requested to speak with Defendants' counsel directly at the 8/8/07 nseeting and 
Defendants denied Plaintiffs' request unless Plaintiffs got a lawyer andor denied Plai~stiffs right 
to represent themselves. Defendants actions/failures to act, conclusions and findings were 
arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, and/or illegal. 
15) Defendants did not have substantial evidence in the agency record and/or 
Defendants were in excess of the authority of statutes and/or had failed follow the provisions of 
the statutes as the legislature had intended to deny Plaintiffs due process and/or equal protection 
of the law when Plaintiffs attended the 9/12/07 meeting and after having obtained time on the 
agenda to present Plaintiffs' analysis of the Defendants' aerial photos and were expecting to 
receive Defendants' decision on Plaiistiffs proposal for settlement of Plaintiffs' clain~s as 
requested by NLCHD clerk at the 8/8/07 meeting and Defendants deny Plaintiffs the opportunity 
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to present their evidence of their analysis of the aerial photos and Defendants did not respond to 
Plaintiffs' settlement proposal and Plaintiffs were denied the opportunity to represent themselves 
and were told to get a lawyer if they did not submit a $750 fee and an application for validation. 
Defendants actions/failures to act, conclusions and findings were arbitrary and capricious, an 
abuse of Defendants' discretion, andlor illegal. 
16) There are no genuine issues of fact in these matters as Plaintiffs have shown that no 
due process and/or equal treatment of the law was afforded to Plaintiffs and/or no evidentiary 
hearings have been held in regards to Canps Canyon Road in section 15 of T39N R3 WBM and 
Defendants have admitted that no hearings have been before the board on these matters and that 
no final decisions have been made notwithstanding Plaintiffs allegations that such hearings 
should have been afforded Plaintiffs and/or such final decisions were made as Defendants had 
acted and/or failed to act arbitrarily and capriciously, abused their discretion in these matters, 
and/or had acted and/or failed to act illegally in these matters. 
17) Plaintiffs have alleged that Plaintiffs land has been wronghlly invaded and occupied 
by Defendants actions/failures to act and that Defendants had acted and/or failed to act arbitrarily 
and capriciously, abused their discretion in these matters, and/or had acted and/or failed to act 
illegally in these matters. Defendants have brought forth no specific admissible evidence to show 
that they had not acted and/or failed to act arbitrarily and capriciously, abused their discretion in 
these matters, and/or had acted and/or failed to act illegally in these matters in denying Plaintiffs 
due process and/or equal treatment of the law in any and all plausible, colorable clainls of 
improper interference with Plaintiffs property rights and the 'ini-rongful per se taking of Plaintiffs' 
land. 
18) The Rimrock survey has shown the first Wagner driveway access to Camps Canyon 
Road to be ~vholly on Plaintiffs land and Defendants bring forth no specific, admissible evidence 
to rebut this. Plaintiffs have alleged that Plaintiffs land has been wrongfully invaded and that 
Defendants actions/failures to act have permitted third parties to wrongfully invade and occupy 
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Plaintiffs' land and/or that Defendants have taken Plaintiffs land for not a public use and that 
Defendants had acted and/or failed to act arbitrarily and capriciously, abused their discretion in 
these matters, and/or had acted and/or failed to act illegally in these matters. 
19) As there are no genuine issues of material and admissible fact in these matters of 
factual andlor plausible wrongful possessions of Plaintiffs' land by Defendants and/or third 
parties and in that Defendants did not have substantial evidence in the agency record and/or 
Defendants were in excess of the authority of statutes and/or had failed follow the provisions of 
the statutes as the legislature had intended to deny Plaintiffs due process and/or equal protection 
and that Defendants actionslfailures to act, conclusions and findings were arbitrary and 
capricious, an abuse of Defendants' discretion, andlor illegal and were a matter of agency policy, 
custom, and/or standard operating procedure, andlor official acts andlor approval of 
subordinates' actions/failures to act by the final policy makers of the agency and that there are no 
genuine issues of admissible material facts that these actions and/or failures to act were not 
"unauthorized" and that Defendants have not shown a relation to public health, safety, morals, 
and/or general welfare to burden Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' land with additional andlor new 
envelopnlents of more and/or new land and that Defendants are prol~ibited from regulating 
Plaintiffs' land as a nuisance and that Plaintiffs' use of their land is not unsafe, iinmoral, 
unhealthful and/or results in any diminution of the public's general welfare and that all matters in 
the issue of liability under 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 are matters of law and not issues of fact, Plaintiffs 
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law (see Fzkentes v. Shevin, 407 US.  67, 92 S. Cf.  1983, 32 
L.Ed 2d 356 (7972) (chattels protected by 14~" Amendment even though possession is disputed); 
see A V c C ~ I l ~ ~ J ?  v Glasgow, 620 F.2d 47 (5'" Cir. 1980) (Due Process required before road is 
built over disputed land); see Carey v. Piphzis, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1012,55 L.Ed.2d 252 
(1978) "(e) Because the right to procedural due process is "absolute" in the sense that it does not 
depend upon the merits of a claimant's substantive assertions, and because of the importance to 
organized society that procedural due process be observed, the denial of procedural due process 
PLAINTIFFS' ANSTVERmG BRIEF TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' ANSWERING BRIEF AND OBJECTIONS 
TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS ,4ND OTHER 
MOTIONS SUBh4ITTED JANUARY 26,2069 
7 8 1337 
should be actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury, and therefore if it is 
determined that the suspensions of the students in this case were justified, they nevertheless will 
be entitled to recover nominal damages"); see also Evers v. The County ofcaster, 745 F 2d 1196 
(19861, (quoting Owen, 445 U.S. at 650-52, 100 S. Ct. at 1415-16 (1979) "The knowledge that a 
municipality will be liable for all of its injurious conduct, whether committed in good faith or 
not, should create an incentive for officials who may harbor doubts about lawfulness of their 
intended actions to err on the side of protecting citizens' constitutional rights. Furthermore, the 
threat that damages might be levied against the city might encourage those in a policy-making 
position to institute internal rules and programs designed to mininlize the likelihood of 
unintentional infringements of constitutional rights"); see k i t e d  States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 
U.S. 114 (1 95 1) (Government's seizure and operation of a coal mine to prevent a national strike 
of coal miners effected a taking); see Puvnyelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 US .  (13 JYallj 166, 177-78 
(1872); see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhatfen CATV Carp., 458 US.  419, 102 S. Ct. 31 64 
(1982); see U. S. v. Dickiuzson, 331 US. 745 (1947) ("When dealing with a problem which arises 
under such diverse circumstances procedural rigidities should be avoided. All that we are here 
holding is that when the Government chooses not to condemn land but to bring about a taking by 
a co~ltinui~lg process of physical events, the owner is not required to resort either to pieceslleal or 
to premature litigation to ascertain the just compensation for what is really 'taken'. . . When the 
governmental acts/omissions deny the landowner the fundamental rights of owslership-the right 
to possess, right to exclude others, andlor the right to dispose of all or a portion of the property- 
these are 'takings"'); see Kaiser Aetna v. CTnited States, 444 US.  164, 179-80, 100 S. Ct. 383, 
392-93, 62 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979). (a property owner's right to exclude others is "universally held 
to be a fundamental element of the property right"); see Lingle v. Chevron US.  A. Inc., (04-163) 
544 U.S. 528 (2005) 363 F.3d 846, ("Conversely, if a govern~nent action is found to be 
impermissible--for instance because it fails to meet the 'public use' requirement or is so arbitrary 
as to violate due process--that is the end of the inquiry. No amount of compensation can 
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authorize such action"); see Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. CiQ ofsun F'alley, 506 F.3 d 85 1, 855-56 
(9th Cir. 2007); see Harris v. County of Riverside, 904 F.2d 497 (1990); see also Ware v. Idalzo 
State Tax Comm 'n, 98 Idaho 477, at 483 (1977); (see Aztec Ltd, Inc. v. Creekside Investment 
Co., 100 Idaho 566, 569,602 P.2d 64,67 (1979)' ("An increase in width does more than merely 
increase the burden upon the servient estate; it has the effect of enveloping additional land."). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants have no rational basis for issuing the first Wagner driveway access permit 
and not revoking it when they were given fair warning that it mias located wholly on Plaintiffs 
property. The only reasonable solution to the problem was a professional survey. Defendants' 
decision to not get a suwey on their own resolution was arbitrary for both sides of the road. 
Defendants' decision to require the Wagners to get a survey professionally done was arbitrary 
Defendants' decision to not get a survey on their own resolution was arbitrary for both sides of 
the road. Defendants' decision to not get a survey on their own resolution was arbitrary for both 
sides of t l ~ e  road. Defendants' actions/failures to act in continuing/not revoking the permit when 
Plaintiffs said they would get a survey were arbitrary. The only legal evidence Defendants have 
to support their issuance of the perniit is the Riinrock survey which shorn-s the first Wagner 
driveway access to be ~vholly on Plaintiffs' land. No reasonable person would debate that the 
shortest distance between two points-the west property line of the 31-1- acre parcel intersection 
with Cainps Canyon Road and the east property line of the 3+/- acre parcel intersection with 
Camps Canyon Road-is not a straight line. It would be iiltuitively obvious that if Defendants 
have admitted to straightening curves and altering the centerline of Camps Canyon Road that the 
distance ~niould be shorter than previously calculated and/or that the previous calculation ivould 
not be reliable. Furthermore, when "Dan Payne said to Mr. Wagner, to the effect of LCl~eclc it. If 
you are within any public prescriptive right-of-way, your driveway access permit is okay'", he 
misleads Mr. Wagner; however, with regards to Plaintiffs he has "taken" their land and in effect 
given it to the Wagners as he has said to Mr. Wagner you may ignore the east property line and 
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parellthetically I and Mr. Arneberg do not then have to confess that it was the NLCHD which 
destroyed the historical driveway access and left an 8 foot embankment in its place instead. 
Whether Mr. Wagner wants to pursue Mr. Landeck's theories under the ITCA is up to Mr. 
Wagner. Plaintiffs are here under 5 1983, as it is Plaintiffs' land and property rights Mr. Payne 
has improperly interfered with. The Defendants were as final policy makers given a choice on 
4112106 and with deliberate indifference to the erroneous deprivation did not withdrawlrevoke 
the permit, refused to get a survey to provide a rational basis for their decision? and refused to 
require the Wagners to get a survey to provide a rational basis for their decision to coiltinue the 
permit. DefendantsICommissioners as fiilal policy makers approved the actions of Mr. Payile on 
both sides of the road and all ~natters relevant are inatters of policy of the NLCHD. Furthermore, 
Defendants acted arbitrarily and capriciously, abused their discretion, andlor acted illegally when 
they continuedlfailed to revoke the permit when Plaiiltiffs said that they would call for a sun7ey, 
as Defendants only increased their risk for liability. They could have at no expense to 
themselves and at no risk of liability to the Wagners have said that they would withdraw the 
perinit until after the survey is conlpleted, as no reasonable person would quarrel with a decision 
by the Defendants to re~naiii neutral until some data comes in. However this would not be in line 
with whatever the Defendants inteiltions inay be. Did they want to avoid adnlission that the may 
have improperly moved Camps Canyon Road? Did they siniply want to make sure that the 
Wagners got their driveway? Did they simply \?-ant to burden the Plaintiffs with the expense of 
the survey and/or the providing of the land for the Wagners first driveway access? There is no 
rational basis for a legitimate governmental interest in any of these questions as there is in not for 
public use. Defendants' actslfailures to act, collclusiolls and findings are arbitrary and 
capricious, an abuse of the Defendants' discretion, andlor illegal. 
The Rimrock survey shows that the 31-1- acre parcel has nloved to the north, that the road 
frontage and acreage have been reduced, that the first Wagner driveway access permit was 
issued: was continued and has failed to have been revoked for an access wholly on Plaintiffs' 
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admissible, material evidence to support their rebutted testimony that there is a debatable issue of 
the legal establishment of the Camps Canyon Road right of way, that the location of the Camps 
Canyon Road right of way does not agree with the public record of the Plaintiffs' and/or the 
M'agners' deeds, or that the Defendants, after numerous alterations are unsure as to the accurate 
location of the Camps Canyon Road right of way. The Wagners' surveys as well as Mr. Payne's 
survey are not professionally done surveys and the road frontage distance Mr. Payne measured 
and the width of the right of way he established are not supported by a professionally done 
survey. However it is, that they may be sure of the correct location and simply may want to 
prepare false testimony (see Plaintiffs ' Third Record Supplemenl, Item No. 5, at 3 ('Orland 
Arneberg said he's lived out there his whole life and can testify that the road hasn't moved), is a 
matter for the crinlinal courts, the tabloids and/or the tv or newspaper stories. The intentions and 
mental states of the Defendants may have some issue in the final judgment of punitive damages 
but the liability of the Defendants individuaIly is of a reasonable standard. Defendants have not 
sought any qualified im~llunity. I~nmunity under ITCA is for those who act in good faith and 
simply may have erred. Defendants were given several chances to act reasonably. 
Summary judgment belongs to Plaintiffs as it is the Defendants' arbitrary and capricious 
exertion of their governmental powers, the abuse of their discretion and/or their illegal actions 
and/or failures to act which have caused Plaintiffs harm; Defendants failures to provided due 
process and equal protection when it is feasible to do so and when the actions/failures to act are 
"not unautlzorized and when it is at that rnome~lt in time when Defendants need a rational basis 
for what they do. There are no exigent circumstances. These are inte~ztional denials. 
Defendants' findings and coilclusions are arbitrary and capricious as there is not substantial 
evidence in the record to support their claims and all evidence in the record runs contrary to 
Defendants conclusions and findings (a claim of an unrecorded prescriptive right of way is a self 
admission of no substantial evidence in the record to support findings and conclusions); 
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Defendants deprivation of Plaintiffs' constitutionally protected property and/or liberty rights and 
land without due process and equal protection andlor rational basis for a legitimate governmental 
interest; and only the issues of 
In District of Cotunzbia v. Robinson, 180 U.S. 92 at 108 (1901), 21 S. Ct. 283 ("It was 
an easement in the land, not the fee to the land, which the public acquired by the road, and the 
measure of the easement was the width of the road"), the debate was over the facts of the case 
whether the Defendants could locate or even show they had intended to survey the road. The 
question here is whether or not a factual debate is required and not whether two reasonable 
people may differ on what the width of the easement might be. The width of the easement 
equals the width of the road is the inference from both Robinson and Meservey as both consider 
the width of the easement or the width of the road as a rebuttable presumption. Fifty feet is a 
starting point at the outer extremity, unless there is a fence then the fence is the outennost 
starting point. One may equally logically start at the narro~vest staring point-the beaten used 
path of travel and precede outu~ards, as many states do. The Defendants in this case want 
nothing to do with either perspective-no rebuttable presuinption at all. 
Camps Canyon Road may be maintained in its physical attributes of location and width as 
a presumption and must remain so unchanged for at least a period of five years of use and 
maintenance to be so legally established; but when the status quo is interrupted, as it has been 
here on several occasions, there must be authority for this interruption as the interruption denies 
its unrecorded establishment. Not being arbitrary and capricious=evidentiary record which is 
antithetical to unrecorded. Defendants would lose their absolute power if they should have to 
inquire of any, save for their relatives, business partners, and/or friends (heaven forbid if they 
should have to ask the Public what they might want) what should be done with Camps Canyon 
Road. The prerequisite for two reasonable persons to disagree is that they both be reasonable. 
We have yet to arrive at that point. 
PLAINTIFFS' ANSWERING BRIEF TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' ANSWERING BRIEF AND OBJECTIONS 
TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTS AND OTHER 
MOTIONS SUBMITTED JANUARY 26,2009 
83 
Defendants thesis "This Brief will show that the District has, at all times relevant to 
this action, properly dischar,ged its statutory responsibilities to improve and maintain the public 
h iaway  known as Camps Canyon." 
Plaintiffs' Third Record Supplement, Item No. 20, at 8 "The District is well within its 
legal rights to widen a road without holding a public hearing when that activity occurs within the 
area of the District's public right-of-way. Plaintiffs fail to accept or understand that the District 
is enlpowered under law to improve and even widen public highways so long as it does not 
exceed, under usual circumstances, the lawful 50 foot width of that highway." 
Between "the width", road and/or easement, and "to improve" and "to maintain" if in any 
way, shape or form the infinitives imply the envelopment of more land lies a rebuttable 
presumption. 
Defendants' Brief, at 16 "The minimum width of public highways established by user in 
Idaho has been 50 feet since 1887." 
Meservey holds, "...and must be determined by the facts and circumstances peculiar 
to the case, and is presumed to be 50 feet in width, unless the facts and circumstances of the 
case clearly indicate that the owner, over whose land the road runs, has limited the width of 
said road to less than 50 feet prior to the time the road became a highway by user." Is this 
simply a Parratt "unauthorized" action, to stop at a comma in a reference and leave out the 
determining factors; son~ething lawyers learn in law school to purposely obfuscate the issues. 
Clearly, Meservey calls for a rebuttable presumption and factual determination. There is nothing 
in I. C.3 40-23 12 or iweservey to mandate a width of 50 feet, although it may be as wide as 
required. How it gets to the desired width is another story and a taking can be as small as a cable 
t.v. box (see Lorefto). 
Defendants' Counsel spends a good deal of time trying to explain what it is that Plaintiffs 
have argued, rather than to listen to what the Plaintiffs have complained of. Defendants have 
exceeded their authority declaring that the minimum width of an unrecorded prescriptive right of 
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way is mandated by Idaho law to be 50 feet (see Defendants' Brief, at 18). Plaintiffs have been 
denied an opportunity for a meaningful response at a meaningful time to address the adverse 
effects and improper interference Defendants actions have had and are continuing to have on 
Plaintiffs land and property and liberty rights. "Specifically, the determination of the width of 
the right of way of Camps Canyon Road must be addressed" (Opinion, at 9). Plaintiffs agree 
with the Court's holding, I~owever, there is the matter not considered which is "at a meaningful 
time". A meaningful time is not after the fact, at a time when the Defendants have already 
destroyed the evidence for the factual determination. A predeprivation hearing is usually 
required and a post deprivational hearing is inadequate if the actiodfailure to act is "not 
unauthorized" and is predictable and foreseeable (see Zinermon). There are no exigent 
circumstances nor are any of Defendants' legal theories of any merit. Defendant can not operate 
under I.C.5 40-23 12. They can scream and holler and pontificate all they want about the width 
of the right of way but when it comes to disturbing the status quo and putting the shovel to 
Plaintiffs land they are first prohibited from the taking of Plaintiffs land without due process and 
without a survey and an accurate description of the lands required (see 1.C.s 40-605 and I.C.5 
40-1 3 10) as without both their actions and/or failures to act would be arbitrary and capricious, an 
abuse of the Defendants' discretion and/or illegal. Defendants' discretion, whether they abuse it 
or not, does not allow them to break the law (see Czaplicki v. Gooding Joint School District No. 
231, 116 Idaho 326, 775 P.2d 640 ("[D]iscretionary function does not shield negligent 
implementation of statutes.. . "). 
'Ixiithout the survey and the description Defendants are left ~ ~ i t h o u t  substantial evidence 
in their record for their findings and conclusiolls and even if the centerline was only moved two 
feet to the northeast or the width was extended to the northeast the outskirts of the new claim of 
25 feet from centerline envelopes more land (see Aztec Ltd., Inc. v. Creekside I~westment Co., 
100 Idaho 566, 569,602 P.2d 64, 67 (1979), ("An increase in width does more than merely 
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increase the burden upon the servient estate; it has the effect of enveloping additional land.") 
This is a per se taking no matter how small (see Loretta). 
"Each of our due process cases has recognized, either explicitly or implicitly, that 
because 'minimum [procedural] requirements [are] a matter of federal law, they are not 
diminished by the fact that the State may have specified its own procedures that it may deem 
adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse official action.' Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 
480,491-(1980). See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S., at 166-167 (POWELL, J., concurring in part); 
id., at 21 1 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Indeed, any other conclusion would allow the State to 
destroy at will virtually any state-created property interest. The Court has considered and 
rejected such an approach: 'While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest, . . . 
it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without 
appropriate procedural safeguards. . . . [Tlhe adequacy of statutory procedures for deprivation of 
a statutorily created property interest must be analyzed in constitutional terms.' Vitek 1,. Jones, 
445 U.S., at 490--49 1, n. 6, quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 41 6 U.S., at 167-(opinion concursing in 
part)." Logan v. Zimn7ermnn Brush Co., 455 U. S. 322, at 432 (1982). 
Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court's order for denying Defendants' Motion For 
Summary Judgment. 
Plaintiffs respectfully request tliis Court's order for granting Plaintiffs' Motion For 
Partial Suinmary Judgment for Defendants liability under 42 U.S.C. 8s  1983,188, et seq. with 
damages to be determined. 
On this 17"' Day of February, 2009 r', 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
Don Halvorson 
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County of Latah ) 
Don and Charlotte Halvorson depose and say: 
1. We are the plaintiffs named in the above case. 
2. On information and belief and Plaintiffs observations, the maintenance of Camps 
Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel from 1996 until 2005 amounted to 
an annual, sometimes biannual grading of the road. Plaintiffs and neighbors plowed 
the snow for most of these years. In the late fall grading of 2005. the NLCHD floated 
a small amount of gravel towards Plaintiffs' fence. This practice has persisted 
through the present. 
3. We first became aware of Defendants claim of prescription and/or to a claim of 50 
foot-25 feet from centerline right of way to the lands abutting to and underlying 
Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel in our fee simple title on 
411 2/06 at the regular meeting of the Cornn~issioners of the NLCWD. 
4. We first became aware of Defendants claim of prescriptive right to damage our fence, 
issue and not revoke the first Wagner driveway access permit, and to widen Camps 
Canyon Road in the late fall of 2005 on 4/12/06. 
5. MTe gave Defendants fair warning of our disagreement with their claims of 
prescription to our land and their claims of prescriptive right to damage our fence. to 
issue and not to revoke the first driveway access permit, and to ~viden Camps Canyon 
Road in the late fall of 2005 on 4/12/06. 
6. We continued from 1/12/06 to give Defendants fair warning of our fact,'s opinion's of 
f a d s  and interpretation of the application of law to our facts and opinionJs of facts 
and sought remedy and settlement with Defendants until they gave us the ultimatum 
of either paying $750 and file for petition to validate Camps Canyon Road or getting 
a lav\?ier in September of 2007. 
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7. Plaintiffs identify their recorded deed as a warranty deed recorded in Latah County as 
instr~iment $42441 1 dated 12'9i1996 as a fee simple and merchantable title for the 
real property, situated in the State of Idaho, County of Latah as described in said 
instrument, including that land which underlies Camps Canyon Road as described in 
said deed. 
8. In the fall of 1996, we were in the process of buying the farm which includes the 
SENE Section 15 T39N R3WBh4 from Ed and Gladys Swanson. During that time 
the NLCHD: on information and belief through foreman, Dan Payne, approached Ed 
Swanson about alterations they wanted to make to Camps Canyon Road in the 
vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel to improve the road for new houses built in the 
canyon. On information and belief the NLCHD wanted to cut down some old trees, 
straighten curves at the east and west ends of the 31-1- acre parcel, move the road bed 
to the northeast. and to skirt the rock outcropping. On information and belief. Ed 
Swanson gave Dan Payneitl~e NLCHD permission to make the changes. Ed Swanson 
told us about his dealings wirh Payne and we accepted the change in the road and 
confirmed Ed Suanson's permission. Prior to these alterations Calnps Canyon Road. 
in the vicinitj of the 3+/- acre parcel, was approximately 12 feet tvide, including 
ditches and supporting structures; there were two curves in the road at the east end of 
the 31,'- acre parcel. Traveling from southeast to northu~est he HanrisiHuff historic 
driveway left the road at the peak of the second curve creating a switchback (after the 
first curve the road was traveling almost due north-lea~ing the road the dri1,eu.a~ 
u.as headed almost due south) and thereby skirting the east propert) line of the 3+/- 
acre parcel. Northwest of the old driveway access the road passed over a rock 
outcropping, then headed slightly to the southtvest, into rhe woods where a logging 
road left the road at the peak of the curve and then the road switched back to the north 
and then again back to the south descending a steep decline in the road and crossing 
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the west property line of the 3%'-acre parcel at the peak of the second curve. The 
alterations of 1996 straightened the curves at both the east end and the west end of the 
3+/- acre parcel. On information and belief in the straightening of the curves at the 
east and at the west ends of the 3+/- acre parcel altered the geographical intersections 
of the east and west property lines with Camps Canyon Road to the north as the 
straightening moved the road bed to the northeast. The movement of the road bed to 
the northeast also resulted in the dropping of the road bed as the terrain slopes to the 
northeast and thus the northeast movement was downhill. The movement of the road 
varied from just a few feet to more than 50 feet depending on where it is measured 
and how it is measured. In its narrowest point of movement, the neu7 road bed laid 
northeast of the old trees: which were cut down and their stumps were excavated out, 
and the old fence line. After the 1996 alterations, there was an 8 foot embankment 
left where the historic driveway entered the road and since that time no one exited the 
Harris place from the old driveway from that point on (the Harris place was owned bq 
absentee owners-Martin Huff, et. al). On his last year of farming the Huff place, the 
renter, Larry Wansen, asked Plaintiffs if they could exit the Wuff Place through 
Plaintiffs' land to carry on their farming operations and finally remove their 
machinery as there uas  no driveway access left. Farming access from then on was 
gained from the south out of the old Doug and Edna Ke113 place as the new renters. + 
Ridgeview Farms took over the farming at about the same time as the alterations took 
place. In the spring of 1997. we rebuilt the fence leaving a buffer between the fence 
and the northeast of the road bed and supporting structures of 5 to 10 feet in the east 
end and the narsowest part of the buffer (a narrow strip of the road frontage abour 20 
feet long at the peak in the curve of the new road). The buffer was left to prevent 
damage to the fence from snow removal (ratio of space at edge of road to road 
surface: 24 foot road surface in a 50 foot right of way=23/50=.48; .48X15 foot road 
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surface=7.2 feet: there may have been a small area undersized (less than 5 feet). 
however this formula includes a variable of supporting structures which also store 
snow; in most of the length of the road the buffer exceeded 10 feet.) from the road 
and no gift was intended of the buffer for future widening of the road. For several 
years after the 1996 alterations. up until we moved the cows to a different wintering 
ground in the early 2000.s we shared snow plowing of the road with the neighbors 
and had no problems with the storage of snow. 
3. The first time I, Don Halvorson, talked with Bob Wagner about his proposed plans 
for a driveway access to Camps Canyon Road was in the fall of 2005. Bob Wagner 
had done his own survey of the 3+/- acre parcel and he wanted to confirm his findings 
with me. I told him his survey was wrong as the east property line of the 31/- acre 
parcel was 40-k feet to the west of where h4r. Wagner had staked it out, that the old 
historic driveway did not cross the grassy draw and did not approach Camps Canyon 
Road in a easterly direction, but rather the old driveway ran along the east property 
line and entered Camps Canyon Road in a northerly direction, directly across from 
Plaintiffs' corrals. Because of the two sharp curves east of the 3+/- acre parcel a 
switchback was created by entering the driveway from the east off of Camps Canyon 
Road. I also told ,Mr. Wagner that the NLCHD had altered Camps Canyon Road in 
1996 and where the old historic driveway approached Camps Canyon Road nomi 
stood an eight foot e~nbankrnent as the NLCHD had straightened the two sharp curves 
and moved the road bed to the northeast. The terrain slopes to the north-northeast 
along the 3+/- acre parcel and movement of the road bed to the northeast necessitated 
the lowering of the road bed and left the abrupt embankment. I told Mr. Wagner he 
needed to get a professionaIlj done survey and talk with the NI,CWD about the 
changes they had made in 1996. Subsequent to the initial call Bob Wagner called 
se\-era1 times in regards to his driveway and construction plans. I told Bob Wagner 
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that the NLCWD had created the problem and that I would stand with him on the issue 
but that his proposed plans were trespassing, and one way or another he needed to 
correct the problem. 
10. We first became aware of the construction of the Wagners first driveway access to 
Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3i-/- acre Parcel on or about 4/8/06. The 
access to and into Camps Canyon Road crossed the east property line of the 3 4 -  acre 
parcel in its entirety. the west edge of the driveway being 20 feet east of the east 
property line. 
1 1. On 4/10/06,1, Don Halvorson, called SLCHD foreman, Dan Payne, and Clearwater 
Power new construction foreman, known only to me as Clint, to inform them that the 
Wagners driveway access was on our property crossing the east property line of the 
3+/- acre parcel. On information and belief, Clearwater power did not attempt to 
install the underground electric line as planned without confirmation by the M' / a  g ners 
that t-he installation would be on the Wagners land and/or within the legal limits of the 
higtnway right of way. 
12. On the morning of 4/12/06.1, Don Halvorson, met with the Latah County Surveyor, 
Ron h/lunson, in regards to the first Wagner driveway access permit and the position 
of the property lines of the 3 4 -  acre parcel and Camps Canyon Road. Ron h4unson 
told me that the best first step was to get a survey; Mr. A4unson also said he had 
talked with Bob Wagner about the problem and had suggested to Bob UTagner that 
Bob X'agner's proposed survey plan mag not be accurate. That same morning, I 
contacted Rimrock Consultants and talked with John Dunne. Mr. Dunne said he 
would begin the paper work and I would get back with him. -4fier the NLCHD 
meeting 1 told h'lr. Dunne to go ahead with the suwey. 
13. On 4/12/06,1, Don Walvorson. attended the regular meeting of the NLCHD 
Commissioners at 1132 'cT7hite Ave M o s c o ~ ~  Idaho. The only person I had talked to 
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in any regards of any NLCHD meeting, other than my wife, was Dan Payne. On 
4/'10i06 I had asked Dan Payne when and where the Commissioners had their 
meetings. I made no requests of Payne or any other member of the NLCHD to be put 
on the agenda. My intention was, time permitting on 4/12/06, I would attend the 
NLCI-ID meeting in order to see how the meetings were run and to ascertain the 
procedure to speak with the Commissioners about the improper interference with our 
property rights. To the best of my recollection, those in attendance were Orland 
Arneberg, Richard Hansen, Ron Landeck, Dan Payne, Dan Carscallen, Paul Stubbs, 
Don Brown, Gary Osborn, John Bolman, Bob and Kate M?agner, Francis and Patsy 
Wagner, and a woman unknown to me. Orland Arneberg called first on me to speak 
although I was not on the agenda. I brought the fact, that I was not on the agenda, to 
Orland Arneberg's attention. Mr. Arneberg did not respond but Dan Payne 
\~olunteered that lie had not notified anyone of the meeting and that Bob Wagner had 
been in his office every day in regards to his driveway access. I then proceeded to 
speak and complained to Commissioners that the permit for the driveway 
access was issued for access \vhoIly across our property and I showed them how the 
driveway crossed the east property Line by showing them aerial photos and where the 
east property line was and where the old driveway was. I also complained about the 
dirt and gravel being pushed into the buffer between our fence and the road bed since 
late fall 2005 extension of width to Camps Canyon Road and continuing with the 
maintenance of the road. I told them we had not given them pem~ission to do so and 
that the NLCHD did not have the authority to do so. I also complained of the injury 
to our fence. on our information and belief, due to the pushing of a wind fallen tree 
through the fence by the grader operator in the fall of 2004. Defendants stated all 
matters were within their 50 foot/25 feet from centerfine prescriptive right of way 
(Defendants called it their "prescriptive right"). I reminded Co~nmissioners that the 
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NLCHD had altered Camps Canyon Road in the vicinity of the 3+/- acre parcel in 
1996 and that, there no longer existed a prescriptive right of way in the vicinity of the 
311- acre parcel and even if such prescriptive right of way did exist, there was no 
extension of the right of way (prescriptive or otherwise) to 25 feet from centerline 
encumbering our property greater than the width of Camps Canyon Road and its 
supporting structures. Mr. Landeck quoted from the Idaho Code reading I.C. $40- 
23 17 (an implied threat that a fine of $150!day could be enforced, however no notice 
was given to us to remove our fence). I told the Defendants that they had 110 right to 
destroy our fence regardless of the type or width of the right of way they 1naq7 have. I 
asked the NLCWD to conduct a survey to substantiate their claims that the driveway 
access was within their right of way, if such right of way existed. I told 
Commissioners that the driveway access crossed the east property line of the ;+/-acre 
parcel. Mr. Paytle and Mr. *4rneberg stated that the driveway access perinit was still 
valid as it was within the prescriptive right of way. I told them that there was no 
prescriptive right of way alld even if there was, the NLCHD only had an easement. 
Mr. Payne said the driveway access was within the 699 feet road frontage on the 
Wagner deed. I pointed ortt to Dan Payne that in 1996 he had altered (straightened) 
the road. Mr. Arneberg responded that the road had not been moved ill his tenure or 
under his tvatch. I suggested that the U'agners and the NLCHD share the expelise of 
the survey as the NLCHD was largely responsible for the driveway problem. The 
meeting was totally without order, Defendants being biased, argumentative and 
confiontational. It ended abruptly when the Commissioners refused to call for a 
survey, I stated that the County surveyor stated that a survey was the correct place to 
start. and then I stated that I would call for a survey. After the meeting, Patsy Wagner 
started yelling that we were ruining her children's lives and Gary Osborn came up to 
me and said that I was probably right. Gary Osborn stated that they [implying those 
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in attendance of the meeting, including Orland Arneberg, and Dan Payne] should not 
have done this [tried to ram the driveway through some sort of legal process], but that 
he was interested in resolving the matter. I told him the place to start was a survey 
and that the Wagners and the NLCHD needed to do so and cooperate. The Wagners 
and their friends and contractors continued to use the driveway access, and on 
Plaintiffs' information and belief were not restricted from any and all use at any time 
by Defendants and that the first permit was not ever revoked and that the Defendants 
still claim "a prescriptive right'" to issue a driveway access permit in the same area to 
resident of the now Wagner place. Defendants have never said otherwise than the 
First Wagner Permit was within their policy and valid. 
14. In early June of 2006. Rimrock Consultants set out tlle stakes for the 3-i- acre parcel 
propert!, lines revealing the trespass of the first Wagner drivewaq access across the 
sast property line of the 34-acre parcel. The Wagner drjvewaj- access \%as wholly on 
Plaintiffs' land. 
15. M:e tried to work out an agreement with the Wagners by offering our cooperation in 
bringing a deeded easement to the NLCHD. On our information and belief, Bob 
U'ag~~er  told us that the NLCHD turned down the idea of a deeded easement and the 
M'agners obtained a second permit and built a new driveway access on or about 
6/10/06. On information and belief, Bob Wagner stated the NLCHD turned down the 
deeded easement on the grounds that the width of the easement would need to be 5 I 
feet as measured from the northeast side of the road to wfiolly include the first 
IYagner driveway access. 
16. In the fall of 2006 the NLCHD blasted out some of the old rock outcropping, placed a 
cul? ert for the second Wagner Drivewat opposite the culvert for our, Halvorsons'. 
access to our corral and thus limiting the road surface to about 19 feet between the 
two driveway accesses and extended the road surface to the northeast, immediately to 
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the west of the culvert installation by pushing an old compaction roller and gravel and 
dirt into our fence and realigning the drainage ditch. Prior to this the width of the 
road in this area was about 15 feet incIuding ditches and supporting structures. This 
alteration added 4 to 5 feet of width, including ditches and supporting structures to 
the road on the northeast side of the road from the west end of Plaintiffs' corral. 
17. In the winter of 2006-2007 we, the Plaintiffs, contacted Mr. Landeck about the 
problems we were having with the KLCHD activities-the improper interference 
with our property rights. He said he was not authorized to talk with us although he 
did not say he was not the NLCHD attorney. He only said we had to talk with the 
NLCWD clerk if u7e had a problem. 
18. In the winter of 2006-2007 we. the Plaintiffs, contacted the NLCHD clerk about the 
problems we were having with the activities of the NLCHD. He said he was not able 
to answer legal questions and was unable to give us advice on how to proceed. We 
proposed writing a letter containing our complair~ts and outlining our requests and 
meeting with the Commissioners. It took several months to get what we expected to 
be a hearing on the matter on 3/21!07. 
19. On 3/2 1/07. Plaintiffs. Don Halvorson and Charlotte Halvorson. attended the regular 
meeting of the NLCHD Commissioners at 1132 White Ave Moscow Idaho. Plaintiffs 
had asked for a meeting vvith Commissioners and had received time on the agenda for 
3/21/07. Plaintiffs supplied Defendants with letter (dated 3/8/07) in ad~ance of the 
3 21/07 meeting indicating Plaintiffs' concerns and seeking resolution to the right of 
\.yay issues with Camps Canyon Road in the l7icinity of the 3&/- acre parcel by means 
of a validation procedure initiated on Commissioners ORTI resolution and/or some 
other means expecting a formal type of hearing. At this meeting Plaintiffs showed 
Defendants/Commissioners that after the 1996 alteration Camps Canyon Road no 
longer agreed with the public record. and asked Defenda~lts/Commissioners to 
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validate Camps Canyon Road under their ONTI resolution. Plaintiffs had supplied 
Defendants with a copy of the Rimrock survej . Defendants brought forth aerial 
photos from 1965 and 1949 without prior notice to Plaintiffs. M'e received no hearing 
or meaningful response to our complaints. The Commissioners were biased and bent 
only on finding reason not to have to listen to us. 
20. Plaintiffs were not given any advance notice of the presentation of the aerial photos at 
the 3/21/07 meeting--without the ability to make any advance analysis of the aerial 
photos. Plaintiffs requested copies of the photos and it took about 6 weeks for 
Plaintiffs to receive copies of the photos. These copies were of such poor quality that 
they were useless for any analysis. Plaintiffs requested better quality copies afier 
about three weeks Plaintiffs received somewhat better quality photos, assumed 
Defendants'/Corni~issioners' averred authenticity and accuracy, and found these 
aerial photos to show the movement of Canlps Canyon Road in the vicinitj of the 
3-d- acre parcel as Plaintiffs had alleged. Plaintiffs showed Defendants counsel the 
results of Plaintiffs analysis at the 7/07 informal meeting on site at Camps Canyon 
Road. 
3 1. On 8/8/07 Plaintiffs attended the regular meeting of the Comrnissioiiers and ask that 
they could talk directly to the NLCHD attorney to try to work out a resolution to the 
problems. The Commissioners felt that our representing ourselves was inappropriate 
as without having an attorney to pay, we didn't have to spend enough money and 
therefore the commissioners denied our requests. 
32. On 8!28/07 ('letter dated 8/23/07) we requested the NLCHD to declare the 
applicabilitj of I.C. 5 40-303a to the situation and the issues that were involved in the 
probleins we were having with the activities of the NLCHD. T&'e received no 
response. 
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23. We asked for and received time on the agenda to show Colnmissioners the results of 
our analysis of the aerial photos for 9/15/07. On 9'1 5/07 Defendants' counsel denied 
us the opportunity to show our analysis and he told us to get a lawyer. 
24. On information and belief, Plaintiffs believe Defendants to be final polic~. makers of 
the NLCRD. 
35. Plaintiffs sought and obtained 2nd Wagner driveway access permit. as public 
information from the KLCI-ID clerk. however were unable to obtain the first Wagner 
driveway access permit as on Plaintiffs' ii~formation and belief. the KLCHD clerk 
said the first Wagner dri~eu-ay access permit had been destroyed. 
26. Defendants continue their widening and maintenance activities in the vicinity of the 
3"/- acre parcel, covering Plaintiffs land with rock, dirt. gravel and debris, and 
encroaching on and damaging Plaintiffs' fence. 
27. None of the several miles of fence Plaintiffs have in the South Latah County Highway 
District. and some of which has been in closer proximity to the edge of the road than 
the 700 feet of fence abutting to Camps Canyon Road for many. many years and 
man!-, many snow falls and gradings with occasional injuo to snow and gravel and 
life goes on peacefully and amicably. 
28. Plaintiffs hat-e spent time. money and effort to resol~re these issues and have 
The ahove statements are true 
Datcd this day of 
SUBSCRIBED AND Si4'ORE TO 
PLAmTIFFS' AFFIDAVIT JN SLiPPORT OF PLANTIFFS' ANSWERING BRIEF TO 
DEFENDAX?'S'h4OTION FOR SUMMARI- JUDGMENTS AXD REPLY TO 
DEFEXDA?4'TS'ANSIV-ERII\iG BRIEF ATD OBJECTIONS TO PL.4ISiTIFFS' L4OTfONS 
FOR PARTIAL SL7MhlARY JUDGh4ENTS AND OTHER h4OTIO'NS SUBMITTED 
JANUARY 26. 2009 12 1358 
SUBSCRIBED AND S WORX TO before me this 
My commission expires: 
CERTIFICATE OF S E R h D  
I hereby certify that on this f l  day of & ~ t l ~ ~ ~  2009, I caused a true and correct copy 
i/ 
of this docurnent to be served on the following individual: in the manner indicated belou-: 
RONALD 3. LAXDECK 
L-4NDECK. RXSTBERG, JUDGE &: 
GRAWAh4, P.A. 
4 1 3 S. Jefferson 
P.O. Box 9244 
hfoscow. ID 87843 
CARL B ~ E R R I C K  
DISTRICT JUDGE 
P.O. Box 896 
Le~?~iston. ID 83501-0896 
[ ] U.S. Mail ___1 i [ ] Federal Express Standard Overilight hlail I 
[ ] FAX (208) 883-4593 I 
[x] Hand Delivery 1 
I 
I - 1 [XI U.S. Mail 
[ ] Federal Express Standard Overnight Mail 1 
f 1 F L 4 x  ! 
PLAKTIFFS' AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' ANSWERTXG BRIEF r 0  
DEFENDrZNTS'AMOTION FOR SUhlMARY JUDGMENTS -4XD REPLY TO 
DEFEXDAXTS'.$NSWERIXG BRIEF AXD OBJECTIONS TO PLAIXTIFFS' MOTIONS 
FOR PARTIAL StTMh44RY JUDGMENTS A 3 D  OTHER MOTIOYS SCBh4ITTED 
JANUARY 26.2009 13 6359 
